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Despite a growing appreciation in recent decades for the significance of the social in many areas of 
philosophy, most philosophers today have not adequately examined their assumptions about how human 
beings are fundamentally social, in particular, how they are socially constituted. This dissertation argues 
that the human individual is socially constituted because her very capacity to be a self and agent must 
draw on a shared public understanding of the interwoven practices, norms, and roles that enables her to 
exercise this capacity in general.  
In Part I of the dissertation, I explicate and adopt Philip Pettit’s suggestion about how to define the 
thesis of the social constitution of the individual and the general form that the argument for this thesis 
should take, even though I find Pettit’s own argument for this thesis to be wanting. I then consider how 
Martin Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time – when properly understood 
– can significantly improve Pettit’s argument. I elaborate and defend the view that the human individual 
is socially constituted because she always initially and mostly shares a public understanding of the world, 
including of herself and her relations with others, that is (in the first instance) normalized.      
In Part II of the dissertation, I make explicit and criticize the dominant understanding of human 
sociality in many strands of contemporary philosophy. This understanding assumes (roughly speaking) 
that the fundamental or primary way in which human beings are social consists in modes of interpersonal 
interactions (IPIA). I critically engage three varieties of IPIA in contemporary philosophy: (1) prominent 
theories of collective intentionality; (2) Donald Davidson’s conception of social interaction in successful 
linguistic communication and of triangulation as a necessary condition of the objectivity of thought; and 
(3) accounts of normativity that stem from standard communalist readings of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. I argue that these versions of IPIA are problematic not only in their own 
terms, but also inadequate precisely because they fail to take into account the social constitution of the 
individual.  
 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL 
Jo-Jo Koo, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
 
 v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ...........................................................................................................VII 
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1 
PART I. DEFINING AND DEFENDING THE THESIS OF THE SOCIAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL 
1.0 PETTIT’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY ................................................................................12 
1.1 A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY .....................................13 
1.2 PETTIT’S NON-REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM ...............................................20 
1.3 PETTIT’S ARGUMENT FOR SOCIAL HOLISM ...............................................31 
1.4 OVERVIEW AND PREVIEW .................................................................................48 
2.0 THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL ........................50 
2.1 HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL .............................................................................................51 
2.2 THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A SITE ...............69 
2.3 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES ................................................................................81 
PART II. THE CRITIQUE OF INTERPERSONAL INTERACTIONISM (IPIA)  
3.0 THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONALITY ........................................................................................................95 
3.1 THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY ..........................................97 
3.2 PROBLEMS WITH THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE 
INTENTIONALITY ................................................................................................112 
3.3 COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL ..........................................124 
 
 
 vi 
 
4.0 THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN DAVIDSON’S APPEAL TO SOCIAL   
INTERACTION .............................................................................................................136 
4.1 THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION ..........138 
4.2 THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THOUGHT ....................................................149 
4.3 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................157 
5.0 THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN COMMUNALIST ACCOUNTS OF THE 
NORMATIVITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING ..............................................................159 
5.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS .................................................................................159 
5.2 THE STANDARD OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMUNALISM ABOUT THE NORMATIVITY OF RULE-
FOLLOWING ..........................................................................................................164 
5.3 LUNTLEY’S CRITIQUE OF COMMUNALISM ABOUT THE 
NORMATIVITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING ........................................................173 
5.4 THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF NORMATIVITY .....................................191 
5.5 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................200 
CONCLUSION. THE SOCIAL IN THE INDIVIDUAL .......................................................202 
APPENDIX A. THE DISTINCTNESS OF PETTIT’S INDIVIDUALISM IN 
RELATION TO FIVE QUESTIONS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY .........................206 
APPENDIX B. EXPLICATION OF RELEVANT HEIDEGGERIAN 
TERMINOLOGY IN BEING AND TIME ..................................................................211 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................213 
 
 
 
 vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
I have many people to thank for the long, arduous process that this dissertation has undergone in 
order to achieve completion. First of all, my deepest gratitude goes to John McDowell for 
assuming the directorship of my dissertation at a time when it was going through a distressing 
rough patch. Beyond his continual feedback on my dissertation, John stands out in my mind for 
his understanding, kindness, generosity, and humanity. Although John often only says what he 
thinks he needs to say, no more no less, I will be forever grateful for his help, in all sorts of 
ways, in enabling me to complete my dissertation. While his name is not often mentioned in the 
dissertation, it should not be hard for the discerning reader to recognize how his way of thinking 
subtly permeates its spirit.  
 Another key member of my committee to whom I owe an enormous amount of gratitude 
is Theodore (Ted) Schatzki. He has been in practice, at the very least, a co-director of this 
dissertation, if not its actual director, even though he is officially designated “merely” as the 
outside reader of the dissertation. Despite the fact that my contacts with him have been mostly 
virtual, I cannot thank him enough for his patience, timely and detailed feedback, 
encouragement, and practical advice that he has given me as I worked on this dissertation. Ted 
has had a central impact on crucial parts of this dissertation, though he cannot be held 
responsible, of course, for how it has exactly turned out as a final product.     
Two other individuals who worked with me on this dissertation project for extended 
periods of time are J. E. (Ted) McGuire and Robert Brandom. Although Ted’s official retirement 
from his professorial duties and, unfortunately, the current condition of his health prevented him 
from remaining as an official member of my committee and participating in my oral defense, Ted 
frequently discussed my work on the dissertation with me. I am tremendously grateful to him for 
his warmth, kindness, and general joie de vivre and bonhomie, especially when I was going 
through tough times in my work on this dissertation. I also wish to thank Bob Brandom for his 
much earlier work with me on the dissertation in its initial stages, as well as for his astute 
comments at the very end of this process regarding how I can better formulate the generic 
position that I criticize in the dissertation. I am thankful that Bob did not give up on my 
 viii 
 
dissertation project despite the rough patch that it encountered. I also want in passing to mention 
Fritz Ringer in fond remembrance (may he rest in peace), with whom I took several stimulating 
(and fun) graduate seminars on European social thought and eventually formed a budding 
friendship. I will miss the sharpness of his wit and his geniality. I am also very grateful to Kathy 
Rivet for helping me with a significant number of administrative matters that went quite beyond 
her regular duties.  
 Although Georg W. Bertram was never an official member of my committee, I cannot 
say enough about all the help and encouragement that he has given me since we met. His 
philosophical acumen, not to mention his incredible productivity, has inspired me in many ways. 
Reading his ambitious and instructive Habilitation, Die Sprache und das Ganze, as well as his 
numerous papers on other philosophical topics, subtly reshaped my original conception of the 
dissertation project. Just as importantly, Georg has also offered me very rewarding friendship, 
which we had the opportunity to deepen during his all too brief two-month stay in Pittsburgh as a 
visiting scholar in 2004.  
I met Georg for the first time at the July 2002 meeting of the Philosophy Colloquia Evian 
in Evian-les-bains, France. I was fortunate enough to attend this Colloquia again in 2003 and 
2004. The Philosophy Colloquia Evian is to my mind a truly unique institution. These week-long 
sessions each July provide an ideal forum for extended philosophical dialogue and exploration, 
both in discussions during the daytime and in informal but often intense ones in the evenings 
over many glasses of red wine along the shores of beautiful Lake Geneva. My participation in 
this Colloquia has given me a model of what genuine philosophical fellowship feels like and 
should aspire to. In connection with this Colloquia, I wish to thank Stefan Blank and Robin 
Celikates for their friendship and help, both in Evian and in Berlin. Last but not least, I want to 
thank David Lauer, whom I also met at this Colloquia for the first time in July 2002. He has been 
an excellent philosophical conversation partner over the years in light of the fact that our 
philosophical interests have a significant degree of overlap.    
 From the time of my graduate studies in Pittsburgh, I want to single out two individuals 
in particular, namely, Julie Zahle and Endre Begby, for their warm and meaningful friendships. 
Both have been continual conversation partners in philosophical and many other matters over the 
years. Although Julie and I have differences of emphasis and perhaps specific disagreements 
about the significance of certain philosophical questions and thinkers, she remains a good friend 
 ix 
 
with whom I will always share fond memories about our time together in Pittsburgh. Not only 
are Endre’s thoughts about philosophy and anything else, for that matter, always incisive and 
thought-provoking, he has been exemplary as a friend by encouraging me through times both 
good and bad. I also hold him largely responsible for introducing me to the soccer team that we 
both passionately support, namely, Tottenham Hotspur. Other friends from my time in Pittsburgh 
whom I wish to thank are Martin Kley, Holly Andersen, Jakob Lindgaard, Hao Tang, Dan Qu, 
Rong-Bang Peng, Li-Shen Liao (may she rest in peace), Susan Whitney, Guido Giuntini, Margot 
Callahan, Van Veselka, and Lucy Turner.  
 It goes without saying that I am very thankful to all members of my family for their 
practical and emotional support over the years. In this context my mother, Yen-Hwa Huang, 
deserves special mention. She has provided me much needed help by looking after my young 
children, Zoe and Gavin, at key periods of time during the later years of my work on this 
dissertation. Although I hold Zoe and Gavin responsible for significantly prolonging the amount 
of time that it took me to finish this dissertation, I will never forget the moments of joy (and, yes, 
also of frustration and fury on occasions) that they have brought into my life.  
 I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Wendy Burgbacher, who has been there from the 
very beginning and made it through to the very end. Words can never fully express my heartfelt 
appreciation for her incredible patience, understanding, and support, as well as for coping with 
all the ups and downs that we went through together as I worked on my dissertation. Ihr gebe ich 
meine unendliche Dankbarkeit und Liebe.   
 
********* 
 
I hereby express my acknowledgment of and gratitude to the following institutions for their generous 
financial support during certain periods of time in my graduate studies and doctoral research: the 
Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship in Humanistic Studies (1995-96), as administered through the 
Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation; the Provost’s Development Fund of the 
University of Pittsburgh (2002-03, 2004-05); the International Studies Fund of the University Center 
for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and the Small Grant Program of the Center 
for West European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, both of which helped to support research 
done at the Institute for Philosophy, University of Hildesheim, Germany (summer 2004).   
 x 
 
 
 
 
Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit.  
(Higher than actuality stands possibility.)  
                       – Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §7 
 
 
Dasein ist je das, was es sein kann und wie es seine Möglichkeit ist.  
(Dasein [the human being] is in each case what it can be and how it is its 
possibility.) 
 
                  – Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §31 
 
 
 
Die für uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch ihre Einfachheit und 
Alltäglichkeit verborgen. (Man kann es nicht bemerken, – weil man es immer vor 
Augen hat.) Die eigentlichen Grundlagen seiner Forschung fallen dem Menschen 
gar nicht auf. Es sei denn, daß ihm dies einmal aufgefallen ist. – Und das heißt: 
das, was, einmal gesehen, das Auffallendste und Stärkste ist, fällt uns nicht auf.  
 
(The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One cannot notice this – because it is always before 
one’s eyes.) The actual foundations of a human being’s inquiry do not strike him 
or her at all. Unless that fact has at some point in time struck him or her. – And 
this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most 
powerful.)  
 
        – Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen, §129 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are fundamentally social. So stated, this thought expresses a platitude with which 
no one would disagree. But matters quickly become less trite when we try to understand how 
precisely human beings are fundamentally social. For once we undertake an inquiry of this sort, 
the precise content of this thought is no longer so obvious or innocuous. Not surprisingly, much 
of the force of this claim turns on how one conceives the nature of the social and, in particular 
for the purposes of this dissertation, how one understands the thesis of the social constitution of 
the human individual. This dissertation aims to show that Martin Heidegger’s conception of 
human social existence in Being and Time – when properly understood – provides the most 
penetrating and insightful account of this constitution.1 Although this view itself is not new, the 
novel way in which this dissertation appropriates and puts Heidegger’s thinking about the social 
to use for its purposes is philosophically interesting and fruitful, as I hope to show in the course 
of the dissertation. In what follows, I will make a few preparatory and broad remarks about the 
general shape of this project. This Introduction will end with a description of the specific 
contents of each chapter. 
As a preliminary step towards understanding what the thesis of the social constitution of 
the human individual is, in the way in which this dissertation seeks to investigate it, it helps in 
the first instance to clarify what this thesis is not about.2 Doing so will dispel the air of banality 
that can initially surround its assertion. First of all, the claim that human beings are 
fundamentally social is not a claim about how they depend causally and materially on one 
                                                 
1 One of the enduring insights of Hubert Dreyfus’s influential interpretation (especially of Division One) of Being 
and Time consists in showing this; see Being-in-the-World, esp. Ch. 8 and 13. He goes so far (in an essay) as to 
claim that “Heidegger’s existential ontology is the best description of human social being that philosophers have yet 
offered, but it is totally abstract” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, “Can there be a Science of Existential Structure and Social 
Meaning?”, p. 38). Please note that the claim is that Heidegger offers the best account of the social constitution of 
the human individual, no less no more. This is one aspect of how human beings are social, though its most 
fundamental one. Moreover, although many prominent twentieth-century philosophers in the German- and French-
speaking world have strongly criticized Heidegger’s conception of human social existence (for reasons that will be 
discussed in Ch. 2), the fact that they have done so indicates at least their recognition of its significance and 
challenge for their own accounts of this existence.   
2 I follow here the lead of Pettit; see The Common Mind, pp. 169f. and “Defining and Defending Social Holism”,  
pp. 119-21. 
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another in the course of living out their lives. That is, the truth of this claim does not turn on the 
fact that we depend instrumentally, economically, politically, psychologically, emotionally, etc., 
on each other’s activities or on the various products of those activities for our survival and well-
being. It is undeniable that we do depend on one another in all these ways for our minimal 
flourishing. But if this is all that the claim that human beings are fundamentally social amounts 
to, this claim would be a platitude. In a similar vein, neither is it a simple developmental claim 
about the evidently social context in which infants and young children are raised by parents or 
others in the course of growing up.3 If this were the content of the thesis in question, it too would 
be a truism. Nor can this thesis be a statistical claim about the great degree to which individual 
human beings happen more often than not to exist and interact with one another rather than 
living solitary lives. Again, if this is what the thesis in question amounts to, it would be trivial. 
More generally, and perhaps provocatively, I submit that the claim that human beings are 
fundamentally social, i.e., that they are necessarily socially constituted, cannot be a factual or 
empirical claim if it is worthy of philosophical inquiry. To say so does not deny, of course, that 
the factual or empirical aspects of human social existence rightly figure in many ways in other 
areas of philosophy, much less deny that these aspects figure quite centrally in the human and 
social sciences as a whole. The present point is simply that these aspects cannot pertain to the 
social constitution of the human individual, in the sense that this dissertation aims to highlight 
and elucidate.  
With this preliminary definition ex negativo of the thesis of the social constitution of the 
individual in place, we can take a first step towards understanding how the appropriation of 
Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time will be put to use in this 
dissertation. Our topic concerns how we should understand the social constitution of the human 
individual. To a first approximation, the understanding of this constitution that will be articulated 
and defended in Part I of this dissertation is this: The human individual is socially constituted 
because her exercise of some basic capacity that is central to her agency depends on her 
                                                 
3 For a compelling account of our social dependence on others in this sense, see Baier, “Doing Things with Others”. 
That we are socially dependent on one another in this straightforward developmental sense does not imply, however, 
the social constitution of the human individual, in the way in which this constitution is conceived in this dissertation 
(see below).   
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understanding of how she exists with other people in the world.4 The key move will be to show 
how a human individual cannot be a distinctively human agent apart from sharing the world with 
others (in a sense that will be explicated and defended in Ch. 2).   
In the analytic tradition, those who work on the metaphysics and explanation of social 
phenomena seem uncomfortable with talk about the social constitution of the individual.5 They 
prefer instead to talk about the sociality of intentional attitudes and actions. Sociality in this 
sense refers to the various ways in which an individual human being relates to or interacts with 
other human beings for achieving certain ends and purposes (e.g., for thinking and acting as 
members of groups or collectives); or else sociality serves as a necessary condition for how 
certain basic phenomena (e.g., successful linguistic communication) or basic aspects of our 
intentionality (e.g., its objective or normative character) can come to be. In this vein, some 
philosophers who work on these topics describe what they do as investigations in “the 
philosophy of sociality, taking it to include at least the study of collective intentionality, social 
ontology, and metaphysics, as well as social epistemology”.6 As such, they take it that the scope 
of the philosophy of sociality does not and need not include reflection on the social constitution 
of the individual, much less conceive and integrate it as a significant aspect of human nature. 
Indeed, they may think it is a serious mistake to address this topic.7 For these reasons, it can be 
said that philosophers of sociality (so understood) attempt to investigate or invoke the 
significance of the social independently of any consideration of the social constitution of the 
individual.  
I believe that a certain set of assumptions underlies this prevalent way of understanding 
or invoking human sociality, ones that remain nearly invisible and hence rarely questioned. 
Because I will extensively criticize this set of assumptions in its various guises in the 
                                                 
4 Please note the qualification: to a first approximation. This very preliminary explication of the thesis of the social 
constitution of the individual will be clarified in Ch. 1 and significantly transformed in Ch. 2.    
5 I speculate that there may be two reasons for this. First, they may think that this idea is “overly metaphysical” or 
even has “undemocratic” implications (cf. Popper’s polemic against the intellectual enemies of “the open society”). 
Second, this idea may be associated in their minds with the idea of social construction in a pejorative (postmodern?) 
sense; see Haslanger, “Social Construction: The ‘Debunking’ Project” and Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social 
Practices, Ch. 1.  
6 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. viii. See also the work of Margaret Gilbert, “Concerning Sociality: The 
Plural Subject as Paradigm”; Living Together, Part II (“Sociality: Introducing Plural Subjects”); and Sociality and 
Responsibility, Ch. 1.   
7 Hans Bernhard Schmid suggests that this view traces back to an unnuanced rejection of the idea of the group mind; 
see his Plural Action, Ch. 2. I will discuss this issue further in Ch. 3 of this dissertation.  
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dissertation, it is useful to give it a label. Call it interpersonal interactionism (IPIA). We can 
specify it generically as follows.8  
The Assumptions of Interpersonal Interactionism (IPIA):  
(I) There exists a prevalent mode of human sociality that is realized when (i) two or more 
individuals are present in some context (ii) who interact with one another in accordance 
with some implicit set of constraints that (should) govern in that context.  
(II) This mode of human sociality suffices for understanding both the fundamental way in 
which human beings are social and all forms of sociality. Accordingly, any account or 
invocation of human sociality should begin with this mode of sociality as its key datum 
and point of departure. 
 
Although most philosophers who can be seen as embracing IPIA readily acknowledge their 
commitment to (I), there is a striking lack of self-consciousness on their part about their adoption 
of (II), to such an extent that (II) is simply taken for granted with little or no argument. If it is 
right to construe IPIA as an argument (on a charitable construal of this argument), the inference 
from (I) to (II) appears to have the form of a well supported inductive argument. But given how 
most philosophers simply take (II) as self-evident, it seems doubtful that the appeal of IPIA rests 
on its persuasiveness as an argument. Rather, it seems more plausible to understand its appeal as 
resting on a certain set of intuitions. What this shows is that although some specific versions of 
IPIA seem to assume that (I) serves as argumentative support for (II), a minimal version of IPIA 
does not require this sort of support in order to be intuitively appealing.   
What are the intuitions that make IPIA appealing? I suspect that one crucial intuition is 
that each of us readily experiences this mode of sociality simply in the course of living our lives. 
In fact, we experience it not only when we actually interact with one another, but already in the 
course of conceiving and planning our own possible actions and projects by taking into account 
the possible attitudes and actions of other people in connection with our own.9 It is undeniable 
that much of what we think and do in everyday life involves either the actual experience of this 
mode of sociality or attention to its possible realization and the attendant consequences thereof. 
Because we experience this mode of sociality so “vivaciously” (as Hume would put it), 
experiences of this sort impress themselves upon us in an especially vivid and concrete way. We 
are thus tempted by the “vivacity” of these impressions in our experience to think not only that 
                                                 
8 I am indebted to Bob Brandom and Ted Schatzki for sharpening the formulation of IPIA. 
9 Cf. Weber’s influential definition of social action: “Action is ‘social’ insofar as its subjective meaning takes 
account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course.” (Economy and Society, Vol. 1, p. 4, 
emphasis in the original German; cf. notes 1-4, pp. 22-4.)   
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interpersonal interactions constitute the fundamental basis of human sociality, but that all forms 
of human sociality must rest on this basis. A second intuition that strengthens the appeal of IPIA 
resonates especially with many philosophers. It turns on how assumption (II) of IPIA becomes a 
platitude once “wholism” and “collectivism” in social ontology are shown to be untenable.10 If 
the choice between versions of IPIA and those of “wholism” or “collectivism” is taken to be 
exhaustive, it becomes intelligible why many philosophers readily embrace IPIA once 
“wholism” and “collectivism” are eliminated as tenable positions in social ontology. Finally, a 
third and related intuition that increases the appeal of IPIA is a residual commitment to some 
form of individualism, even in cases of IPIA that reject or lessen the motivation for reductionism 
with regard to other philosophical issues.11 In sum, although these remarks about why IPIA is 
intuitively appealing are exploratory, the attractiveness of IPIA for many philosophers cannot be 
denied. In the face of this appeal, one of the major aims of this dissertation is to show that IPIA, 
in particular assumption (II), is untenable once it undergoes critical scrutiny.  
A query can arise at this point regarding the relevance of IPIA for the concerns of this 
dissertation.12 It points out that even if IPIA were true, it implies next to nothing about the social 
constitution of the individual. For the topic of human sociality, at first glance, is concerned with 
how human individuals relate to one another in some shape or form, whereas that of the social 
constitution of the human individual is about how the human individual herself is so constituted 
in some non-trivial sense. It seems mistaken, therefore, to regard IPIA as a competing conception 
of this constitution; indeed, it is unclear whether IPIA is even relevant in this context. My 
response to this query is that it is true, strictly speaking, that the plausibility or possible truth of 
IPIA would have no implications for the social constitution of the individual. As I noted above, 
philosophers who implicitly take IPIA for granted in their conceptions of human sociality would 
actually find nothing wrong with this consequence; in fact, they may even embrace it with relief. 
One of the main aims of the dissertation, however, is to show that this understanding of human 
sociality in accordance with IPIA, especially assumption (II), is seriously flawed precisely 
because it ignores or fails to take fully into account the social constitution of the human 
individual. Although IPIA is not a competing conception of this constitution, it does not follow 
                                                 
10 For an extended discussion, see Ch. 1.  
11 See my examination of Pettit’s social holism in 1.3 and other forms of IPIA in Part II of this dissertation.   
12 It has been raised in conversation by John McDowell.   
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that scrutiny of IPIA is completely irrelevant for or disconnected from reflection on this 
constitution. Thus, even though accounts of or appeals to human sociality along the lines of 
IPIA, strictly speaking, do not explicitly involve the social constitution of the individual, the 
same cannot be said for the converse. One of the important aims of the dissertation, then, is to 
challenge philosophers of sociality (broadly construed) to take into account the social 
constitution of the individual, prior to giving their analyses of human sociality or invoking it in 
their work for their purposes. If the main line of argument of this dissertation is convincing, its 
upshot is that it is not optional for philosophers of sociality to consider and integrate the social 
constitution of the individual into their frameworks, if they wish to avoid certain intellectual 
blind spots or pitfalls in their work.   
As it will be apparent in the course of this dissertation, then, one significant interest and 
fruitfulness of my appropriation of Heidegger’s thinking about the social will consist in its 
confrontation with various versions of IPIA. Doing so will also show how deeply IPIA is 
entrenched not only in disparate areas of philosophy, but also in ways that cut across the divide 
between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy.13 To anticipate, a crucial point for which I will 
argue in this confrontation is that the social constitution of the individual is a necessary condition 
of the intelligibility, and thereby the possibility, of modes of interpersonal interaction. The claim 
will be that human beings are not fundamentally social by co-existing and interacting with 
others, but already in their very way of existing as human individuals in the world.14 I want in 
effect to turn the idea of interpersonal interactionism on its head: Interpersonal interactions 
cannot adequately explain how we humans are fundamentally social, but depend for their very 
intelligibility on how the world in which a human individual lives and acts (in a sense that will 
be elaborated in detail in Ch. 2) already bears on and structures his or her understanding and 
activities as an individual agent. If this is true, the social constitution of the individual is an 
                                                 
13 The view that interpersonal interactions are the fundamental or primary way in which human beings are (or ought 
to be) social is also clearly at work, in some version of it, in the “continental” philosophies, e.g., of Fichte, Hegel, 
Sartre, Buber, Levinas, Habermas, and Honneth (to mention only a few prominent thinkers in this tradition). 
Although these “continental” strands of thought receive less attention in this dissertation than those in the “analytic” 
tradition (see 2.3, though, for some engagement with the former), I want to emphasize that interpersonal 
interactionism is without doubt prevalent in the “continental” tradition as well. Note that I am using the expressions 
‘analytic philosophy’ and ‘continental philosophy’ and their cognates loosely, not suggesting that they each pick out 
a single homogenous tradition by any means, much less subscribe to some common program or set of philosophical 
doctrines. 
14 Although it is likely at this early juncture that the meaning of this claim is opaque, my hope is that its full import 
will become clear and appreciated by the end of the dissertation.   
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inherent aspect or dimension of his or her very way of understanding (knowing his or her way 
around in) the world as such. 
Although Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time is clearly 
central to this dissertation, it is important to bear the following qualifications in mind regarding 
how I will interpret and appropriate this conception. As far as its scope is concerned, this 
dissertation cannot aim to survey and evaluate exhaustively various interpretations of 
Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time; it is not meant to be 
scholarly in this manner. Regarding its “method” of interpretation, although some exegesis of the 
relevant parts of Being and Time will be unavoidable, the modus operandi of this interpretation is 
not primarily explicative, but philosophical in the sense of working out the content of these 
insights in the form of an extended argument and then seeking to anticipate and rebut likely 
objections to it.15 More generally, this dissertation works deliberately at the intersection of 
analytic and continental philosophy and is intended to address readers who are not already 
familiar with the formidable philosophical vocabulary in which Heidegger’s thinking is 
expressed.16 The philosophical fruitfulness of working at this intersection will depend on what 
the dissertation manages to show, not on one’s prior assumptions or (dare I say) prejudices about 
the orientation or style of either philosophical tradition. In other words, this dissertation makes 
no apologies for being neither properly “continental” enough, even though Heidegger’s thinking 
in Being and Time figures centrally in the project, nor properly “analytic” enough, despite the 
fact that a good many of the issues it addresses originate in literatures that are “analytic” in 
orientation. Taylor Carman’s apt description of the hermeneutical attitude that shapes his 
insightful interpretation of the early Heidegger also holds for that of this dissertation: 
The result is a reading of Being and Time that is, I hope, neither antiquarian nor anachronistic. I have 
focused on some problems at the expense of others, many of them fed by discussions in contemporary 
Anglo-American philosophy, though I have tried to deal with them within what strikes me as the 
conceptual horizons proper to Heidegger’s thinking. The book is therefore neither a commentary on Being 
and Time nor simply a Heideggerian approach to some independently defined philosophical domain.17 
 
One final remark about the general scope of this dissertation must be made. Given that its 
topic is the social constitution of the human individual, it may strike some readers as odd, if not 
                                                 
15 I do not mean to suggest that explication is not philosophical, nor that doing philosophy does not involve 
explication; these are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, a legitimate distinction remains between them.  
16 Remarks addressed to those who are already familiar with his vocabulary and way of thinking will be mostly 
confined to the footnotes.   
17 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, p. 1. 
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downright neglectful, that I have chosen not to delve into the recently burgeoning literature on 
the theme of recognition (Anerkennung). Although this theme stems originally from Fichte’s and 
especially Hegel’s reflections on the significance of intersubjectivity for their respective 
philosophical projects,18 it has become mutatis mutandis fruitful again for theorizing about 
various issues in contemporary theoretical and practical philosophy.19 I am inclined to think that 
a comprehensive treatment of the topic of the social constitution of the individual would have to 
consider and integrate this theme at some point. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to take its significance into account for the simple reason that doing so would have 
distracted from the specific concerns of this dissertation or entailed writing quite a different and 
even longer one altogether. Whether this decision turns out to be a serious lacuna or mistake is a 
question that is best answered at the end of the dissertation.  
This dissertation divides into two main parts. Part I is concerned with how we should 
understand and defend the thesis of the social constitution of the human individual; it is 
composed of Ch. 1 and 2. Part II consists of the critique of various versions of interpersonal 
interactionism (IPIA); it is composed of Ch. 3, 4, and 5.    
The specific content of each chapter in the dissertation is as follows. In Ch. 1 I scrutinize 
Philip Pettit’s social ontology. Doing so is worthwhile for the following reasons. First, Pettit 
helpfully introduces a much needed meta-distinction in social ontology, for he distinguishes the 
distinction between individualism and collectivism on the one hand from the distinction between 
atomism and holism on the other. Equipped with this meta-distinction, we can eliminate much of 
the confusion that underlies the supposed opposition between “individualism and holism” in 
social ontology. Second, Pettit holds that there is a systematic connection between issues in 
social ontology and certain themes in the philosophy of mind and language. Since this 
connection will also figure in this dissertation, it is useful to examine Pettit’s conception of how 
these two sets of issues are related. Third, while I will argue that Pettit’s argument for social 
                                                 
18 For an illuminating discussion of this, see R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other.   
19 For some examples, see Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism” and “The Structure of Desire 
and Recognition”. He discerns a clear connection between his inferentialist approach in contemporary philosophy of 
language and mind and Hegel’s conception of determinate negation and self-consciousness (as the latter is 
interdependent with mutual recognition in Hegel’s sense). Brandom’s self-consciousness about this connection is 
expressed in Tales of the Mighty Dead, Introduction, pp. 12-5 and Ch. 3. See also Taylor’s “The Politics of 
Recognition” and the responses to it in Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism. See also Honneth, The Struggle for 
Recognition and Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?. Their work on the philosophical significance 
of recognition in its different aspects has in turn generated considerable secondary literature.      
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holism (according to his understanding of that position) is ultimately unconvincing, it is 
instructive to understand precisely why it is unpersuasive in anticipation of the position that I 
seek to develop and defend in the rest of the dissertation regarding how we should understand the 
social constitution of the human individual.  
In Ch. 2 I articulate, in the form of an extended explication and argument, the thesis of 
the social constitution of the human individual. As mentioned, this is done by way of an 
interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time. In so 
doing, I appropriate and defend his insight that human beings are fundamentally social by 
existing and acting predominantly (as he puts it) in the mode of the one (das Man) in the course 
of living their lives. In other words, the social constitution of the individual is shown to be an 
inherent and fundamental aspect of our typically normalized way of understanding and dealing 
with things (entities, phenomena) in the world, including ourselves and other people. As we will 
see, the explanation of what this involves is quite complicated; along the way, a common 
misunderstanding of Heidegger’s conception of human social existence will also have to be 
addressed and put into the right context. Accordingly, this chapter will end by anticipating and 
rebutting some likely objections against my interpretation and appropriation of Heidegger’s 
conception of human social existence.   
With my interpretive appropriation of this conception in place, I begin the critique of 
various versions of interpersonal interactionism (IPIA) in Part II by assessing in Ch. 3 a currently 
fashionable instance of it, namely, theories of collective intentionality. Toward this end I sketch 
and then criticize what are likely the three most prominent theories of collective intentionality on 
offer, namely, those of Margaret Gilbert, Raimo Tuomela, and John Searle. My criticisms of 
these theories will not be general, but tailored specifically to the concerns of this dissertation. 
In Ch. 4 I continue the critique of IPIA by evaluating the version of it that informs 
Donald Davidson’s appeal to social interaction for his philosophical purposes. Davidson tries to 
use the conceptual resources of social interaction (of a certain sort) to account for the occurrence 
of successful linguistic communication and the possibility of propositional thought. I argue that 
his appeal to social interaction is problematic upon examination, in ways that derive from his 
implicit commitment to IPIA.      
In Ch. 5 I tie up some loose ends that linger from the previous chapters, ones that center 
on the significance of normativity in the social constitution of the human individual. I address 
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this topic initially by elaborating the standard opposition between individualist and communalist 
conceptions of rule-following that stem from Wittgenstein’s treatment of this issue in his 
Philosophical Investigations. In this connection I take up and partially endorse Michael 
Luntley’s position concerning this issue. His interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thinking about rule-
following is provocative and worth examining. He argues forcefully that individualist and 
communalist treatments of rule-following both fail to get at Wittgenstein’s actual insights about 
the nature of normativity, in the first instance concerning the normativity of meaning. I show that 
while Luntley’s unorthodox and nuanced individualism regarding the nature of normativity is 
convincing when seen in light of the standard opposition mentioned above, it is nevertheless one-
sided unless it integrates some of Meredith Williams’s insights about the connection between 
normativity and the social that her interpretation of Wittgenstein (at its best) makes available. As 
it will turn out, these insights coalesce readily with the Heideggerian conception of the social 
constitution of the human individual that I work out in Ch. 2. By the same token, I also argue that 
the Heideggerian conception is misleading unless it is understood in connection with the aspects 
of normativity to which Luntley and Williams draw our attention.  
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PART I. DEFINING AND DEFENDING THE THESIS OF THE SOCIAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL
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1.0  PETTIT’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
Social philosophy in general examines the multidimensional and complicated ways in which 
human beings relate to the social environment in which they exist. Traditionally, social 
philosophy has been divided into two main branches: a metaphysical-explanatory branch and an 
evaluative branch. The former branch is primarily concerned with the philosophical investigation 
of the ontological status and basic characteristics of social phenomena, along with their attendant 
modes of explanation, while the latter branch extends into political philosophy by entering into 
the evaluation of the legitimacy of various social policies and political arrangements. Although 
these two branches are no doubt related, they can be examined, at least in the first instance, as 
fairly distinct areas of philosophical inquiry.1 This dissertation will seek to articulate and defend 
a conception of the social constitution of the human individual that is situated within the confines 
of the metaphysical and explanatory branch of social philosophy, which I shall understand as 
social ontology in a broad sense. 
In The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics, Philip Pettit 
articulates and defends (among much else) a novel social ontology.2 Because it has not been as 
familiar and widely received as I think it should be, I provide extensive explications of it in my 
treatment below. Although I will eventually argue that his arguments for the position that he 
conceives as social holism are not ultimately persuasive (see 1.3), I want to emphasize in the first 
two sections of this chapter (1.1 and 1.2) why his social ontology is worthy of scrutiny. My 
critique of Pettit’s social ontology in 1.3, then, is a mark of respect for it, and the spirit in which I 
will criticize it is constructive. The sections in this chapter concern the following issues. In 1.1, I 
explain a meta-distinction that Pettit presents, one that I think ought to be crucial for social 
ontology. In 1.2, I sketch and endorse, in some detail but not exhaustively, Pettit’s defense of 
                                                 
1 I do not intend with this statement to preclude the approach to social philosophy that a family of critical social 
theories have put forward, e.g., broadly “social constructionist” conceptions of race, gender, etc., as well as those 
associated with the so-called Frankfurt School. Theorists in these traditions have sought to challenge the strict 
demarcation of epistemological, metaphysical, or explanatory issues from evaluative ones as these concern human 
beings. 
2 The basic framework of Pettit’s social ontology had already been developed, albeit in somewhat different terms, in 
his earlier book with Graham Macdonald in Semantics and Social Science.    
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individualism against collectivism. My aim in this section is to address and resolve, hopefully 
once and for all, the debate between “individualism and holism” that has often bedeviled social 
philosophy and the philosophy of social science. Finally in 1.3, I lay out and present criticisms of 
Pettit’s conception and defense of social holism, seeking to appropriate the basic insights of that 
position while also expressing some dissatisfactions with the assumptions that underlie his 
specific arguments for it. I conclude by announcing what I take to be the positive contribution of 
Pettit’s conception of social holism for the purposes of this dissertation in 1.4.   
1.1 A CRUCIAL DISTINCTION IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
First and foremost, Pettit helpfully distinguishes issues that have been constantly and 
systematically run together in the long-standing debate between “individualism and holism” in 
social ontology.3 He urges that we must distinguish between the issue that separates 
individualism from collectivism and the issue that separates atomism from holism (111-6, 172f.). 
According to his terminological regimentation, the main issue that properly divides 
individualism and collectivism is whether there are social regularities or social forces that 
compromise our capacity to be autonomous intentional agents. This issue in social ontology is of 
a “vertical” character, in that collectivists argue that such social regularities or forces operate at a 
level that is “higher” than that of ordinary intentional psychology; moreover, these supposedly 
“higher-level” regularities or forces causally determine the “lower-level” behavior and attitudes 
of individual agents in ways that undermine their autonomy. Consider some examples of such 
effects of social regularities or forces: 
1. Increased employment in a society leads to lesser hostility toward members of ethnic 
minorities who live in it. 
2. Capitalism destroys the norms and structure of traditional communities. 
3. Gender and racial identity is to a large extent a result of the psychological internalization 
of a system of beliefs, practices, and institutions of a society. 
 
                                                 
3 All references in the text of this chapter are henceforth to Pettit, The Common Mind.  
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Such social-structural processes give at least the appearance that social regularities or social 
forces shape the behavior of individual agents in ways that do not take place prima facie at the 
level of intentional psychology or individual agency. Collectivism affirms the existence and 
causal efficacy of such social-structural regularities or forces and holds that they significantly 
restrict the autonomy of individual agents. In opposition, individualism denies that intentional 
psychology and individual agency can be compromised in the ways that collectivism maintains.4   
By contrast, the central issue according to Pettit that properly divides atomism and holism 
in social ontology concerns the “horizontal” relations among such agents themselves, not the 
“vertical” relation between social-structural regularities or forces and the intentional behavior of 
individual agents. The horizontal issue concerns what sort of significance we should attribute to 
the social relations that human beings experience in their constitution as thinking intentional 
agents.5 Put differently, the issue between atomism and holism turns on the extent to which 
social relations among individual human beings transform them in some fundamental way so 
that, absent the occurrence and enjoyment of such relations, certain distinctive human capacities 
could not be actualized. Social atomism in this sense denies that a human being’s relations with 
others are necessary except in instrumental terms and holds open the possibility that a human 
being can in principle exercise all the capacities that are characteristic of being a thinking 
intentional agent in total isolation from other human beings. Thus, it assumes that the idea of a 
“pre-social” individual agent is in principle intelligible. In opposition, social holism rejects this 
possibility and emphasizes the non-instrumental significance of other people as a necessary 
condition of being such an agent at all. It contends that one’s relations and interactions with other 
human beings are not secondary to, but rather partly constitutive of, one’s very capacity to be a 
thinking intentional creature at all. (Terminologically speaking, then, the terms of Latin origin 
pick out what Pettit identifies as the “vertical” issue in social ontology, and the terms of Greek 
origin the “horizontal” issue therein.)   
Once we are equipped with this meta-distinction between individualism/collectivism and 
atomism/holism, we put ourselves in the position of breaking the traditional association of 
individualism with atomism and collectivism with holism. What results now as a viable and 
                                                 
4 It is important to point out, even at this early juncture, that a commitment to individualism in Pettit’s sense does 
not entail a commitment to reductive methodological individualism (see 1.2).  
5 In Pettit’s framework, intentional agents who can think are fundamentally different from merely intentional 
systems; thus the expression ‘thinking intentional subject’ has a distinctive meaning in his framework (see 1.3).  
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attractive conceptual possibility is the position of holistic individualism, which is the one that 
Pettit defends and I broadly endorse. This is the view that there is no incompatibility between 
holding that the existence and causal relevance of social regularities or social forces do not 
compromise intentional psychology and individual agency, and also maintaining that individual 
agents’ social relations with one another are partly constitutive of their very capacity to be 
thinking intentional agents. In short, holistic individualism is the view that individual human 
beings are socially constituted without the implication that they are thereby under the control of 
social-structural regularities or forces in ways that threaten their autonomy.  
There may be those, however, who are skeptical of whether there really is a sustainable 
conceptual independence between individualism/collectivism and atomism/holism. It is thus 
instructive to rehearse Pettit’s argument for this and, in particular, his remarks on why they have 
so often been conflated with each other (172-5). To begin with, since it is taken for granted by all 
sides that there is no inconsistency in the “pure” positions of atomistic individualism (e.g., 
Hobbes’s conception of human nature, reductive individualist explanations of collective 
behavior, etc.), and holistic collectivism (e.g., crudely Hegelian and Marxian social theories, 
Durkheimian functionalism and structuralism in the social sciences, etc.), the question of 
whether the two sides are truly conceptually independent turns on whether there is any 
inconsistency in the “mixed” positions of atomistic collectivism and holistic individualism.  
Although it is hard to conceive, there does not appear to be anything obviously 
inconsistent in atomistic collectivism. I think that the best illustration of this possibility is not one 
that Pettit himself explicitly considers, but one that is clearly compatible with the spirit of his 
way of thinking. For what qualifies someone as a collectivist, in the broadest sense, is her belief 
that there are regularities or forces that vertically undermine or at least seriously compromise 
intentional psychology or individual agency. This broadest construal of collectivism, then, makes 
room for the possibility that there may be such regularities or forces that can come not only 
“from above” the level of intentional psychology, but also “from below” the latter. Put 
differently, collectivism as a conceptual possibility envisages not only that there are 
suprapersonal regularities or forces at work that compromise individual agency, but could also 
countenance the possibility that there may be (to borrow a distinction from contemporary 
philosophy of mind) subpersonal regularities or forces that can collectively shape the intentional 
psychology of individual agents. For some examples, consider intellectual movements such as 
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Freudian psychoanalysis or research programs in the social sciences like sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology, each of which seems to be committed to collectivism in this broadest 
sense. What is relevant is precisely that they can each be understood as atomistic and yet also 
collectivist in Pettit’s sense. For they hold at once that there are regularities or forces at work in a 
human individual that strongly constrain her intentional psychology or behavior, which then 
have significant consequences for the various features of her collective existence; and yet insist 
that the source of these collective effects originates atomistically (subpersonally). That is, these 
effects originate from beneath the body surface of any human individual agent and thus occur in 
isolation from any individual’s relations with other agents (though not in isolation from the 
actual environment in which an individual lives). In Pettit’s terminology, these sub-personal 
regularities or forces “outflank” the ones operating at the level of intentional psychology in the 
sense of having been selected by the process of natural selection (156f.). This is clearly the 
guiding idea of research programs like sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. But perhaps 
the most dramatic example of the consistency of atomistic collectivism is expressed by the 
thought of the later Freud in Civilization and its Discontents. Freud posits in that book an 
analogy between the internal drives that affect the libidinal economy of a human individual and 
the societal forces that shape the collective evolution of civilization. He argues that such drives 
strongly shape the behavior of individual human beings, behavior that in turn affects the nature 
of their collective existence. The point here is not to settle the question about the plausibility and 
explanatory power of such intellectual movements or research programs for human social 
behavior, but rather to give some evidence that atomistic collectivism, broadly construed, is not 
obviously inconsistent.  
What about the consistency of holistic individualism, which is far more plausible than 
atomistic collectivism? Given how Pettit regiments the terminology, there is no obvious way in 
which holistic individualism is inconsistent short of begging his question (173). But since 
terminological stipulation is rather unsatisfactory as a way of settling matters, consider the very 
idea of holistic individualism by reference to two of its more specific exemplifications. Take first 
our capacity to understand and speak a natural language. Once we learn to do so with 
competence, we come to express ourselves in relation to our environment and other people by 
largely conforming to the linguistic and non-linguistic constraints involved in speaking such a 
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language.6 We come in particular to realize expressive freedom, in the sense of a freedom whose 
actualization consists precisely in the sort of implicit and dynamic conformity to norms that 
enables the speakers of a language to have novel intentional states, novel desires, and other novel 
motivational propensities, as well as to perform novel actions.7 There is no incompatibility here 
between being constrained by norms implicit in the linguistic and non-linguistic practices of a 
community (holism) and being self-determining (individualism).  
Consider also the example of becoming acculturated into the practices of a community. 
Once we learn to understand a culture, we begin to anticipate what a member of that culture is 
supposed to do in given situations. For example, being American will tend to render obvious and 
natural certain self-understandings of individuals in relation to the world and others; being raised 
as an American, one simply finds oneself with a certain determinate range of such self-
understandings and their attendant significance. This way of being constrained by the culture(s) 
in which one has been brought up (holism) does not undermine one’s autonomy, but is what 
gives it its concrete expression (individualism). The idea that one can simply choose who one is 
or can be, from a standpoint that conceives the possibility and desirability of totally detaching 
oneself from one’s sociocultural heritage, is a hyper-individualistic conceit.8   
It does not seem, therefore, that there is anything obviously inconsistent in the position of 
holistic individualism; indeed, it seems prima facie to be the most plausible among the four 
possible options in social ontology. But perhaps the best way to reject the skepticism about the 
true independence of the issues that separate individualism from collectivism and atomism from 
holism is to consider why these two issues have been continually and systematically run 
together. Pettit gives three reasons for this conflation (173-5), and it is instructive to elaborate 
them.   
                                                 
6 I put this thought for now in vague terms in order to postpone addressing the question of how, or even whether, we 
need to conform to the linguistic and non-linguistic constraints involved in speaking a language. Someone like 
Davidson argues that there are no such constraints. I will examine his views at length in Ch. 4.  
7 Brandom, “Freedom and Constraint by Norms”, esp. pp. 185-9; see also Taylor, “Language and Human Nature” 
and “Theories of Meaning”.   
8 The existentialism of the early Sartre is susceptible to being construed as a sort of hyper-individualism; see esp. 
“The Humanism of Existentialism”. The belief that I can unconditionally choose my identity would be equivalent to 
the delusion of my choosing this among indefinitely many possibilities: “Should I be a contemporary American, a 
10th century Chinese of the Sung dynasty, a Roman gladiator, a pre-Columbus Aztec, …?” Without any prior 
acculturation, there can be no sensible basis for choice at all. For a convincing argument for this point, see Taylor, 
“What is Human Agency?”.  
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First, there has been the tendency in social philosophy to think of individuals and society 
on the model of parts and whole. This tendency has seduced us into a certain picture of the 
relation between individuals and society.9   
If we think in the part-whole way of individuals and society, then we will see the holist as saying that 
individuals are changed through becoming parts of the whole. If we see him as saying that, then we will 
easily take his thesis to be that the whole is greater than the parts. And if we take the thesis in that way, we 
will easily confuse it with the collectivist thesis, since this lends itself to expression in just those terms: the 
whole is greater than the parts in the sense that the parts are affected in some sense from above. (173) 
 
This slide occurs when we move, unjustifiably, from the thought that the individual is changed 
through becoming a part of the whole to the belief that the individual is thereby less causally 
efficacious or significant than the whole, i.e., that the whole (society) is, therefore, in some sense 
greater or more coercive than its constituent parts (individual agents). But the latter thought does 
not follow from the former: There is no logical implication from the plausible thought that the 
individual is changed by undergoing socialization to the conclusion that she thereby becomes 
subordinate (ontologically or causally speaking) to the society of which she has become a 
member.  
Second, another way in which we are led to miss the meta-distinction between 
individualism/collectivism and atomism/holism is by conflating the claim that there is a shared 
stock of concepts or tradition of thought with the claim that there is a shared mind, group 
consciousness, collectivity, or spirit in some crude sense. 
Holists say that there is a common fund of concepts, a shared body of thought, on which individual thinkers 
rely; atomists deny this. But what holists say is easily confused with the claim that there is a common 
center of consciousness, a shared state of thinking, operative in social life. (174) 
 
This slide occurs in moving from the fact that there is a common source of thinkable contents to 
the fallacy of thinking that there must therefore be, as a necessary condition of this sort of 
sharing, a common mind, consciousness, collectivity, or spirit that enables such sharing to take 
place. But the former idea does not presuppose the latter. People belonging to different cultures 
can and do think, mostly, the same thoughts, or at least widely overlapping thoughts, if they can 
individuate the determinate content of a particular thought at all, whether the thought in question 
shows up as familiar or strange.10  But it would be ludicrous to believe, on that account, that they 
must – literally – share a common mind, consciousness, collectivity, or spirit in order to 
                                                 
9 Cf. the approach to social ontology undertaken by Quinton in “Social Objects” and Ruben in The Metaphysics of 
the Social World. 
10 Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. 
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individuate the same thoughts at all. The latter belief reveals an illegitimate reification of the 
capacity to think in general, let alone to think the same thoughts. 
Third and finally, the preferred metaphors through which individualists and collectivists, 
as well as atomists and holists, express themselves tempt us into thinking in terms of certain 
confused associations. 
The received individualist metaphor is mechanical, with the working of a society being compared to the 
working of a clock or whatever. The standard collectivist metaphor … tends to be organic, with society 
being cast as an organism, often as an organism that displays characteristic patterns of growth and decline, 
perhaps even of recurrence. But the mechanical metaphor not only emphasizes the desired individualist 
point, that the origin of social movement is in the micro-structure, among the individuals depicted in 
intentional psychology; it also suggests, in atomist vein, that the elements of that structure are as detachable 
without remainder as the bits of the clock. Thus the individualism it expresses gets to be confused with 
atomism. On the other side the organic metaphor not only highlights the collectivist view of society as 
involving regularities that compromise individual psychology from above; it also serves to express the 
holist view that individuals depend on one another for significant properties, in the distinctive way in which 
the parts of a living organism depend on one another. Thus the collectivism expressed by this metaphor 
equally gets to be confused with holism. (174f.)  
 
The temptation for the individualist, then, is to infer from the belief that we can understand how 
individual decisions and actions can produce and affect social phenomena to the false conclusion 
that the constituents of such phenomena can fully remain what they are apart from the social 
contexts in which they are embedded. Similarly, the temptation for the collectivist is to infer, 
from the (questionable) belief that supra- or sub-personal regularities or forces override 
intentional ones, to the (holist) conclusion that individuals depend organically on one another for 
their very standing as thinking and autonomous beings. But the inferences from one position in 
social ontology on the vertical issue to another on the horizontal issue, and vice versa, are 
actually optional, albeit tempting, as Pettit shows well.  
In sum, we not only do well in our efforts to investigate social phenomena to keep these 
issues distinct, but also to envisage the plausibility of holistic individualism as a viable and 
attractive position in social ontology.  
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1.2 PETTIT’S NON-REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
Because much ink has been spilled over the issue of whether individualism or collectivism is 
correct, I will give somewhat short shrift to it.11 I will focus instead on highlighting Pettit’s 
conception of non-reductive individualism in social philosophy. My aim in this section is not to 
defend it against all possible objections, but merely to present it as arguably a conclusive 
resolution of the long-standing debate in social ontology and the philosophy of social 
explanation about whether individualism or collectivism is correct.   
It is useful to begin by mentioning some important historical events in the transition from 
the late Middle Ages to the modern era that motivated collectivist thought. During this transition 
people in the West began to encounter a whole range of social entities on a much larger scale. 
Among other factors, the rise of the nation-state along with the operation of its various 
administrative institutions, corporate persons such as the East and West Indian trading 
companies, the emergence of global trade, and the explosion in population in Europe all 
contributed to the growing sense that there were larger, anonymous social forces at work that 
were much more involved in people’s daily lives than before (126-8). Studies of the non-Western 
world (e.g., those by Herder and the Humboldt brothers) also provided an appreciation for the 
diversity of cultures, traditions, customs, and nations. They encouraged the attempt to isolate the 
“essential” characteristics of peoples as collective entities; later on in the nineteenth century, the 
development of organicist ways of thinking about social life reinforced this tendency.  
Given this societal and intellectual background, it is not hard to see why people came to 
believe in the plausibility and truth of collectivism. As I see it, there are two main arguments for 
collectivism in social thought.12 The first “argument” is really just the assertion that individual 
                                                 
11 For just a sample, see the essays collected in Martin and MacIntyre (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Social 
Science, Part VI. This issue is discussed in every introductory text in the philosophy of social science. In my 
examination of Pettit’s views in this and the next section, I will abide by his terminological regimentation of terms 
in social ontology (as explicated at the beginning of the previous section). Readers should keep this in mind as I 
proceed. 
12 A third argument has also recently emerged in light of the explanatory ambitions of evolutionary psychology. In 
Pettit’s terminology, if evolutionary psychological accounts of human social existence are correct, they would 
“outflank” our understanding of ourselves as intentional agents by invoking subpersonal causes for our beliefs, 
actions, and norms (see The Common Mind, pp. 134f., 155-63). Because this family of arguments for collectivism is 
less plausible, however, or at any rate has a far more limited scope than the two more familiar arguments for it that I 
discuss in this section, I shall ignore this family of arguments and let Pettit speak for himself on this issue.     
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agents are merely the vehicles or medium through which collective agents like the community 
(e.g., the Volksgeist, conscience collective, the Wesenswille of the Gemeinschaft, social structure, 
the social system, etc.) operate and exert their will on the individuals who are its members.13 On 
such a view, individual agents have little to no significance in shaping their lives through their 
actions, serving merely instead to embody and carry out, whether intentionally or not, the 
dictates of such collective agents, which are supposedly primary in existence and causally 
efficacious in relation to individual agents. The strongest proponent of this form of collectivism 
is probably Emile Durkheim, as best seen in his introduction and use of the concept of “social 
facts”.14 According to Durkheim, such facts purport to describe 
types of conduct or thought [that] are not only external to the individual but are, moreover, endowed with 
coercive powers, by virtue of which they impose themselves upon him, independent of his will. … These 
ways of thinking and acting [i.e., social facts in Durkheim’s sense] therefore constitute the proper domain 
of sociology. It is true that, when we define them with this word ‘constraint’, we risk shocking the zealous 
partisans of absolute individualism. For those who profess the complete autonomy of the individual, man’s 
dignity is diminished whenever he is made to feel that he is not completely self-determining.15   
 
Sociological method as we practice it rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as 
things, that is, as realities external to the individual. …  It is not realized that there can be no sociology 
unless societies exist, and that societies cannot exist if there are only individuals.16 
 
Social facts, then, claim to describe social phenomena at a level that is at once external to and 
coercive of individual agency; furthermore, Durkheim alleges that such phenomena exist above 
and beyond the level at which individual agents exist.17    
In light of Pettit’s cautions about how we should do social ontology, however, this 
“argument” for collectivism is utterly unconvincing because it illegitimately hypostasizes and 
personifies the community in its relation to the individuals who are its members.18 More 
specifically, it mistakenly runs together the nomological conception of causation and the idea of 
                                                 
13 For an instructive and critical examination of this tendency in the history of German social thought, see Ringer, 
The Decline of the German Mandarins.  
14 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 1-13.   
15 Ibid., 2-4.  
16 Durkheim, Suicide, Preface, p. 37f, emphasis in the original. (Did Margaret Thatcher read Durkheim once upon a 
time? She once said provocatively: “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and 
there are families.” [Passage from a speech of Thatcher that is quoted in Guignon, On Being Authentic, p. 34.]) 
17 I will explain this talk of “levels” in due course. 
18 For rather devastating criticisms of Durkheim on this score, see, e.g., Lukes, Emile Durkheim, Introduction; 
Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, pp. 185-8. This tendency also exists in a sense in contemporary 
philosophy of language and mind, even if it does not miss the distinction between causation and normative 
constraint in the same way that Durkheim does. Brandom rightly criticizes this reified conception of a community in 
these areas of philosophy, which he characterizes as invoking an illegitimate “I-we” sort of sociality, in Making It 
Explicit, pp. 37-40 and 593-601.  
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enabling normative constraints, which ought to be kept apart if we are to understand properly 
how a human agent’s membership in a community influences her attitudes and behavior. Indeed, 
Durkheim himself can be seen as unwittingly blurring just this distinction:  
A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of 
exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognized in its turn by the existence of 
some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it.19   
 
But once it is clear that this understanding of the nature of the community as a relatively self-
contained collective agent with autonomous causal powers is mistaken, this particular 
“argument” for collectivism becomes unmotivated, let alone persuasive. Although a human 
agent’s participation in a community does indeed constrain her behavior, it is a mistake to 
believe that the nature of the constraint in question lies in her capacity to be directly causally 
affected by social entities thought to exist at a level that is “higher” than the level of individual 
agency.   
A second argument for collectivism is prima facie more plausible. It stems from the 
growing use of the systematic collection of social statistics since the nineteenth century. The 
examination of such statistics enables social scientists to discern large-scale aggregate social 
regularities and social forces. What is striking is that these regularities and forces seem to display 
relatively invariant patterns despite undergoing changes in their constituents, i.e., in the 
individuals instantiating such patterns, or in their attitudes and behavior over time and place.20 
The examination of such patterns has led some less cautious social scientists to endorse a sort of 
statistical determinism that encourages the idea of discovering laws in the social sciences and in 
human history on a par with those revealed in the natural sciences. Once again, Durkheim, in 
particular in his study of suicide as a societal phenomenon, can be viewed as giving a 
paradigmatic statement of this sort of collectivism. As he writes:  
If … the suicides committed in a given society during a given period of time are taken as a whole, it 
appears that this total is not simply a sum of independent units, a collective total, but is itself a new fact sui 
generis, with its own unity, individuality and consequently its own nature – a nature, furthermore, 
dominantly social.21 … Each society is predisposed to contribute a definite quota of voluntary suicide.22 
 
Some prominent French thinkers of the last century, perhaps influenced indirectly by Durkheim, 
have given even more extreme expressions of this sort of collectivism. Consider this passage 
                                                 
19 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, p. 10. 
20 See the beginning of the previous section for a few examples. 
21 Durkheim, Suicide, p. 46.  
22 Ibid., p. 51. 
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from the structural Marxist Louis Althusser, who emphasizes the explanatory power of social 
forces as opposed to aggregate social regularities: 
The structure of the relations of production determines the places and functions occupied and adopted by 
the agents of production. … The true “subjects” (in the sense of constitutive agents of production) are 
therefore not these occupants or functionaries, are not, despite all the appearances, … “concrete 
individuals”, “real men” – but the definition and distribution of these places and functions. The true 
“subjects” are these definers and distributors: the relations of production (and political and ideological 
social relations).23 
 
In strong opposition to this form of collectivism, many critics of the thought of Althusser, 
and to a lesser extent, of Claude Lévi-Strauss (the father of structuralism in the social sciences) 
and Talcott Parsons (the father of sociological functionalism), have rightly criticized this unduly 
passive view of individual agents. Such critics object that individual agents in their theories are 
unjustifiably treated as “mere social dopes” who cannot help but conform to the regularities and 
forces exerted by large-scale social structures unknown to themselves (133). They argue that it is 
a gross falsification of actual human social life to claim that individual agents act in the robotic 
ways that such collectivists envisage.24     
Pettit’s position on this issue displays much sympathy with these criticisms of 
collectivism. In Pettit’s terminology, if collectivism is true, then social regularities or social 
forces “override” individual agency and intentional psychology (132). The overriding thesis 
concerns the relation between two supposedly distinct levels of causal powers, namely, the 
social-structural and the intentional. The collectivist argues that higher-level causal powers 
trump those that operate at the level of individual agency when conflicts between them take 
place, at which point such agency is either undermined or compromised. And the source of the 
causal powers at the higher level is supposed to consist either in the subsumption of individual 
agents’ activities under some social-statistical law, or in their governance in accordance with the 
structural constraints that some social system imposes upon them. In other words, if the behavior 
of individual agents is explainable in terms of its subsumption under such a law or its realization 
within such a system, these social facts about them compel them to perform certain actions 
against their will. 
                                                 
23 This passage is quoted from Pettit, The Common Mind, p. 133, emphasis in the original. 
24 For a strong backlash against this “objectivizing” tendency from within the French intellectual tradition, see 
Bourdieu, Outlines of a Theory of Practice and The Logic of Practice. For criticism of sociological functionalism, 
see Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology. For summary criticisms, respectively, of functionalism and 
structuralism in the social sciences, see Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory, Ch. 2, pp. 7-10, and Central 
Problems in Social Theory, Ch. 1.   
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These certainly seem to be the views of the thinkers cited above. But is the overriding 
thesis of collectivism true? Pettit makes a convincing case that it is not. The strategy is to 
undermine the collectivist assumption about the possibility of conflict between two supposedly 
distinct levels of causal powers. Once it can be seen how there can be no actual conflict in this 
sense, the claim about the causal impact of social-structural properties on intentional ones 
becomes moot (148-52). This can be done by arguing for the thesis of the supervenience of the 
higher-level causal properties on the lower-level ones. On a standard understanding of the idea of 
supervenience, higher-level properties are supervenient on lower-level ones just in case there can 
be no difference of properties at the higher level without there also being a difference of 
properties at the lower one.25 If true, the endorsement of this doctrine amounts to a commitment 
to some form of causal fundamentalism about the level at which causal powers actually operate 
(151). In social ontology, such a causal fundamentalism entails that there can be no social 
causation that takes place except at the level of individual agency. There can be no “social action 
at a distance”, and groups, organizations, institutions, social structures, or social systems cannot 
exercise causal powers independently of the intentional states and actions of individual agents.   
Now, the endorsement of this doctrine of causal fundamentalism in social ontology has 
traditionally entailed methodological individualism.26 But Pettit’s conclusion that individualism 
triumphs over collectivism does not have such an entailment. For he argues that it does not 
follow from the truth of individualism that higher-level properties or states are thereby causally 
irrelevant, which is a conclusion that proponents of methodological individualism typically wish 
                                                 
25 Pettit’s conception of supervenience seems to hold that properties and states of items at the supervenient level are 
token- but not type-identical to those at the subvenient level; his distinction between higher-level role states and 
lower-level realizer states as specifications, respectively, of the status of mental and physical states reveals his 
commitment to some version of the token-identity thesis (24-32). His view is similar to Davidson’s regarding the 
irreducible character of intentional states; see Davidson, “Mental Events”. Haugeland has forcefully criticized this 
understanding of supervenience in terms of the token-identity thesis; see his “Weak Supervenience”. Because what 
is significant for my aims, however, is the view that supervenience without reductionism is plausible and true, a 
view that both the token-identity thesis and global supervenience endorse, I do not need to settle the question of 
which account of supervenience is correct here.  
26 Or at least in its strong, reductive version: Strong methodological individualism holds that finished or “rock-
bottom” explanations in the social sciences must always be strict individualist explanations, i.e., refer only to 
individuals, their properties and actions. For explication of this position, see Zahle, “Holism and Supervenience”, 
esp. p. 316. As far as I can tell, Pettit’s individualism is compatible with what Zahle characterizes as moderate 
methodological individualism (ibid.), i.e., the view that social-scientific explanations must always be non-strictly 
individualist, i.e., always include but presumably not necessarily reduce its explananda to the properties and 
activities of individuals, etc. If this is what “methodological individualism” means, then Pettit could be understood 
to endorse it. This is a matter of terminology more than anything else.   
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to draw. After much stage-setting (32-42, 144-9), Pettit’s key move is to apply his “program 
model” of causal relevance to the vertical issue in social ontology. According to such a model, 
higher-level properties or states are causally relevant just in case they “program” for the 
instantiation of lower-level properties or states by ensuring, or at least by making highly 
probable, that there are always more causally basic, and hence lower-level, properties or states 
that are causally efficacious whenever higher-level properties or states are indeed causally 
relevant (149-55).  
Now, what constitutes a level of organization, description, and explanation involves three 
conditions (147f.). (1) There is the basic assumption that each level is characterized in terms of 
the properties and states that occur there, as well as the range of phenomena made possible by 
means of the instantiation of those properties or states. For example, intentional phenomena and 
their explanation are made possible by the use of intentional vocabulary, one in which (as 
Davidson puts it) the constitutive ideal of rationality plays an enabling and constraining role.27 
(2) If properties, states, and their associated phenomena belong to the same level, they are 
causally congruent, whereas those belonging to different levels are not so. For example, two 
properties will belong to the same level “if that means that the factors they constitute always 
relate as parts of the same causal whole or as stages (or parts of stages) in the same causal chain. 
Otherwise they will belong to different levels” (147). Finally, (3) what makes a level “higher” or 
“lower” than another depends on whether a level is more causally basic than another. A level is 
more causally basic than another just in case there can be no causation at a higher level without 
there also being causation at a lower level, but not vice versa. If a level is more causally basic, 
then, it is the lower level on which the higher level supervenes.          
Pettit uses the following example to illustrate the significance of these conditions as they 
figure in the program model of causal relevance. The elasticity of an eraser is causally relevant to 
its disposition to bend because it ensures that there exists a certain configuration of molecules in 
the eraser, with the appropriate molecular structure, that is so constituted so as to cause the eraser 
to bend when sufficient pressure is applied to it. The invocation of its elasticity is causally 
relevant and genuinely explanatory, not empty (i.e., elasticity is not a “dormitive virtue” of the 
eraser), because this invocation guarantees that there is some more causally basic (lower-level) 
                                                 
27 Davidson, “Mental Events”.   
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configuration of its constituents whose state disposes the eraser to bend. It is not explanatorily 
relevant that it is any particular configuration of molecules that does so in a given situation; 
what is required is only that there be some such configuration that is disposed to bend when the 
triggering circumstances obtain for it to do so.28 In this sense the higher-level property of 
elasticity supervenes on the lower-level chemical properties of a configuration of molecules of a 
certain kind. Thus, while the elasticity does not in a strict sense directly cause the eraser to bend, 
it is causally relevant to its bending precisely by ensuring or at least making highly probable – 
i.e., by “programming for” – the existence of some configuration of molecules with the right 
structure for the eraser to bend when the triggering circumstances of its bending obtain. The 
objection that the elasticity of the eraser is causally irrelevant to its actual bending, and thus that 
the invocation of its elasticity is explanatorily empty, is mistaken because it unduly restricts 
causal relevance to information about factual causation, i.e., about what actually causes the 
eraser to bend in a particular situation. Although such information is indeed explanatory, there 
can also be revealing and useful information that does not serve merely as a placeholder account 
for some other one that is supposedly better by providing more “fine-grained” information about 
the factual causal history for the occurrence of an event or condition. How can this be so? The 
higher-level explanation works by using a certain vocabulary (a certain “material” logic) that lets 
investigators perceive patterns of causal relevance that range over particular events and 
conditions, because such patterns are made intelligible in the first place through the use of this 
vocabulary.29   
Consider now the following example as an illustration in terms of social phenomena. 
Why does someone like David, who lives in the US and is self-employed, choose not to have 
health care coverage? Well, the lower-level explanation for his choice is just that he could not 
afford the cost of the health insurance policies offered to him by some health insurance 
representative. But there is, ceteris paribus, a higher-level explanation available for why he 
makes this choice. It has to do with how the health insurance industry in the US operates mostly 
in connection with businesses or organizations that offer health insurance as a significant benefit 
to their employees. In this context, the primary aim of the US health insurance industry is to 
                                                 
28 In terms of quantificational logic, this claim expresses an existential, not a universal, statement. More generally, 
Pettit’s argument here is quite similar to that made by Putnam in “Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology”,  
pp. 428-33.   
29 See Dennett, “Real Patterns”.  
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maximize profit and find as many legal ways as possible to reduce their reimbursements for 
individuals’ health care expenses. Given such interests, it is not cost-effective for them to offer 
health care coverage to single individuals, regardless of their actual health, when it is much more 
profitable to offer such coverage to particular populations of people and much more cost-
effective for them to cover them when some individuals from these populations require 
expensive medical treatment. These interests are thus causally relevant to the explanation of the 
choice that David makes in his circumstance by “programming for” the particular set of 
incentives and disincentives that he is faced with when he considers his health insurance options. 
It is this set of incentives and disincentives that, ceteris paribus, makes it highly probable that 
David and individuals in similar socioeconomic positions prefer to go without health insurance. 
This is an example not only of how conditions at a higher explanatory level provide more 
information than those at the lower level with regard to the occurrence of some particular event 
of a certain type; such conditions at the higher level also make highly probable (“program for”) 
the occurrence of that event at the lower level by circumscribing the range of choices, incentives, 
and disincentives that individuals face at the lower level.   
Many other examples of this sort of social explanation can be easily given. For present 
purposes, what is relevant here is that this account of supervenience does not advocate the 
desirability or requirement of inter-level reduction between the supervenient (higher) and 
subvenient (lower) levels of organization with regard to their causal relevance. There can be 
revealing and useful information provided at a macro-level of organization and description that 
remains invisible at the level of individual agency. Social or collective entities can thus be 
characterized as being expressively but not ontologically or causally autonomous.30 Although 
they are not ontologically self-subsisting, our reference to social and collective entities – more 
generally, our intentional attitudes containing the use of concepts that make sense in relation to 
them – enable us to dramatically increase our expressive resources in our understanding and 
experience of human reality.31   
                                                 
30 Although I have some important disagreement with John Searle’s conception of social reality (see 3.2), he makes 
a similar point in terms of his distinction between the ontological subjectivity but epistemic objectivity of social 
entities; see Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, esp. Ch. 1.     
31 For an elaboration of how Pettit’s individualism is distinguishable from five other questions that have often been 
run together with the debate between “individualism and holism”, see Appendix A of this dissertation. See also The 
Common Mind, Ch. 5, on how he combines his holistic individualism in social ontology with explanatory pluralism 
in the philosophy of social explanation. 
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Pettit’s program model and its commitment to causal fundamentalism apply thus 
straightforwardly to the vertical issue in social ontology. On this view, higher-level properties or 
states like rate of suicide, unemployment, poverty, capitalism, gender or racial identity, etc. – in 
short, all social-structural properties or states – are causally relevant and thereby genuinely 
explanatory by ensuring or at least making highly probable the existence of some lower-level 
properties or states that are realized and causally efficacious at the level of the agency of 
individual human beings. Collective agents like communities, organizations, groups, institutions, 
etc., and collective entities like social regularities and forces, do not exist except insofar as they 
are embodied and expressed through the intentional attitudes and behavior of individual human 
beings. This position avoids the collectivist temptation to reify social phenomena, along with the 
misguided view that there can be direct, inter-level causation between the social-structural and 
the intentional. But it does not thereby follow from this conclusion that collective agents and 
entities cannot influence and constrain individual agency. Quite to the contrary, they do so by 
circumscribing – by “programming for” – a complex of norms, explicit rules, attitudes, 
incentives, opportunities, and sanctions for the individuals who understand themselves as 
immersed in and engaging with the range of phenomena that make sense within such a complex.  
Daniel Little has recently articulated a convergent account of non-reductive individualism 
in social ontology. His label for the sort of individualism that he defends is “methodological 
localism” (ML). This position is meant to supersede the traditional opposition between 
“individualism and holism” by capturing the grain of truth in both. Here is a summary statement 
of Little’s position, which can also serve as a relatively succinct statement of Pettit’s non-
reductive individualism:  
[ML] affirms that there are large social structures and facts that influence social outcomes, but it insists that 
these structures are only possible insofar as they are embodied in the actions and states of socially 
constructed individuals. With individualism, the moderate position [of ML] embraces the point that 
individuals are the bearers of social structures and causes. There is no such thing as an autonomous social 
force; rather, all social properties and effects are conveyed through the individuals who constitute a 
population at a time. Against individualism, however, methodological localism affirms the “social-ness” of 
social actors. ML denies the possibility or desirability of characterizing the individual pre-socially. Instead, 
the individual is understood as a socially constituted actor, affected by large current social facts such as 
value systems, social structures, extended social networks, and the like. In other words, ML denies the 
possibility of reductionism from the level of the social to the level of a population of non-social individuals; 
rather, the individual is constituted by social facts, and the social facts are constituted by the current 
characteristics of the persons who make them up. Furthermore, ML affirms the existence of social 
constructs beyond the purview of the individual actor or group. … [I]nstitutions have real effects on 
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individual behavior and on social processes and outcomes – always mediated through the structured 
circumstances of agency of the myriad participants in these institutions and the affected society.32        
 
As can be seen, Little’s methodological localism insists on the expressive autonomy but 
ontological and causal dependence of collective entities on individual agency. In particular, Little 
is especially good at showing how the causal relevance and powers of such entities should be 
understood in terms of their structuring of the “leeway” or “room for maneuver” (cf. the German 
word ‘Spielraum’) on the basis of which individual agents understand themselves and act in the 
world. Specifically, collective agents and entities affect individual attitudes and behavior by 
shaping the “incentives, preference-formation, belief-acquisition, or powers and opportunities” 
that make determinate sense to individual agents.33 This is the proper way to understand how 
collective agents and entities at once enable and constrain – but cannot externally coerce in 
Durkheim’s sense – individual agency. Barring certain circumstances, individual agents in 
general have the capacity to choose (or not to choose) to act in various ways in given situations. 
What they cannot choose to do is to revise, at least not entirely or at once, the background 
complex of incentives, opportunities, etc., that makes sense to them and circumscribes their 
choices in the first place.   
Following Little, we can distinguish a number of entities, patterns, and levels of 
organization and explanation that constitute the social world and understand how they are 
connected with one another.34 First, there is the level of the social in its most immediate 
concretion: the level of the socially constituted individual whose behavior is paradigmatically 
understood in terms of intentional psychology and individual agency. This level includes the 
social development of and interactions among distinct individual agents. Both Pettit and Little 
insist on the ontological and causal primacy of this level. Second, there is the level of the social 
that supervenes on that of individual agency: namely, that of groups, organizations, and 
institutions. These entities can be characterized either concretely, in terms of the individuals who 
                                                 
32 Little, “Levels of the Social”, p. 346.   
33 Ibid., p. 361.   
34 Ibid., p. 351. Note that this talk of the “social world” need not be understood as talk of a realm that is 
distinguishable from the natural world to such an extent that a dualism is generated between the “social” and the 
“natural” world. This remark is meant to deflect the charge made by Rouse that any talk of the “social world” 
already implies such a strong separation between the two and is hence, if his arguments are sound, ultimately 
untenable; see Rouse, Knowledge and Power, Ch. 6 and How Scientific Practices Matter, Ch. 2. One can still 
maintain a distinction, however, between the two without letting it eo ipso become a dualism, although Rouse is 
right to argue that certain philosophers (e.g., Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor) often treat this distinction as 
establishing a dualism between the social and natural world.   
 30 
 
constitute them and act within the local settings that make sense to them, or abstractly, in terms 
of the explicit rules, practices, roles, and institutional functioning of such entities themselves. 
Third, there is the level of the social at an even higher level of organization that itself supervenes 
on the level of groups, organizations, and institutions. The entities, norms, or patterns of 
behavior constituted at this level are often characterized in terms of social identities (e.g., race, 
gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnic identity, etc.), social structures (e.g., education, 
bureaucracy, nation-state, etc.), or social systems (e.g., economic and political systems, 
globalization, etc.) that coordinate and constrain the behavior of entities at the second and first 
levels. Lastly, there is also a level of the social that is discernable in terms of statistical patterns 
that characterize populations of people.  
As long as we abide by the basic commitment that all of these levels supervene 
ultimately, i.e., ontologically and causally, on the level of socially constituted individuals, there 
need not be any strict reduction of the entities, patterns, and phenomena at the other levels to the 
level of individual agency or intentional psychology. By the same token, the acknowledgment of 
the social constitution of the individual implies that we can and, indeed, in some cases must 
explain social phenomena without reducing such explanations to ones that apply only at the level 
of intentional psychology and individual agency.35 For the contexts within which individual 
agency is exercised are themselves socially structured with reference to entities, processes, and 
patterns that are only discernible and intelligible at the other higher levels of the social. The 
social world, then, it goes without saying, is a large and tangled web. Pettit and Little have 
performed yeoman’s service by showing how the inextricable complexity of this web does not 
threaten our self-understanding as individual agents who exercise autonomy under socially 
structured circumstances.  
                                                 
35 Pettit, The Common Mind, Ch. 5.  
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1.3 PETTIT’S ARGUMENT FOR SOCIAL HOLISM 
Having explicated Pettit’s understanding and defense of individualism against collectivism, we 
turn now to the evaluation of his extended arguments for social holism against social atomism. 
Like the vertical issue concerning individualism and collectivism, the horizontal issue 
concerning atomism and holism arose in a particular historical context in Western thought. 
Familiarly, holism was a reaction against the atomistic way in which early modern political 
philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and their contractarian descendants conceive the basic 
existence of the human individual as capable of being in principle solitary.36 Social holists object 
that social atomists seriously underestimate the extent to which human beings are shaped by their 
social environment, in ways that are not merely instrumental to the attainment of the ends of 
loosely associated individual agents. In opposition, social holists argue that “an individual can 
realize his or her humanity only in community with others: that there is a sense in which 
community comes first, individual human beings second”.37   
As Pettit notes, however, this thesis, so formulated, is rather vague. We need first to 
define more clearly what the holist thesis is regarding the social constitution of the human 
individual. Following the lead of Charles Taylor,38 Pettit formulates the thesis of holism as 
follows: 
Individual human beings are not entirely self-sufficient. (1) They must depend upon one another for the 
possession and exercise of some basic capacity that is central to the flourishing of the human being. (2) 
Furthermore, no one can come to possess and exercise this basic capacity – no one can be properly human 
– except by interacting with other human beings.39 
 
As already emphasized in the Introduction to this dissertation, this thesis must not be understood 
in a causal, instrumental, developmental, or statistical way – indeed, in general, in a factual or 
                                                 
36 See Taylor, “Atomism”.   
37 Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, p. 116. 
38 Taylor, “Atomism”, p. 191: “The claim is that living in society is a necessary condition of the development of 
rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming 
a fully responsible, autonomous being. … [The holist contention is] that outside society, or in some variants outside 
certain kinds of society, our distinctively human capacities could not develop.”  
39 Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, p. 117, passage somewhat modified. Since Pettit regards this 
later essay as a refinement of the initial argument for social holism that he presents in The Common Mind, I will 
treat his position in this paper as more definitive. Nevertheless, as far as I can tell, there are no significant 
differences between them in terms of Pettit’s argument for social holism; rather, their main differences concern how 
precisely to formulate the thesis of social holism.       
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empirical way – if it is not to express a mere platitude. Its formulation deserves thus some 
explication before we assess Pettit’s arguments for it. In particular, we must clarify its content if 
it is to be non-trivial and worthy of philosophical consideration. Moreover, these determinations 
will be directly relevant for the conception of the social constitution of the human individual that 
this dissertation presents and defends in later chapters.    
Pettit helpfully specifies the content of social holism in terms of his answers to three 
questions that he raises about its content.40 First, what is the sort of basic capacity that is claimed 
to be central to the flourishing of the human being, such that its possession and exercise depend 
essentially on the enjoyment of social relations? Second, what is the nature of the dependence in 
question upon social relations: Is it causal or rather non-causal dependence? Third, what is it 
exactly that an individual depends on for the exercise of the relevant basic capacity: Does it 
depend on the mere existence of others, or rather on her interactions with them?    
To begin with the answer to the first question, the sort of basic capacity that is distinctive 
of a flourishing human being cannot be fully explained in terms of some biological characteristic 
such as the possession of a specific genetic makeup (namely, human DNA) or set of bodily 
abilities (e.g., the ability to be bipedal or use tools). Neither can it suffice to understand the sort 
of capacity in question in terms of what is required for the continuous bodily survival of a human 
individual. The obvious reason is that none of these characteristics or abilities requires the 
sustained robust enjoyment of social relations in order to persist. Rather, the sort of basic 
capacity in question must be one whose exercise puts individual agents in the position to be self-
determining: not in the sense, of course, that they can unconditionally determine all the 
circumstances under which they think and act, but in the sense that a certain range of beliefs or 
courses of action are open to them as possibilities that they can reflectively consider, and for 
which they can be held responsible when they act upon them or not.41 Paradigmatically, human 
beings determine themselves in the relevant sense when they can consider and provide reasons, 
when prompted, for what they believe and do, as opposed to reacting merely instinctively to the 
impacts of the environment in which they are situated. Self-determination in this sense is 
                                                 
40 Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, pp. 117-21.   
41 Taylor’s invocation of the ideas of rationality, moral agency, and autonomy in the passage cited certainly suggests 
this. I do not wish to wade here into the traditional debate between determinism and free will. I will assume that the 
sense of self-determination in question is sufficiently intelligible and plausible so as not to require further 
elaboration.  
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fundamentally connected with the capacity for reflection and deliberation. What basic capacity 
of the human being can play this important role?   
Pettit submits that the obvious candidate is the capacity to think (169). He argues that a 
thinker must be able (1) to engage in what he characterizes as intentional ascent and (2) to follow 
rules, above and beyond just interacting with its environment in ways that display intentionality. 
Very briefly, the ability to engage in intentional ascent consists in an intentional agent’s capacity 
to reflect upon its responses to its environment and what it can or should do (54-64, 69-76). As 
Pettit puts it, this capacity is the requirement that 
an intentional system should not only have intentional states with contents – states like the belief that p, the 
desire that p, and so on – it should also have intentional states that are about such contents. It should not 
only have attitudes that bear contents, it should also have attitudes towards contents. (60) 
 
We [thinking beings] are not just creatures who form beliefs and desires – more or less rationally – and 
proceed under favorable conditions to act in the way that they rationalize. We are also creatures who 
understand what it is for those states to be rational – albeit our understanding is marked by the images and 
resources of a particular culture and tradition – and who have a care for the attainment of that rationality. 
(57f.) 
 
According to Pettit’s terminological regimentation, what distinguishes the thinking intentional 
agent from the non-thinking intentional system is that the former can evaluate the overall 
rationality and, more generally, the qualitative worth, of its engagement with its environment, 
whereas the non-thinking intentional system cannot do so (55). This is what fundamentally 
constitutes thinking intentional agents as persons, i.e., beings who have selves; human beings 
who are so constituted are not only purposive and intentional creatures, but care about the 
quality of their engagements with their environment as expressions of their self-understanding 
and self-worth.42 This capacity for intentional ascent captures, then, the age-old philosophical 
conviction that what distinguishes human beings from other animals is their rationality: their 
ability to subject their first-order beliefs and desires, attitudes and intentions, to high-order 
standards of evaluation regarding their correctness and value, standards that themselves may be 
subject from time to time to critical assessment and alteration.43 As interesting and important as 
                                                 
42 See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” and Taylor, “What is Human Agency?” 
Pettit’s conception of the capacity to think clearly resonates to the conception of personhood (selfhood) articulated 
by Frankfurt and Taylor.  
43 Note that it is not required that a thinker be always explicitly aware that he is reflecting up or taking attitudes 
toward contents; it is only required that he be able in principle to perform, at least some of the time, intentional 
ascent in relation to such contents. This echoes Kant’s thought that the “I think” must be able to accompany all my 
representations, not that it actually, at all times, has to do so. 
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Pettit’s conception of intentional ascent is, however, it is tangential to his argument for social 
holism and will thus not be further discussed here. On the other hand, because his argument for 
social holism depends heavily on his conception of the possibility of rule-following, we will 
need to understand the latter before we can assess the former.   
Having isolated the capacity to think as central to the flourishing of any human being, 
Pettit next argues that a human being cannot exercise it absent the enjoyment of social relations. 
The claim is that this capacity depends necessarily on other human beings in order to be realized. 
What is the nature of this dependence? Does social holism hold that the capacity to think 
depends causally or non-causally on the enjoyment of social relations? Furthermore, does its 
exercise depend merely on the existence of others, or rather on the interactions with them? 
Pettit argues that the dependence in question cannot be causal if it is to justify social 
holism. The argument that he gives for this conclusion is indirect (169-71): Social holism would 
be trivially true were it to claim that individual agents must causally depend in a variety of ways 
on either the existence of or interaction with others.44 Thus, the dependence on others must be of 
a non-causal sort. What can this mean? The dependence in question must require the enjoyment 
of social relations in a constitutive sense: The activity of thinking thoughts must depend on social 
relations with others in the sense that its very structure already involves a social aspect.45 
Intuitively, we can for now make sense of the idea of the constitutive dependence of X on Y as 
follows. Consider the bearing by X of various properties such as status, power, and so on. Status 
and power are such that their very possession and exercise intrinsically involve social relations. 
One could not, in the relevant sense, acquire status and exercise power unless other people 
adopted certain attitudes and behaved in certain ways toward the bearer of status or power. Thus, 
if X and Y are individual agents, then X’s possession and exercise of status, power, etc., cannot be 
actualized apart from Y’s ascription in practice of such social-relational properties to X. The 
bearing by X of such properties cannot be logically distinct from Y’s attitude of taking X to have 
                                                 
44 Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, p. 120f. 
45 Although he uses both expressions, Pettit tends to put the issue in terms of supervenient, rather than constitutive, 
dependence. I find, however, that framing the issue in terms of supervenient dependence distracts, rather than helps, 
as the way to clarify the issues here, so I will avoid this way of talking unless necessary.  
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them; the ascription by other Y’s to X of such properties is a constitutive aspect of X bearing 
those social-relational properties.46   
In order for the argument for social holism to be compelling, then, the social holist must 
argue that the capacity to think depends constitutively, not causally, on the enjoyment of social 
relations with others. The analogy with properties like status and power also answers 
straightaway the third question about the content of social holism. The mere co-existence of 
others is clearly insufficient to generate the status, power, or other social-relational properties 
that an individual possesses. Rather, other people must take and treat her as having that status or 
power. Analogously, a social holist like Pettit argues that what an individual constitutively 
depends upon, in her exercise of the capacity to think, are her interactions with others, not 
merely her passive co-existence with them: 
Social holism means that if it is fixed that I have a certain thought, then it will be simultaneously fixed that 
other people have certain thoughts too; no act of thinking, at least as things stand with human beings, 
without an interactive context of thinking subjects. (172) 
 
In sum, social holism according to Pettit is the view that any human individual must depend non-
causally on interactions with other individuals in order to possess and exercise his or her capacity 
to think.   
With these elaborations in place, we can now lay out and evaluate Pettit’s argument for 
social holism. Schematically, it has the following inferential structure (181): 
1. The interactive thesis: A human being can follow a rule only on the basis of interpersonal 
or intertemporal interaction. 
2. The commonability thesis: The rules followed by a human thinker are commonable; they 
are rules that another can claim as a common possession. 
3. A negative claim: If a human being follows a rule on the basis only of intertemporal 
interaction with herself, then that rule is not commonable. 
---------------------------------- 
Conclusion: The rules followed by a human thinker are not followed on the basis of such 
intrapersonal interaction alone; they must be followed on a basis that involves interaction 
with others. 
 
Although the argument is formally valid by disjunctive syllogism, I aim to show below that it is 
unsound.     
                                                 
46 This does not imply that the ascription of others of social-relational properties like status and power is on its own 
sufficient for the actualization of the latter; such ascription forms at most a necessary condition. For one thing, there 
needs to be a prior understanding of the social and institutional structure on the basis of which status and power can 
show up and be significant at all.  
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On Pettit’s view, the bulk of the work of the argument for social holism depends on 
showing the truth, or at least the overwhelming plausibility, of the commonability thesis and the 
attendant negative claim. He takes the interactive thesis as something that he has already 
established elsewhere (in Ch. 2 of The Common Mind). Let us for the moment grant that the 
interactive thesis has been established and examine his arguments for the commonability thesis 
and the negative claim. The commonability thesis is simply his label for what is more standardly 
characterized as the publicity condition; clearly the use of ‘commonability’ is intended to bring 
out the accessibility by others of the contents of a thinker’s thoughts, insofar as such contents are 
constrained by rules. On Pettit’s view, rules are normative constraints that apply in an indefinite 
variety of types of situations (65, 81). Given this understanding of what rules are, the 
commonability condition is the condition that 
one human being can knowledgeably identify, as such, the rules followed by another and identify them as 
rules that she can follow herself: in particular, that one human being can knowledgeably identify the 
propositions and propositional elements that another targets in her thought. (180) 
 
The commonability condition in question must itself satisfy two requirements in order to be 
robust (182). First, an observer’s identification of the rules that a thinker follows cannot occur 
through conjectural luck (presumably this stipulation is meant to rule out Gettier-style 
counterexamples). She must instead identify the rules in question “knowledgeably” by doing so 
in a “sufficiently privileged or reliable manner” that does not consist in making informed guesses 
about what the operative rules are (ibid.). Second, in order for the observer to count as 
knowledgeably identifying the rules that a thinker follows, it must be the case that the observer 
herself can come to follow them in the same manner. In this sense the identification of the rules 
that are followed must not be achieved in an “oblique or parasitic” way; that is, the observer of 
the rule-follower must also be able in principle to let the rule in view guide her own potential 
rule-following activities (182f.).  
If the commonability thesis is so understood, what arguments does Pettit give in its 
favor? First, he argues that “all the evidence suggests as a matter of fact that the rules that people 
follow in thinking are commonable” in the sense just specified (183, emphasis added). The claim 
is apparently that because we take it for granted in ordinary life that the contents of a thinker’s 
thoughts are in principle accessible to us in our observations and dealings with her, the truth of 
the commonability thesis is our working default assumption: “We take it as axiomatic that if the 
person is a thinker at all, then she is a scrutable thinker: that if she is a thinker at all, then we can 
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know which rules she is following and recognize them as rules that we might follow ourselves.” 
(183) Second, Pettit argues that it is generally in our interest to follow rules that are accessible to 
others, for doing so tends not only to promote the instrumental success of our activities, but 
serves indeed as a practical requirement of what it is to be a thinker at all, for it “would be a sure 
sign of psychological derangement – or perhaps warped philosophical motive – for any one of us 
to seek out purely private rules to follow. It is part of showing oneself to be sane that one does 
not seek the refuge of a thought-world that is epistemically sealed against the comprehension of 
others.” (189) In sum, the reasons that Pettit provides for justifying the commonability thesis are 
factual and grounded in common sense.  
Having invoked common sense as his way of defending the truth, or at least the 
overwhelming plausibility, of the commonability thesis, Pettit tries next to argue for the negative 
claim that rules cannot be commonable solely on the basis of intertemporal intrapersonal 
interactions, i.e., the sort of interactions that a person has solely with her past and future selves 
regarding the correctness of her rule-following activities. In essence, Pettit’s argument in this 
context rehearses the familiar scenario, prominent especially in light of Kripke’s reading of the 
later Wittgenstein on rule-following, that any finite set of examples of a supposed rule can 
hypothetically instantiate an indefinite number of different rules.47 The relevant point here is the 
following: If it were really true that someone could follow rules solely on the basis of her 
intertemporal but intrapersonal interactions with herself, then the best that an observer of her 
behavior could ever do is to hypothesize about the contents of the rules that she actually follows. 
How so? Because the best epistemic position that such an observer could occupy would always 
be one that is “left on the outside” of the rule-following activities of the person observed: 
When I observe you following a rule that is fixed solely by reference to your own habits and practices, then 
I am in the impossible position of someone who is trying to identify an indefinitely relevant rule by the 
consideration of a finite number of cases. I am stymied by the oldest problem in the induction game. The 
problem will not stop me from conjecturing about the rule that you are following. And it will not prevent 
me from later falsifying a given conjecture, as I find that you do not respond as the rule that I postulated 
earlier would require. But it will make it impossible for me to know which rule you are following, in the 
sense in which I am supposed to know this for commonable rules. (186) 
 
In other words, even if I were able provisionally to identify some rule that you are following, 
nothing would guarantee that my working identification of the rule in question would ensure that 
I would be able to follow it in the same way that you do; and this possibility would lead me to 
                                                 
47 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Ch. 2. 
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think that I have not really knowledgeably identified the rule in question after all. Pettit’s move 
here is to treat these implications as a reductio ad absurdum of the possibility of a thinker who 
interacts only intrapersonally with herself over time concerning her rule-following (184-6). He 
must think, in light of the two reasons he gives for the truth or overwhelming plausibility of the 
commonability thesis, that the cost of not endorsing it would be too great. He concludes, 
therefore, that we are justified in endorsing social holism in light of his defense of the premises 
of the argument for it.  
Would a resolute skeptic about the reality of rule-following, however, feel satisfied by 
this argument? I think clearly not. For such a skeptic would dispute both the requirement that 
commonability is a necessary condition of rule-following and Pettit’s claim that he has shown 
that rule-following cannot occur in principle solely on the basis of a thinker’s intertemporal but 
intrapersonal interactions with herself. From the perspective of the skeptic, Pettit’s emphasis that 
we assume, as a matter of fact in ordinary life, that rules are commonable begs the question of 
the skeptic about why rules must be so in the first place. The reason is simple. It is a 
commonplace in the literature concerning epistemological skepticism that invocation of common 
sense and how things actually are will not be persuasive from the skeptic’s perspective. For he 
insists that we must be able to rule out, not just as a matter of fact but as a mere possibility, that 
we may be deceived (e.g., by a malicious demon or by our condition as brains-in-a-vat, etc.) in 
believing that we successfully represent the way things really are. But Pettit plainly fails to 
establish this stronger conclusion with regard to our assumption that the rules in question must 
be commonable. Indeed, the skeptic here could seize upon the moves of Kripke’s Wittgenstein in 
laying out the “skeptical paradox” of rule-following and draw instead the opposing conclusion 
from the one that Pettit himself draws: The skeptic can insist that Pettit’s rehearsal of the worries 
of Kripke’s Wittgenstein in this context does not amount to a reductio of the skeptic’s view, but 
rather actually supports his very skepticism about the necessity of commonability for rule-
following. The skeptic thinks the proper lesson to be learned is that we cannot help but always be 
“left on the outside” concerning the discovery of the rules that someone follows.  
Now, Pettit actually acknowledges that his argument so far cannot placate this sort of 
skepticism about the necessity of the commonability of rule-following. But he brushes it off by 
replying, in effect in a Humean spirit, that no reasonable people in the course of ordinary life 
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could live out their lives on the basis of the belief that the commonability thesis is false.48 As he 
writes in brief response, skeptics 
deprive us of the ordinary notion of knowledge itself, refusing to countenance the regular paradigms of 
what it is to know something. And the important point is that, short of scepticism, it is very difficult to 
reject the assumption that one person can non-parasitically know which rule another is following. (184)   
 
Pettit, then, effectively concedes that skepticism about the necessity of the commonability of 
rules is viable. But this dismissive response on his part is rather odd. For one thing, he takes 
skepticism about rule-following seriously elsewhere and repeatedly emphasizes how it must be 
rebutted in order for thought and meaning to be possible (64-9, 76-86).49 Given this 
commitment, it is curious that Pettit thinks he can simply shrug off skepticism about whether 
rules must be commonable as a necessary aspect of rule-following.  
But the unpersuasive character of Pettit’s argument here does not really depend in my 
view on his dismissal of skepticism about rule-following. Rather, it stems from the unfortunate 
way in which he has cast the skeptical challenge in terms of an epistemological orientation in 
general. For Pettit has in effect transformed the thesis of social holism, by my lights 
unjustifiably, into a putative solution to the problem of other minds. Through his treatment this 
thesis comes to be understood in terms of how we in our role as observers can come to know – in 
his terms, to “identify knowledgeably” – the rules that a thinker is following.50 But how does a 
question concerning the social constitution of the human individual come to be equated with one 
about our entitlement to know the rules that another thinker follows? Is this what is really 
involved and at stake in properly understanding the nature of our social constitution? Has Pettit 
not in fact changed the subject? Even if we grant that understanding our reasons for believing 
that other people follow rules as we do – that other people have minds much like our own – is 
important, does showing this possibility exhaust the nature of our basic social constitution as 
                                                 
48 I mean Hume as he expresses himself in the final section of Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature, esp. p. 269. 
49 See Pettit, “The Reality of Rule-Following”, p. 31: “If speech and thought involve rule-following, then the 
magnitude of the [skeptical challenge about its reality] can hardly be overstated. Deny that there are such things as 
rules, deny that there is anything that counts strictly as rule-following, and you put in jeopardy some of our most 
central notions about ourselves. More than that, you also put in jeopardy our notion of the world as requiring us, 
given our words and concepts, to describe it this way rather than that; you undermine our conception of objective 
characterization. There is no extant philosophical challenge that compares on the scale of iconoclasm with the 
sceptical challenge to rule-following.”  
50 Cf. Hyslop, “Other Minds”. This does not imply that I agree with the underlying philosophical assumptions that 
make the problem of other minds seem pressing, let alone with those of Hyslop. In fact, I find these assumptions 
highly questionable and optional. But I will not go into this here. 
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human individuals? I think not. For one thing, it accepts too readily the problematic assumption 
that there is a basic epistemic gap between the inner mind of the thinker and her outer behavior, 
an assumption that renders the problem of other minds seemingly pressing in the first place. But 
this view fails to acknowledge that an individual’s “outer” behavior is sometimes simply 
constitutive of the “inner” life of that individual. Except when one finds oneself in special 
circumstances (e.g., watching actors in performances, etc.), the occurrence of avowals, facial 
expressions, and bodily gestures often provides non-inferential information and revealing insight 
into the mind of the person who exhibits them.  
More importantly, it ought to be uncontroversial to hold that an individual’s attitudes in 
general are deeply conditioned by the culture of the communities in which she is brought up, 
even when she chooses to reject these attitudes. For an individual’s culture serves as the 
expressive reservoir in relation to which she in the first instance understands and determines 
herself. In this sense the self-understanding of the individual is fundamentally constituted by her 
sociocultural heritage. But this is an ontological, not an epistemological, aspect of her 
constitution as an individual. That is, the constitution in question does not depend on whether 
other people can knowledgeably identify the specific rules to which an individual conforms, but 
rather on the way of being of a socially constituted creature in general. The pertinent question 
ought to be how an individual grasps a determinate range of possibilities of understanding things 
and acting upon them as intelligible at all, not how some observer can discover the rules that this 
individual follows in a way that puts him in a position to follow them himself.51   
Consider as illustration the mundane example of someone who waits at a bus stop for a 
bus. What makes this action for an agent so much as intelligible as a possible course of action, 
i.e., as something that so much as makes sense to her as something that she could do, let alone as 
something that she actually does? Here is a preliminary answer to this question (one that will be 
further elaborated in Ch. 2). In order for this agent, let alone for some observer, to make sense of 
her behavior, she must already understand how this action of hers hangs together with the host of 
other practices in relation to which this action makes sense. In this case, she must already 
understand what buses and bus-related paraphernalia are in relation to other vehicles, the role of 
bus drivers and fellow passengers, traffic patterns, how this action makes sense in relation to her 
                                                 
51 I will discuss the relevant concept of possibilities and its connection with intelligibility in Ch. 2. 
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immediate, intermediate, and long-term goals, etc. To be sure, this practical understanding of 
herself in performing this action may be assessed, singly or even severally, in terms of the 
correctness of her conformity to the relevant norms that govern bus-waiting behavior. But it 
would be unintelligible, let alone impossible, for there to be a simultaneous assessment of the 
correctness of the entire pattern of practices that renders this behavior so much as intelligible. 
One can, of course, assess the correctness of individual performances of a practice at one time. 
But doing so already relies on understanding of how this practice hangs together with other 
related practices. If, as Pettit argues, the social constitution of the individual consists in the 
commonability of rule-following, this claim in the final analysis must itself rest on the prior 
practical understanding of the entire nexus of practices that makes intelligible the doings of 
agents as possible actions they can perform at all on given occasions. Thus, the commonability 
of rules and its significance for rule-following cannot ultimately explain the fundamental way in 
which human individuals are socially constituted. Understanding the social constitution of the 
human individual should be concerned, in the first instance, with how the range of possible 
actions that an agent can perform can be so much as intelligible at all to him or her, not with 
whether the rule she follows is commonable. 
Finally, the social constitution of the individual not only makes intelligible and hence 
enables any individual to be a person with a determinate set of life-attitudes, projects, and 
aspirations, but can also serve, for better or worse, as the ideological foundation for them. That 
is, this constitution can subtly shape, in often subconscious ways, the meaningful range of life-
attitudes and aspirations that an individual finds to be live or dead possibilities of understanding 
and acting.52 An individual’s social constitution must be regarded, therefore, as both enabling 
and constraining the agency of the individual. Whether an observer of a thinker can 
knowledgeably identify the rules at work is, to be sure, an aspect of this constitution, but it 
cannot be the only way in which individual agents are fundamentally socially constituted. As far 
as Pettit’s transposition of the thesis of social holism is concerned, then, it is curiously silent 
about these basic aspects of the social constitution of the individual. Even if he need not concern 
himself explicitly with these aspects, it is at least unclear how his transformation of the thesis of 
                                                 
52 Critical social theories often focus their analyses on exposing these subconscious and subtle ways in which our 
sociocultural constitution embodies hidden differential power relations that cause unjust social relations among 
individual persons. For a clear and sophisticated discussion of these phenomena, see Haslanger, “Gender and Race: 
(What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?”. 
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social holism into an apparent solution to the problem of other minds could be significant for 
them.  
I submit, therefore, that Pettit’s argument for social holism as it stands so far is not 
persuasive. But he also deploys another argument for it in this context that is prima facie more 
compelling: He tries to show how interpersonal interactions can provide the basis of rule-
following rather than how solely intrapersonal interactions with oneself over time cannot. 
According to this positive argument, Pettit’s basic contention is that “if there is truly a rule you 
are trying to follow, then I can know which rule it is” (187). He tries to support this conclusion 
by arguing two points:  
First, that under this scenario [of interpersonal interactions] there is a rule that you are trying to follow only 
if there is a negotiable convergence in our responses. And second, that if there is a negotiable convergence 
in our responses, then I am able to know which rule you are following, and in non-parasitic mode. (Ibid.)   
 
The scenario envisaged is the following. Assume that you and I are thinking intentional subjects 
who interact with each other. The difference from the intertemporally but intrapersonally 
interactive situation is that in the interpersonal case you are no longer just an individual whose 
ostensible rule-following activities I merely observe “from the outside”. Rather, I am 
intrinsically involved in determining the normativity of the rule that you follow because “you 
take pause and seek out discounting factors whenever you find that there is, by your lights, an 
intrapersonal discrepancy of response or a discrepancy across your response and mine” (187). 
The key move here is the claim that you as a rule-follower no longer exercise exclusive control 
over the correctness of your rule-following activities.  
You view a discrepancy in our responses with just the same degree of seriousness as a discrepancy in your 
own responses over time. You give my responses the same presumptive relevance and authority as you give 
your own responses, so that I am as intimately involved in your rule-following intentions and project as 
your other selves. (188) 
 
Why should this be the case? According to Pettit, the reason is that the fallibility 
requirement of what it is to follow rules cannot be satisfied as a matter of fact in the absence of 
interpersonal interactions. Briefly, on Pettit’s account of the nature of rule-following, someone 
counts as a rule-follower if and only if she can (1) identify the rule in question independently, (2) 
apply it directly, and (3) be fallible nonetheless about the correctness of her application of it (86-
97).53 Rules must be independently identifiable because a finite set of cases should not be 
                                                 
53 See also Pettit, “The Reality of Rule-Following”.  
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regarded merely as instances of a rule (as Kripke’s Wittgenstein would have us see them), but 
rather as exemplars of the rule in question to some subject (the subjective activity of the rule-
follower in relation to the rule matters). Furthermore, rules must be directly applicable, i.e., be 
applied without further guidance from another rule, so as to avoid the problem of infinite regress 
that plagues intellectualist conceptions of rule-following (cf. Wittgenstein’s rejection of the need 
for what he calls “interpretations” [Deutungen] for rule-following).54 Independent identifiability 
and direct applicability are aspects of what Pettit calls the extrapolative inclinations of a rule-
follower. But as he himself acknowledges, when these two aspects of rule-following are taken by 
themselves, 
there is going to be an a priori connection between the rule r and the inclination in virtue of which certain 
cases exemplify the rule. The rule, r, is just that rule which corresponds case by case with the responses the 
inclination prompts the subject to make, in extrapolating from the original examples. Thus it is a priori 
knowable that as the inclination goes, so goes the rule. … The inclination will be definitive of how the rule 
should go in every new case. It will not represent an attempt to divine how the rule should go; it will be 
itself the determinant of how the rule should go. (91)  
 
If this is so, there will not be any difference (to recall a point that the later Wittgenstein makes) 
between believing that one has correctly followed a rule and actually having done so.55 The 
normativity of rule-following would be illusory in this case, for then we would start to lose our 
grip on the idea of actually getting things right and wrong.  
Because this situation is intolerable, any account of rule-following, on pain of embracing 
some sort of skeptical solution to it, must make room for the possibility that rule-followers can 
indeed be fallible (176f.). On Pettit’s view, the way to ensure that the fallibility requirement is 
satisfied depends on determining whether a rule is applied under favorable or unfavorable 
circumstances (91-7). We need not enter into all the specific details of Pettit’s account of 
favorable circumstances here.56 What is relevant for our purposes is that he argues that a rule-
follower has to care about the discrepancies in her rule-following across time and among 
persons, for it is only by attending to and dealing with these discrepancies that we come to 
establish what the favorable circumstances are that set the normative standard by reference to 
                                                 
54 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §201. I think that these conditions of rule-following, as they figure 
here, are uncontroversial in light of the overwhelming empirical evidence, especially, of how babies and toddlers 
learn how to do and say things. Although I will not elaborate them further in this chapter, they will become 
significant when I discuss the normativity of rule-following in Ch. 5. Because the way in which I wish to do so there 
will be situated in a different philosophical landscape, I will postpone my treatment of that topic until that chapter.   
55 Ibid., §202. 
56 See Pettit, “A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions”.  
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which we judge whether a rule has been followed correctly or not (95). First and most 
importantly, the rule-follower must be disturbed by the appearance of discrepancies in her rule-
following activities, either intrapersonally over time or interpersonally across the relevant 
persons. On this view, something is amiss if she finds, by her own lights, that she follows a rule 
in different ways at different times without any justifiable alteration in her collateral 
commitments in beliefs or actions; something is also wrong if she and other rule-followers are 
inclined to make different judgments in their attempt to follow ostensibly the same rule. Second, 
she must try to maintain the intrapersonal and interpersonal constancy of her rule-following by 
seeking out various factors that can discount the intrapersonal or interpersonal discrepancies in 
following the rule in question so as to resolve the apparent dissonance across time and persons. 
Pettit’s view is that once this process of recognizing and discounting perturbing factors that lead 
to discrepancies in one’s rule-following gets going, we succeed in establishing the normativity of 
a rule because the rule that emerges will be one that can survive interpersonal negotiation about 
the normal and ideal circumstances of its bindingness. Once we can come to an agreement about 
the favorable circumstances under which rules are to be binding, then it should be obvious and 
straightforward, so Pettit argues, how I can also knowledgeably identify, and hence follow, the 
rule that you are following. For we are now equally “on the inside” as fellow participants in 
determining the normativity of the rule and its favorable circumstances of application.  
My own habit of response, and my own practice of negotiation, are involved in fixing the identity of the 
rule, if there is one, on which you are targeted. Otherwise put, the success conditions for your project of 
rule-following involve me intrinsically. … [W]e must form community with one another, each recognizing 
the other as equally criterial for whether there are rules that either of us follows; we must invest one another 
with authority on what the rules are. … No reliable interpretation, as things stand, without social 
interaction. No interpretation without incorporation [into a community of interpreters]. (188f.) 
 
How compelling, though, is Pettit’s account of the interpersonal interactive source of the 
normativity of rule-following? First of all, since it is intended as a partially empirical account, it 
is clearly quite an idealization of ordinary human psychology. But it does not take great effort to 
see that most people in ordinary life do not pay attention to, let alone try to discount, the 
discrepancies they may encounter in the course of their rule-following unless they are compelled 
to do so by their factual circumstances. Furthermore, even if they acknowledge that they 
encounter such discrepancies, either intrapersonally or interpersonally, it seems even more 
idealized to hold that most people actively seek to maintain constancy in the correctness of their 
rule-following. People have to be quite reasonable and self-critical if they are to negotiate with 
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one another about the favorable circumstances under which the rules they have in view are 
correctly discerned and applied.  
Second and more importantly, it is not obvious why the addition of other people 
interacting with a thinker can ensure the satisfaction of the fallibility condition required, and 
hence show the soundness of Pettit’s argument for social holism.57 Why should an individual 
person be so disabled regarding the correctness of her rule-following in comparison with the 
addition of other people on the scene? Suppose, for the sake of Pettit’s argument, that an 
individual’s rule-following is so hampered. What is it about the addition of other people’s 
assessments, in themselves, that could constitute normativity here? Why can’t other people, 
either individually or collectively, be just as wrong in their assessments of the correctness of 
their own rule-following or that of others? I suspect that the intuitive idea motivating Pettit’s 
interpersonally interactive conception of the social constitution of the individual is our common 
experience that we can each be sanctioned for the correctness of our rule-following by other 
people. This idea as it stands is innocuous and less censorious than it can seem, for disciplinary 
actions by other people that correct our rule-following can just as well lead to a gain in the 
understanding of the world and in one’s self-understanding; there can be no doubt that the 
addition of multiple perspectives of other people regarding the correctness of one’s conformity to 
norms is useful. We can characterize this process as the interpersonal and interactionist 
articulation of the favorable and unfavorable conditions under which norms become binding for 
a thinking individual. Because human individuals are not omniscient, other people can often 
illuminate and help us achieve greater clarity about the contents and appropriateness of our 
intentional attitudes, as well as what intended or unintended consequences can follow from the 
performance of our actions.  
But if other people discern unclear or problematic aspects of our thinking and doing, the 
suggestions or criticisms that emerge from this process of evaluation cannot consist solely in the 
fact that it is others who have made them rather than we ourselves as single individuals. The 
reason should be plain upon reflection: Other people’s evaluations are telling only if such 
evaluations themselves answer to some relevant normative standard that is independent of other 
people in the sense of not being fully under their control. Consider the example of a teacher who 
                                                 
57 My remarks in what follows are partially indebted to Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, Ch. 4, esp. 
pp. 113-5. They anticipate my fuller treatment of Luntley’s view in 5.3.  
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corrects a student in the course of instructing him. The normative force of her corrections does 
not really derive from the fact that she is another individual vis-à-vis her student, but rather from 
her presumed expertise in whatever it is that she teaches. Of course, given the extensive training 
and experience that she has accumulated in what she teaches, the student rightly defers to her 
expertise. But this is accepted practice not because she is another individual with a different 
perspective on the matter at hand, but only because of her expertise, which itself must answer to 
some independent normative standard that constrains her own understanding of what she teaches. 
Otherwise, if her expertise itself depended wholly on the fact that others (presumably, fellow 
experts in her field of expertise) certify her as possessing it, an infinite regress of such judgments 
would ensue regarding the normative authority to which such expertise appeals. Now, this 
regress is typically halted in ordinary life when some appropriate sanctioning body grants to 
candidates the relevant social status that certifies their acquisition of the expertise in question 
(e.g., by way of finishing the relevant training and receiving the attendant degree, etc.). This is 
all well and good, but it can make it seem as if it is the constituent members – so, other 
individuals – of this sanctioning body who possess the normative authority to determine what the 
relevant normative standard is and how it should be applied. We should not run together, 
however, the factual institutional circumstances that certify what individuals must be able to do 
in order to be entitled to claim relevant expertise in a field with the philosophical point that the 
possession and evaluation of this expertise must itself answer to some independent normative 
standard that is not fully under the control of other people, not even those who are the 
acknowledged experts in the field and members of the sanctioning body. In the case where two 
or more individuals are equally experts in the same field, it is all the more clear that the 
normative authority deriving from possession of the expertise is insufficient on its own to 
conclusively settle disputes about what the normative standard is or how it should be applied.  
In short, the normativity of other people’s evaluations of one’s thoughts and actions 
derives from the responsiveness of these evaluations itself to some independent normative 
standard not fully controlled by the participants themselves, not solely from the fact that it is 
other people who assess the rule-following of some single individual. For this reason Pettit’s 
argument that the normativity of rules consists in interpersonal negotiations about the favorable 
circumstances governing its bindingness highlights at best the process according to which the 
normativity of rules is established. But this cannot be the whole account about how rules or 
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norms actually bind individuals. To be sure, we should reject Platonism about the normativity of 
standards and aim to see how they are inherent aspects of our actual practices.58 But it remains 
an open question how we should precisely understand the nature of practices so as to incorporate 
a satisfactory account of normativity. The foregoing remarks suggest at least that interpersonal 
interactions cannot constitute the sole basis of normativity, even though such interactions are 
undeniably one of its important modes of articulation.59  
To conclude this section, I have argued that the epistemological orientation that Pettit has 
given to social holism and his argument for the interactive thesis are both questionable upon 
examination. It is apparent that what really motivates his particular conception and defense of 
social holism is the assumption that an individual’s engagements with the world cannot as such 
be fallible. Because the world on this conception is assumed to be normatively inert, the 
bindingness of rules or norms must accordingly come from somewhere else apart from these 
engagements, namely, from interpersonal interactions qua a conceptually isolated realm of 
activity that is abstracted from the world. It is this underlying assumption that motivates and 
makes at least plausible Pettit’s interpersonally interactionist conception of the social 
constitution of the individual. In my view, the problems it faces stem from his specific definition 
and defense of the thesis of social holism, not from its generic definition, which Pettit has 
helpfully clarified. The examination of these problems is instructive because they point ex 
negativo toward an alternative understanding of the social constitution of the individual that is 
more adequate, one according to which the world we live in and engage with is not normatively 
inert. If we can make sense of this thought, doing so opens up the possibility of understanding 
the social constitution of the individual as an intrinsic aspect of her very way of being in the 
world, not only via her interpersonal interactions with others. It will be one of the main tasks of 
the next chapter to show how our engagements with the world already enable the thoughts and 
actions of individual thinkers to be norm-governed.  
                                                 
58 M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, pp. 164-7, 172-7; Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement,  
p. 9f.  
59 What an adequate account requires is complicated. I tackle this topic in Ch. 5.  
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1.4 OVERVIEW AND PREVIEW 
It is time to take stock and put my scrutiny of Pettit’s social ontology in this chapter into context. 
I have tried to register two reservations about its content and underlying motivation. The first 
concerns his restriction of the content of social holism. This restriction transposes what is at issue 
in this position into a version of the problem of other minds, cast now in terms of the issue of 
rule-following. I argued that this restriction, while understandable in light of Pettit’s other 
commitments, misses the essential point of inquiring about the social constitution of the human 
individual. In order properly to understand this constitution, what we want and need is an 
account of how the possible range of actions that agents can perform is so much as intelligible at 
all, as opposed to the commonability of their thoughts. The latter consideration presupposes the 
intelligibility of the former, and thus cannot explain the basic way in which the human individual 
is socially constituted. Second, I also argued that the underlying motivation for Pettit’s 
conception of social holism is his assumption that normativity must be generated from 
somewhere else apart from one’s engagements with the world. He locates this source of 
normativity in the interpersonal interactions of thinkers with one another. In response, I 
suggested that this assumption is questionable if we wish to understand not just the social 
articulation, but rather the social constitution, of the human individual.  
Despite these criticisms of Pettit’s conception and defense of social holism, I wish to 
emphasize that he has done us a great service by clearly elaborating the general content and 
argumentative structure of social holism. By successfully disambiguating the constant confusion 
in traditional social theory and social ontology between individualism and collectivism on the 
one hand, and atomism and holism on the other, Pettit shows how affirming the social 
constitution of the individual does not threaten individual autonomy, but actually serves as a 
condition of the possibility of the latter. With this result, one can consequently defend social 
holism without being committed to the mistaken view of collectivism. Holism now becomes a 
thesis about the enabling conditions of exercising individual autonomy, not the way in which the 
individual is somehow subservient to and dominated by collective entities (“wholism”). Recall 
Pettit’s formulation of the thesis of social holism:  
Individual human beings are not entirely self-sufficient. (1) They must depend on one another for the 
possession and exercise of some basic capacity – namely, the capacity to think – that is central to the 
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flourishing of the human being. (2) Furthermore, no one can come to possess and exercise this basic 
capacity – no one can be properly human – except by interacting with other human beings. 
 
In my view this articulation expresses the correct understanding of the general shape of 
how one should go about defining and defending social holism. Where Pettit goes wrong, 
however, is that he inserts the wrong capacity into this structure. As I will argue in the next 
chapter, on the basis of an appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time, the basic 
capacity that is central to the flourishing of the human being ought to be what Heidegger 
characterizes as being-in-the-world, not just the capacity to think as Pettit would have it. Strictly 
speaking, although being-in-the-world is the basic constitution, not just a capacity, of being 
human, it will become clear that for Heidegger this constitution is not something a human being 
can possess apart from his or her ongoing capacity to understand the world. Thus, it is not wrong 
to urge that we substitute the idea of being-in-the-world as the proper element in the 
argumentative structure of social holism for Pettit’s conception of the capacity to think. 
Consequently, when we adapt Pettit’s formulation of the thesis of social holism from the 
Heideggerian perspective of providing an existential description and analysis of the human 
being, it now comes to this: 
Individual human beings are not entirely self-sufficient. (1) They must depend upon one another for the 
possession and exercise of some basic capacity – namely, the capacity to be-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) 
– that is central to the flourishing of the human being. (2) Furthermore, no one can come to possess and 
exercise this basic capacity – no one can be properly human – except by sharing the world, not primarily 
by interacting with other human beings. 
 
As we will see, it will take quite a bit of work to unpack and make sense of this Heideggerian 
understanding of the thesis and significance of social holism. This is the main task of the next 
chapter.
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2.0  THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL 
In this chapter I present my argument for how we should understand the thesis of social holism. 
Given its definition at the end of the previous chapter, this argument amounts to a defense of the 
thesis of the social constitution of the human individual. Contrary to Pettit’s argument that this 
constitution consists in the commonability of thoughts on the basis of interpersonal interactions, I 
will argue that human beings are already socially constituted in virtue of their particular way of 
existing in the world, which (as I will show) is analytically distinct from their interactions with 
others. This argument consists primarily in appropriating the insights concerning this constitution 
that Heidegger provides in Being and Time. Although Heidegger’s method in that work is 
phenomenological (in his own sense of that term [SZ §7]1) and seems at first glance to eschew 
arguments, I think it is fruitful and at times necessary to articulate the insights of his thinking in 
argumentative form.2 Given this approach, I will adapt and explicate Heidegger’s argument 
concerning the social constitution of the individual for my purposes. Although some 
interpretation of Being and Time will be unavoidable, I do so with the sole aim of extracting the 
argument for the social constitution of the individual that I discern as available in that text.   
This chapter is organized as follows. In 2.1, I provide an interpretive appropriation of 
Heidegger’s conception of this constitution. In 2.2, I indicate how my appropriation of 
Heidegger’s thinking converges with the “site” social ontology that Theodore Schatzki has 
recently worked out in great detail. This sets me up to address a possible specific objection that 
Schatzki could raise regarding my understanding of the one (das Man) as underwriting the 
fundamental nature of human social existence. In 2.3, I reply to some likely objections to my 
appropriation of Heidegger’s conception of the social.   
                                                 
1 For a succinct explanation of Heidegger’s understanding of the method of phenomenology, see Blattner, 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, pp. 27-33. Henceforth all references in the text of this chapter are to Heidegger’s Sein 
und Zeit (cited as SZ); Macquarrie and Robinson’s English translation of this work has the German pagination on its 
margins. All translations of passages from Sein und Zeit are my own; emphases are in the original German unless 
otherwise indicated. In Appendix B of this dissertation, I provide a brief explication of some of Heidegger’s 
terminology that is relevant for this dissertation. 
2 Lest there is any misunderstanding, I am not suggesting that his phenomenological method is somehow deficient or 
flawed unless it is cast in such form. To my mind philosophy at its best requires both the use of arguments and 
perspicuous description; these should not be thought to be mutually exclusive.      
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2.1 HEIDEGGER’S CONCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL 
As noted in Ch. 1, in order to justify the thesis of the social constitution of the individual, what 
must be shown is how some basic capacities distinctive of what it is to be a human individual 
must be socially constituted. For simplicity’s sake, I focus here on one basic capacity, namely, 
human understanding, in an important sense to be explicated below.3 The argument that I adapt 
from Heidegger’s conception of human social existence in Being and Time can be summarized in 
the following steps:4 
1. Being a human individual presupposes understanding the world as a practical holistic  
context. 
2. Understanding the world as such a context is required for understanding how people 
(including oneself) make sense in terms of what they do. 
3. Making sense of what people do requires understanding (“projecting”) the situational 
possibilities that are intelligible to people in their engagements with entities and with one 
another.  
4. The intelligibility of situational possibilities, and hence the intelligibility of people and 
the entities that people understand, is normatively constrained.  
5. The normative intelligibility of situational possibilities is socially constituted because 
this intelligibility conditions the understanding and activities of a multitude of people as 
individual agents.  
6. An individual cannot help but draw on this intelligibility in understanding 
(“projecting”) the typical range and types of actions that he or she can perform in a 
situation. More strongly put, neither an individual’s activities, nor his or her interpersonal 
interactions, can generate this intelligibility on their own, for such activities and 
interactions presuppose the prior understanding of this intelligibility in order for such 
activities and interactions to make sense and hence be possible at all. 
7. Therefore, an individual is socially constituted because the normative intelligibility of 
situational possibilities that enables the exercise of his or her capacity to be a human 
individual at all is itself socially constituted.  
 
Each of these claims will require explication and justification.  
                                                 
3 Other basic capacities are embodiment and language, but these in a way that is interdependent with understanding.  
4 I have benefited in general from the following interpretations of Heidegger’s early philosophy, even when I have 
some specific disagreements or differences of emphasis with them: Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World; Haugeland, 
“Heidegger on Being a Person”, “Dasein’s Disclosedness”, “Truth and Rule-Following”, and “Letting Be”; 
Brandom, “Heidegger’s Categories in Sein und Zeit” and “Dasein, the Being that Thematizes”; Okrent, Heidegger’s 
Pragmatism; Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism and Heidegger’s Being and Time; Carman, “On Being 
Social” and Heidegger’s Analytic; Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism” and “Early 
Heidegger on Sociality”; and Boedeker, “Individual and Community in Early Heidegger”.  
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To begin with, unless one is inclined to find solipsism compelling, it should be a platitude 
to accept that being a human individual requires at a minimum the capacity to do things in the 
world. It is not trivial, however, to reflect on what enables any individual in general to be an 
agent prior to the particular exercises of his or her agency. I submit that it is his or her ability to 
understand the world as a practical holistic context. It is important at the outset to emphasize that 
the understanding in question is not intellectualistic, but primarily practical (SZ 143). 
Understanding something in this sense is dealing (using, coping) with it skillfully or competently 
in a situation. It includes, but also extends beyond, the understanding of utterances that express 
intentional attitudes; as such, it proceeds without needing to formulate, much less consult, some 
set of rules that explicitly specifies what counts as skillful or competent performance.5 Clearly 
much of what we do exhibits this sort of understanding, with bodily activities as paradigmatic 
expressions of competent practice. What I want to bring out now is how being a human 
individual who understands things in this sense presupposes engagement with the world as a 
practical holistic context and what doing so involves.  
Toward this end, it is first crucial to understand the nature of the world in the way 
considered here. One of Heidegger’s most significant achievements in Being and Time consists 
in illuminating our unreflective understanding of the world by drawing attention to four different 
senses of ‘the world’ (SZ §14). In his framework, ‘the world’ in the first (“ontic-categorical”) 
sense refers to the totality of entities that can be “present-at-hand” (vorhanden) within it (SZ 64). 
‘The world’ in this sense is the universe, i.e., the totality of entities that exist independently of 
our understanding of them.6 ‘The world’ in the second (“ontological-categorical”) sense is 
something that has exercised metaphysicians past and present. It refers to the set of basic 
categories that determine entities as what they essentially are, such that these entities can be seen 
as belonging to a certain domain or region of being (SZ 64f.). Categories in this sense specify the 
constitutive standard or ontological framework that “lets entities be” physical, biological, 
functional, mental, psychological, mathematical, abstract, etc., in general by specifying the 
                                                 
5 See Ryle on the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind, Ch. 2. 
6 The word ‘exist’ is used in its ordinary sense here. In Heidegger’s vocabulary, only Dasein can “exist”, i.e., be-in-
the-world, whereas entities that are not Dasein do not “exist” in this stipulated sense. This does not mean, of course, 
that such entities do not exist in the ordinary sense.   
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necessary conditions that entities must satisfy in order to be entities of a basic kind at all.7 It is 
important to emphasize that such a standard or framework does not constitute entities by causally 
bringing them into existence. Rather, it constitutes them by determining their basic makeup in 
the sense of specifying a set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied if an entity is to be of 
a certain basic kind at all; the satisfaction of these conditions is prior in the order of explanation 
to any questions regarding the existence and properties of specific entities. For example, location 
in space and time is constitutive in this sense of what it is to be a physical entity at all; nothing 
can be physical unless it satisfies this necessary condition (among others) of being physical.8 
Philosophers have overwhelmingly concentrated their efforts on articulating these two 
senses of what the world is, though obviously in different terms. Against this backdrop, 
Heidegger emphasizes the significance of the third and especially the fourth senses of ‘the world’ 
that most philosophers have in his view overlooked. ‘The world’ in the third (“ontic-
existentiell”) sense refers to the concrete context in which a human being lives as an engaged 
agent rather than a detached spectator. It is the lifeworld that a human being understands and in 
terms of which she acts in the course of living her life (SZ 65).9 The world in this sense cannot 
exist independently of human understanding, norms, and practices. Correspondingly, the fourth 
(“ontological-existential”) sense of ‘the world’ refers to the ontological framework that 
constitutes a complex of items as belonging to any lifeworld at all.10 Heidegger calls this entire 
framework the worldliness (Weltlichkeit) of the world (SZ esp. §18). It articulates the constitutive 
standard that lets the items in question be worldly at all (SZ 65, 85). Given this terminology, it is 
worth noting in passing that physical entities are not as such worldly, but only so insofar as they 
are constituted as aspects of some lifeworld. As I understand it, the key to understanding the 
worldliness of the world is at least twofold: The structure of the world is what Heidegger calls 
the referential nexus of significance (Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit), and the 
                                                 
7 Haugeland, “Truth and Rule-Following”, pp. 320-7 and esp. “Letting Be”; Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal 
Idealism, p. 4f. I will further elaborate the important concept of letting be below. 
8 In Heidegger’s terminology, a constitutive standard or ontological framework is called the “being” (Sein) of an 
entity because the latter’s “being” is that which determines it basically as the (kind of) entity that it is. Thus, a 
constitutive aspect of the being of physical entities is their necessary spatiotemporality. See Appendix B for further 
explication. 
9 I mean “lifeworld” in Heidegger’s sense: “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such ‘lives’” (SZ 65), not as this term 
figures, insofar as it means something different, in the thoughts of other philosophers (e.g., the later Husserl, Schütz, 
or Habermas).   
10 I will discuss what these items are below.  
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basic character or way of being of the world is normative practical holism. As we will see, the 
structure and basic character of the world qua worldly are interdependent; we can only make 
sense of them in the final analysis as a unitary phenomenon. Because understanding the world in 
its worldliness will have significant implications for how we should understand the social 
constitution of the individual, it is important first to illustrate the worldliness of the world.11 
Consider the following mundane example. When I want to buy something in a store, my 
conscious attention is focused on whether the store offers what I want or need. This intention 
makes sense, however, only insofar as it draws on my prior understanding of how a particular 
complex of items already relate to one another as an organized whole that structures and gives 
sense to my activities within this complex. Thus, for those who are familiar with shopping 
practices, it is utterly obvious that: e.g., stores are places where one can buy things or services; 
the people showing up in that setting are understood in terms of the typical roles that they occupy 
(e.g., as store employees, customers, etc.); one usually must pay some form of money in return 
for buying something or paying for some service, etc. All of these mundane expectations about 
how things, people, and actions make sense in that context, as well as what further phenomena 
are opened up against the background of those expectations (e.g., the item desired is missing or 
defective; the salesperson acts in an odd or rude way; I forgot to bring some form of money to 
pay for the item, etc.), must already interrelate and be in place as an organized complex if the 
intention of buying something is to be intelligible at all. Although agents need not be consciously 
aware that they rely on this background understanding in the course of acting in the world, it 
must be in place as a necessary condition of the intelligibility of the intentions and actions that 
they conceive and carry out in the world.  
This mundane example (and it would be very easy to imagine countless others) illustrates 
how the world with which we engage is fundamentally a space of intelligibility in which entities 
and, more generally, the phenomena through which entities show themselves, make sense.12 This 
space has the following basic constituents and structure: (1) a totality of entities that show up as 
“ready-to-hand” (zuhandene) equipment, each of which is used for performing some specific 
task; (2) more encompassing short-term and medium-term goals which are accomplished by 
performing these tasks; and (3) the self-interpretations for the sake of which (Worum-willen [SZ 
                                                 
11 Unless otherwise indicated, I will henceforth use ‘world’ in the third sense explicated above.   
12 Cf. Schatzki, Social Practices, p. 111.  
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84, 86, 123]) individual human beings realize (enact) who they are in some context by using 
relevant equipment to accomplish certain short-term and medium-term goals within that context. 
For example, I buy some groceries at a store (encounter and deal with some nexus of equipment) 
in order to prepare and cook meals (accomplish a short-term goal) for the purpose of feeding my 
family (accomplish a medium-term goal), which is ultimately for the sake of realizing my 
ongoing self-interpretation as a parent who takes care of my family. Any functioning human 
agent is utterly familiar with the world in this primarily practical way, as long as he or she has 
already learned the relevant practices.13 What is significant is not so much that we exhibit a 
primarily practical orientation toward the world, which is obviously true, but that this orientation 
presupposes that the world is already minimally understood as a whole in terms of the three 
structural elements mentioned. Thus, in order to know, e.g., what a store, a product, a customer 
or store employee, buying and selling practices, etc., are, we must be already familiar with how 
each of these items relate to one another and play the particular roles that they do within some 
practically significant complex. When we understand the world as exhibiting this pragmatic 
intelligibility, this shows that the world that concerns us makes sense as a referential nexus of 
significance, i.e., an interrelated complex of equipment, tasks, short- and longer-term goals and 
ends, all of which in turn relate to and thereby make sense for the sake of enacting some self-
interpretations on our part. The central point is that the world does not show up, in the normal 
course of living our lives, as a collection of disparate, present-at-hand things to which we are 
indifferent, but rather as a practically significant whole in which our self-interpretations are 
already involved as a basic constituent. It should be evident, furthermore, that the basic character 
or way of being of entities that make sense in terms of their belongingness to some referential 
nexus of significance is, in the first instance, their practical holism.  
It only takes a moment’s reflection to see that the worldliness of the world is not some 
exceptional condition in which human beings happen on occasion to be, but pervasive as the 
basic condition of being a human individual (barring some sort of significant bodily, 
psychological, or developmental impairment). The possibility of contemplation, i.e., adopting the 
                                                 
13 This is primarily, but not completely, practical because the self-interpretations for the sake of which we do things 
do not serve as means toward the accomplishment of any further end, but realize and express who we are in 
significant spheres of our lives: “The primary ‘for-what’ [Wozu] is a for-the-sake-of-which [Worum-willen]. The 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’ always concerns, however, the being of Dasein, for which, in its being, this being itself is 
essentially an issue [dem es in seinem Sein wesenhaft um dieses Sein selbst geht].” (SZ 84; cf. 12)  
 56 
 
theoretical stance of deliberately not engaging with entities in the world, is not a counterexample 
because it always derives from our basic condition of dealing with things in the world in their 
worldliness, not one that can ground (justify and sustain) the latter. For our purposes, drawing 
attention to the world in its worldliness matters for understanding human social existence and 
activities because people typically make sense in terms of what they do, i.e., how they 
understand things and act against the background of our familiarity with some referential nexus 
of significance (SZ 117-9).14 Once we grasp the ongoing self-interpretations that individuals live 
out in particular contexts, which are typically intelligible in terms of the various roles that they 
enact therein, we have a working sense of who they are and thereby how we can possibly interact 
with them (if we do so).15 These roles range from the utterly mundane (e.g., customer, consumer, 
car driver, commuter, pedestrian, etc.) to ones that matter much more to the self-interpretations 
of any individual in important spheres of human life (paradigmatically, his or her life at work, at 
home, in relation to loved ones and friends, in leisure, etc.).16 This does not, of course, imply that 
people’s identities are reducible to such roles, nor that they are disabled, let alone forbidden, 
from doing things or engaging with others in ways that diverge from or challenge the typical 
expectations about what people do in the course of occupying such roles. Neither is it the case 
that an individual can only inhabit one or a few roles at a time, quite the contrary in fact.17 
Nevertheless, what merits emphasis here is that this working sense of how we understand and 
possibly interact with people is itself only intelligible on the basis of our prior familiarity with 
the referential nexus of significance (the world) in which people’s mundane and more 
meaningful self-interpretations play a constitutive role.  
                                                 
14 Other people “show up in terms of the world [begegnen aus der Welt her] within which concernful-
circumspective Dasein essentially dwells” (SZ 119). “The world does not only let [gibt] the ready-to-hand be [frei] 
as entities that show up in an intraworldly way, but also Dasein, the others in their co-Dasein.” (SZ 123)  
15 I do not mean “role” in the overly passive sense in which some influential sociologists (e.g., Parsons and 
Goffman) conceive it. It means rather what Anthony Giddens has characterized as a social position: “A social 
position can be regarded as a social identity that carries with it a certain range (however diffusely specified) of 
prerogatives and obligations that an actor who is accorded that identity (or is an ‘incumbent’ of that position) may 
activate or carry out: these prerogatives and obligations constitute the role-prescriptions associated with that 
position.” (Giddens, The Constitution of Society, p. 84) As long as this is clear, the use of ‘role’ is harmless. I retain 
it because it can be applied to both things and people.   
16 Heidegger also argues that being a self, in the sense of the possibility of coming to “own” oneself by taking 
responsibility for who one is, cannot ultimately be exhausted in the uncritical acceptance of the roles and self-
interpretations which we primarily and mostly adopt or simply fall into. But we need not consider this issue in detail 
for our purposes here.    
17 Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Sociality”, p. 245. 
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At first glance, this point should be uncontroversial and can seem to amount merely to an 
experiential claim about how an individual encounters and makes sense of others in ordinary life. 
In particular, it seems to leave untouched the idea of the individual as an agent who can do things 
apart from her possible encounters and interactions with others. Heidegger, however, wants to 
make a more radical claim about how we are fundamentally social (in his terminology, “being-
with-one-another” [Miteinandersein] or more simply “being-with [Mitsein]), beyond how other 
people show up to us as intelligible aspects of the world. As he writes: 
The phenomenological assertion that Dasein is essentially being-with has an existential-ontological 
meaning. It does not want to establish ontically that I am not factically alone in a present-at-hand way, or 
even that others with my mode of being occur. … Being-with determines Dasein existentially even when an 
other is not factically present-at-hand and perceived. Even the aloneness of Dasein is being-with in the 
world. … Thus, being-with … is not grounded in a co-occurrence of several “subjects”. … Being-with is a 
determination in each case of one’s own Dasein …. (SZ 120f., emphases added)         
 
This passage makes the following strong and initially counterintuitive claim: The most basic way 
in which any human individual is social does not depend on the presence of, much less 
interactions with, other people in that individual’s activities. Rather, the social nature of human 
existence is constitutive of (i.e., has an “existential-ontological” status concerning) his or her 
very capacity to be an individual at all, regardless of whether others are present with whom an 
individual can possibly interact. In terms of the distinction drawn in the Introduction to this 
dissertation, this claim thus pertains to the social constitution of the individual, not just to the 
different ways in which she can coexist with other people. How can this strong claim be 
justified?  
In answering this question, it is important first to clarify how understanding is 
fundamentally “projective” (entwerfend [SZ 145f.]). Emphasizing this aspect of understanding 
does not add anything new to our understanding of things, but makes explicit what has been 
implicitly operative all along regarding our basic way of existing in the world. In understanding 
the world, what an individual projects in a particular situation is not the totality of logically 
possible ways in which she can understand things and act, but the range of possible actions that 
make sense to her as sensible to carry out given her involvement in a particular referential nexus 
of significance (world). An individual’s familiarity with this range conditions the intelligibility 
of what he or she understands and does in a particular situation. Again, the projection of this 
range need not be something of which individuals are consciously aware. To use the example of 
shopping again, my self-interpretation as a shopper in a store projects the range of possible 
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actions available for me to conceive and perform in that setting (e.g., browse or buy things, get 
information from or make requests of a salesperson, get a refund for a prior purchase of 
something, etc.). My familiarity with some range of possible actions constitutes, therefore, my 
situational leeway or room for maneuver (Spielraum [SZ 145]), i.e., the concrete field of possible 
experiences and actions that make sense to me on that occasion.18 My understanding of some 
situational room for maneuver is what enables me to find my activities in some context 
meaningful by opening up the relevant range of possible actions that I can conceive and perform 
therein; this grasp of a situational room for maneuver also constrains such actions by casting 
other ones as not sensible on that occasion (e.g., actually living in the store as my home, etc.). In 
short, the projection of some determinate situational room for maneuver for an individual is 
prior, not temporally speaking but in the order of logical dependence, to her actual performance 
of a particular action; it is the latter’s necessary condition of intelligibility.19  
This point should be perspicuous enough as it stands, but one can also give an indirect 
argument for its truth in the following way. Suppose an individual has a particular intention and 
acts in some way to carry it out. Does it ever make sense to think that this individual can only 
have that single intention in mind and act to carry it out without already projecting (i.e., 
understanding) the set of other possible actions that are related to (enmeshed with) the action in 
question? Clearly not, for we would not consider someone who can only perform one single 
action to be an agent at all, but rather a primitive robot. Being a competent agent requires the 
capacity to consider a number of diverse intentions and to do a variety of things that are 
interrelated in terms of the pragmatic intelligibility discussed above. But in order to do so, an 
agent must be able to project the relevant situational room for maneuver that in turn structures 
the intelligibility of specific intentions and actions.  
A few further remarks about understanding as projection are in order. First, the 
situational room for maneuver projected by an individual also forms the space of intelligibility 
                                                 
18 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, pp. 189-91. Understanding “projects the being of Dasein on the basis of its for-the-
sake-of-which [i.e., its roles and self-interpretations] just as primordially as on the basis of significance qua the 
worldliness of its current world. … Projection is the existential ontological makeup of the room for maneuver 
[Spielraum] of [Dasein’s] factical ability-to-be.” (SZ 145)     
19 Here I disagree with Blattner, who argues that projection as pressing forward into some particular possibility is 
primary to projection as situational room for maneuver; see Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, pp. 40-2. I think this 
gets the order of explanation exactly backwards. Although Blattner is clearly aware of this issue, I remain 
unpersuaded by his effort to show that his reading is correct.  
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against which atypical intentions and actions become significant. For example, a person in a 
store can refuse to pay for products or services; a salesperson can actively discourage customers 
from buying anything in the store; a robber can steal things from the store; an artist can create an 
artwork that alludes to or plays with, in some aesthetically interesting way, our typical 
experience or activity in the store; etc. The atypical character of these intentions and actions is 
clearly parasitic on a prior understanding of how they can be typical. The point is that while such 
atypical actions clearly make sense as possible actions, which is distinct from the question of 
whether they should be performed, their atypical character derives from actions that are 
understood to be typical. Second, understanding as projection does not just concern the self-
interpretations of an individual. It also opens up the possible ways for non-human entities to be 
what and how they are (e.g., as products that can be bought, used, or consumed, enjoyed, etc.). 
This is just the point that the functional properties that ready-to-hand entities and other people 
exhibit cannot exist absent people’s understanding of them.20 This shows how the self-
interpretation projected by an individual’s understanding is not something that is separable in the 
final analysis from the world (the referential nexus of significance) with which it is engaged (SZ 
123, 143-5). Third, it should be clear that projection in this fundamental sense is not the 
conception of an overall goal or plan of action to be achieved, nor the prediction of how things 
will be in the future given certain actual or hypothetical conditions. These narrower 
understandings of the idea of projection presuppose, and thus cannot explain, how understanding 
is projective in the more basic sense, for these understandings are only intelligible once the world 
as a referential nexus of significance is already understood as a whole and in place. Lastly, it is 
important to mention that the projective nature of understanding must not be understood in a 
Humean sense as the compulsion to impose our “inner” mental states and values onto a meaning- 
and value-free “outer” world. The Humean view is problematic (among other reasons) because it 
takes the idea of projective purport for granted: It assumes that one does not need to explain how 
the mind can globally project properties onto what is supposedly “outside” itself, regardless of 
whether its projection onto the “external” world actually “hits its target” or not (see esp. SZ 62, 
149f.; cf. §§43-4). Unless the possibility of projective purport is first explained as a general 
                                                 
20 “The world as such is not only disclosed as possible significance, but the letting-be [Freigabe] of intraworldly 
entities itself lets such entities be in terms of their possibilities. The ready-to-hand is as such uncovered in its 
serviceability, useability, possibility of being worn down [Abträglichkeit].” (SZ 144)  
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capacity of being human, however, there is no reason to suppose we should take the Humean 
conception of projection as the basic (global), as opposed to being merely a derivative (local), 
way in which human beings comport themselves toward the world.21     
I have shown thus far that being an individual requires the ability to project ranges of 
situationally possible experiences and actions (some situational room for maneuver) on a 
particular occasion, the projecting of which is what in turn enables the individual to conceive 
specific actions as intelligible at all and thereby possibly to perform them. Although the example 
of shopping that I have used to illustrate how an individual engages with the world is inherently 
projective, I have not exploited the fact that this example happens to involve the presence of 
and/or interactions with other people in order to justify the social constitution of the individual. 
Rather, what I have argued is that the projecting of situational possibilities is a necessary 
condition for what it is to be a human individual in general. It is worth noting that if this is true, 
even the performance of what can be called “individual” actions or practices must also require 
the projecting of situational rooms for maneuver. Thus, the performance of any “individual” 
actions, in the sense that one can carry them out alone (e.g., brushing one’s teeth, cooking for 
oneself, encountering sign-posts while driving or going for a walk in the woods alone, etc.), must 
still involve the prior projection of some relevant situational room for maneuver in order to be so 
much as intelligible and thus really possible. In this regard there is no substantive difference 
between individual and collective actions. What matters is not the singularity or collectivity of 
the agency, but the fact that both modes of agency can only engage the world by first projecting 
situational rooms for maneuver.  
A pressing question can now arise. Suppose it is true that the exercise of agency requires 
an understanding of the world as a holistic practical context; that is, suppose that this 
understanding necessarily involves the projection of the situational possibilities (situational 
rooms for maneuver) concerning the entities they deal with, including those that make sense of 
oneself and other people. As just noted, it remains as yet unclear why these two points amount to 
the social constitution of the individual, rather than just the distinctive way in which a human 
individual engages with the world. In Heidegger’s account of human social existence, he moves 
                                                 
21 In a nutshell, the Humean conception of projection is mistaken because it is committed to subject-object dualism. 
To spell out the argument in detail, however, for why it is seriously flawed would effectively require discussion of 
the whole of Division One of Being and Time, something that I need not do here.  
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rather quickly from the thought that an individual must project typical ranges of situational 
possibilities that structure the intelligibility of actions (e.g., the craftsman in the workshop, the 
provider of goods and services in a store, etc. [SZ 117f.]) to the stronger claim that he or she 
always already shares a common world with other people. As Heidegger writes: 
On the basis of this with-like [mithaften] being-in-the-world, the world is in each case always already one 
that I share with others. The world of Dasein is the common world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is being-with [or co-
existence] with others [Mitsein mit Anderen]. The intraworldly being-in-itself of these others is co-Dasein 
[Mitdasein]. (SZ 118)    
 
But what ensures that people do indeed share the world with one another, since it is individual 
human beings who understand the world?22 Putting this question in the terms developed above, 
what ensures that the situational room for maneuver that an individual projects on some occasion 
is the same as or meshes coherently with the ones that others project? Unless this can be shown, 
it is hard to see how the claim that a human being “always already lives in a common world” can 
be convincingly justified. In effect, what I argued above regarding the projective character of 
understanding has focused solely for analytical purposes on what must be involved in the activity 
of understanding the world, i.e., how we engage with the world, without paying sufficient 
attention to what it is that we engage with on the basis of this understanding. But what an 
individual understands in her engagement with the world cannot be ignored in the final analysis. 
On my reading, Heidegger’s discussion of the significance of the one23 (das Man [SZ §27]) 
addresses this important issue (among other things).  
What is the one? To begin with, it specifies who we are initially and mostly (zunächst 
und zumeist), or primarily and usually, in our everyday existence.24 Our identities make sense 
usually in terms of the roles and self-interpretations, both mundane and significant, for the sakes 
of which we are what we do over time (e.g., commuter, customer, consumer, practitioner of a 
certain occupation, co-worker, partner, spouse, parent, friend, etc.). It is clearly our sociocultural 
                                                 
22 This is Olafson’s objection to Heidegger’s conception of being-with; see Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, 
p. 146f. For direct rebuttals of this objection, see Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, Ch. 8; Carman, “On Being Social”; 
Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism” and “Early Heidegger on Sociality”; and 
Boedeker, “Individual and Community in Early Heidegger”. 
23 In what follows, whenever I italicize ‘one’, I am using it in Heidegger’s loaded sense of this word. When I do not 
italicize it, I am using it as this is standardly done (as one does!) in English.     
24 “The expression ‘everydayness’ means … a definite how of existence that predominates Dasein…. We have often 
used in the present analysis the expression ‘initially and mostly’ [‘zunächst und zumeist’]. ‘Initially’ means: the way 
in which Dasein is ‘manifest’ [i.e., shows up as making sense] in the with-one-another of publicness … ‘Mostly’ 
means: the way in which Dasein, not always but ‘as a rule’, shows him- or herself for anyone.” (SZ 370)   
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heritage (i.e., the one) that provides the initial contents of these roles and self-interpretations, 
which at once makes available and delimits the typical range of situational possibilities that make 
sense for individuals in their actual lives.25 But the one does not ultimately refer to any particular 
individual, group, or population of individuals, or even the sum of all individuals in a community 
or society (SZ 128f.). Indeed, the one does not refer to any entity (Seiendes) at all, but more 
generally highlights the mostly inconspicuous but pervasive normative intelligibility of the world 
as a whole that forms the background against which human individuals initially and mostly 
understand anything and act.26 The claim is that the basic way in which we exist in the world is 
necessarily intelligible in terms of our grasp of and tacit conformity to the sociocultural norms 
that the one supplies. Despite the tendentious rhetoric that Heidegger uses to describe the 
superficial but insidious “dictatorship” of the one over our everyday lives (SZ 126-8), it would be 
a mistake to understand the one as merely his label for the factual tendency of human beings to 
desire and strive for social conformism. Rather, the one, or more precisely an individual’s being 
in the mode of the one as his or her predominant way of existing in the world, is a necessary 
aspect or structure of human existence in general, not something that is optional for any human 
being.27 We do well, therefore, to distinguish carefully between the factual tendency of human 
beings (for better or worse) to pursue social conformism and their structural conformity to the 
one as one of the constitutive characteristics of their being in the world.28  
We now need to explain what an individual’s understanding of the normative 
intelligibility that informs her familiarity with the world has to do with her ability to share a 
common world with others, and thereby how she is most basically socially constituted. This turns 
on the public character of norms in two senses. First and more familiarly, it is always a multitude 
or plurality of people who find norms intelligible; the contents of such norms are impersonal in 
the sense that they are not initially and mostly the unique inventions or exclusive possessions of 
                                                 
25 Obviously, a multicultural individual embodies more than just one sociocultural heritage.  
26 “Everyday Dasein draws the preontological interpretation of its being from the familiar [nächsten] mode of being 
of the one.” (SZ 130; cf. 169) 
27 “The one is an existential and belongs as originary phenomenon to the positive makeup of Dasein…. Self-
ownership [Das eigentliche Selbstsein] does not rest on an exceptional condition of the subject that is detached from 
the one, but is an existentiell modification of the one as one of its essential existentials.” (SZ 129f.) The ‘its’ at the 
end of the last sentence refers to human existence in general (Dasein or being-in-the-world), not to the one.   
28 As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the key insights of Dreyfus’s interpretation of Being and Time is his use 
of this important distinction to clear up what appears at first glance to be Heidegger’s confusion about the status and 
significance of das Man; see esp. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, Ch. 8 and 13.    
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particular individuals. Rather, they can be understood by anyone who is familiar with them on 
the basis of his or her sociocultural heritage (SZ 126f.). This should be obvious just by reflecting 
upon the nature of roles and self-interpretations in general. Second and more importantly, the 
public character of the one expresses the normativity – in the first instance, the normalization – 
involved in our dealings with entities in the world, including with ourselves and other people.29 
Heidegger chooses the term ‘das Man’ to capture the impersonal and normative (normalized) 
aspects of our everyday existence in general. Linguistically speaking, this neologism stems from 
the German impersonal pronoun ‘man’, which figures (when translated into English) in 
utterances like, e.g., “One can get to the airport from the university by taking the 28X bus” or 
“One shouldn’t talk during a movie screening”, etc. In colloquial English, we do not usually use 
‘one’ (because it sounds stilted), but rather words like ‘you’ or ‘people’ (“This is how you drive 
a car with a stick shift”, “That’s what people do at interviews”, etc.).    
It should be clear how roles and self-interpretations are normalized. The adoption by or 
ascription to an individual of a role or self-interpretation straightforwardly implies that he or she 
is supposed to act in certain normal or acceptable ways that are tied to that role or self-
interpretation. But as pointed out above, the occupation of a role or self-interpretation does not 
only normalize and thereby make intelligible one’s typical identity on an occasion. It also 
normalizes the equipment, the tasks accomplished with it, and the various goals and ends that are 
pertinent to its occupation (SZ 123). That is, the occupation of a role or self-interpretation 
normalizes (or standardizes) the relevant referential nexus of significance tied to this role or self-
interpretation on that occasion. For example, being a customer or a salesperson requires that 
products for sale are supposed to come with some price; a store is supposed to be a place where 
items are made available for purchase; customers are supposed to pay for things they want to 
buy, etc.30 Unless an individual is already familiar with how things are normally understood and 
done in terms of that referential nexus of significance, none of the situational possibilities of 
                                                 
29 I note for now that normativity as such is not identical to normalization, but concerns a broader set of phenomena 
and issues. I will discuss this point in Ch. 5, when I will relate the line of thought set out in this chapter to the debate 
concerning the nature of rule-following. It is important for my purposes, however, to show how the theme of 
normativity (leaving unspecified what it is exactly for the moment) shows up to us, in the first instance, under the 
guise of how phenomena are normalized. This will become clearer in what follows below.    
30 “The ready-to-hand has in all cases proprieties and improprieties [Geeignetheiten und Ungeeignetheiten], and its 
‘properties’ are, as it were, still bound up in these proprieties and improprieties, just like how the present-at-hand, as 
[a] possible mode of being of something ready-to-hand, [is bound up] in readiness-to-hand.” (SZ 83)  
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experience and action that are typically open to him in the context of shopping will be 
intelligible. To generalize, we take for granted without self-consciousness in our everyday 
existence, as our “default” way of dealing with entities in the world, that there are normal 
(typical, standard) ways for entities, including people, to be what and how they are. The 
normativity in play is mostly inconspicuous unless there is some type of breakdown or violation 
of the way things are supposed to be (used, occur, behave, act, etc.). It is important to understand 
that the normativity that entities exhibit is not primarily instrumental, prudential, or morally 
prescriptive, but figures as a constitutive aspect of their very intelligibility. What is crucial to 
understand is that any individual must already draw on the normative intelligibility of the world 
when she makes sense of things or co-exists with others by projecting some relevant situational 
room for maneuver, regardless of whether she in fact conforms to some norm or not on some 
particular occasion.31   
When human individuals take over roles and self-interpretations in this manner, they 
interpret themselves and act on the basis of the public norms that are supplied by the one. When 
they do so, they understand themselves as one-selves (Man-selbst), i.e., as what one is supposed 
to do on given occasions once one adopts or, more often, simply falls into the occupation of roles 
and self-interpretations (for-the-sakes-of-which) that are public in the sense explicated above. In 
everyday life, we initially and mostly exist as one-selves.   
The self of everyday Dasein is the one-self [das Man-selbst]. … When Dasein is familiar to itself as the 
one-self, this means at the same time that the one prescribes the initial interpretation of the world and of 
being-in-the-world. The one-self, for the sake of which Dasein is in everyday life, articulates the referential 
nexus of significance. The world of Dasein renders intelligible entities that show up in terms of an 
involvement-whole [i.e., a situational room for maneuver] that is familiar to the one and within the limits 
that have been established through the averageness of the one. Initially, factical Dasein is in the common 
world that has been discovered in an average way. Initially, it is not “I” who “am” my own self [Zunächst 
“bin” nicht “ich” im Sinne des eigenen Selbst], but the others in the way of the one. … Initially, Dasein is 
the one and mostly remains so. (SZ 129)           
 
By now it should not be hard to see how the practical holism of the world discussed above 
coalesces with the normativity (normalization) of the world in virtue of our largely 
inconspicuous but ubiquitous conformity to the norms provided by the one. For example, entities 
                                                 
31 I will elaborate this point below. For the time being, this remark responds to the objection that people often do not 
in fact act in ways that conform to norms; see MacIntyre, “The Idea of a Social Science”. This objection 
misunderstands the fundamental way in which norms govern our activities by assuming, mistakenly, that there can 
be no conformity to norms unless people actually conform to them all or most of the time. But the point is that they 
cannot so much as actually conform to norms (or not) unless they first understand the intelligibility of the world in 
which they find themselves, an intelligibility that is already normative.     
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like products, price tags, shelves, cash registers, customers, store employees, etc., can only make 
sense by playing their normal roles in our understanding of ourselves and others in a referential 
nexus of significance. Absent a shared understanding of what it is for them to behave normally, 
no practically intelligible nexus can be sustained as an interrelated complex that a multitude or 
plurality of individuals understand in common. The normativity (normalization) maintained by 
our predominant existence in the mode of the one is thus constitutive of our basic comportment 
toward the world by constraining our typical understanding of some relevant nexus of practically 
meaningful items (tasks, nested ends, self-interpretations). What normalized comportment makes 
intelligible and governs is how such items are “referred” or “assigned” (verwiesen [SZ 83f., 123]) 
to one another, i.e., how they hang together as a complex whole within some practically 
intelligible nexus. In short, normative practical holism is the basic and full character of the 
worldliness of the world. 
Understanding oneself and acting primarily and mostly in accordance with the normative 
intelligibility that the one supplies, then, is what ensures that individuals by and large share a 
common world. As Heidegger writes in a lecture course that served as an earlier draft of Being 
and Time: 
The one as that which forms the everyday being-with-one-another … constitutes what we call the public in 
the strict sense of the word. It implies that the world is always already primarily given as the common 
world. It is not the case that on the one hand there are first individual subjects which at any given time have 
their own world; and that the task would then arise of putting together, by virtue of some sort of an 
arrangement, the various particular worlds of the individuals and of agreeing how one would have a 
common world. This is how philosophers imagine these things when they ask about the constitution of the 
intersubjective world. We say instead that the first thing that is given is the common world – the one – the 
world in which Dasein is absorbed ….32  
 
Note that what is shared by different individuals in belonging to a common world is not rigid 
conformity to a set of norms concerning how one should think or behave, but a common starting-
point or frame of reference – a common way of knowing one’s way around in the world – in 
relation to which both agreements and disagreements can determinately emerge. Lest there be 
any misunderstanding, the necessity of our structural conformity to the norms supplied by the 
one does not imply that individuals can never act in ways that violate such norms. But in order 
for this non-conformity itself to be significant, it must occur against the background of some 
ongoing understanding of what the normal or acceptable way of understanding things and acting 
                                                 
32 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 246. This earlier account of the social constitution of the human 
being is in a number of ways clearer and more comprehensive than the compressed one offered in Being and Time.  
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is on given occasions, even if individuals reject this understanding in the end. Indeed, conformity 
to the normative intelligibility of the one does not preclude, but actually makes possible, the 
standing potential for resistance to the averageness maintained by our immersion in the one.33 
We are now finally in the position to understand the social constitution of the human 
individual. Because such an individual understands the everyday world as one-self, she cannot 
help but initially and mostly project situational possibilities of experience and action that are 
public, as this occurs by and large in accordance with the normative (normalized) intelligibility 
that the one supplies. Her predominant existence in the mode of the one, which both enables but 
also constrains her ability to be a situated concrete agent at all, is the fundamental way in which 
the human individual is socially constituted. For such an individual cannot help but draw on the 
normative intelligibility informing the overall significance of the world that the one provides by 
way of her familiarity with and general conformity to the public norms that the one makes 
available. No single individual can generate and fully control the normative intelligibility that the 
one supplies, for this intelligibility already constrains the activities of a multitude or plurality of 
individuals by opening up and delimiting the possible roles or self-interpretations that these 
individuals can take up, an intelligibility that in turn structures how they deal with one another 
and non-human entities in some situation.34 In more familiar terms, this is just what is involved 
for individuals to be “socialized” into customs, practices, and traditions. This socialization does 
not simply condition and affect how we interact with other people, but always presupposes an 
individual’s socialization into a world that is common. The normative intelligibility that the one 
articulates, then, serves as the reservoir of possibilities that gives typical content to the self-
interpretations that make sense to any human individual in her dealings with the world on some 
particular occasion. Although her activity of projecting situational possibilities is numerically 
distinct from those of others, the content (i.e., the range of possibilities and types of actions) that 
                                                 
33 “Dasein is never capable of extricating itself from how things are interpreted in everyday life because it grows up 
initially in the midst of the latter. All genuine [acts of] understanding, interpreting and communicating, 
rediscovering, and novel appropriating comes about in the midst of, from, and against how things are interpreted in 
everyday life.” (SZ 169; cf. 153)        
34 It is in this precise sense that “the one-self, for the sake for which Dasein is in everyday life, articulates the 
referential nexus of significance” (SZ 129).  
 67 
 
they each project contains wide-ranging commonalities that are normalized, insofar they 
understand themselves in the mode of the one.35  
A final question can arise about the nature of the one: Does the one merely circumscribe 
the typical possibilities that a human individual projects and lives out, or does it rather exhaust 
his possibilities in general, whether these are typical or not?36 This question concerns whether 
our predominant existence as one-selves in everyday life makes sufficient room for the diversity 
of human existence, in the sense that different individuals can project and actualize possibilities 
that differ from those envisaged by the one. Now, it cannot be the case that the one, qua the 
normative intelligibility of the world, exhausts the full range of possible experiences and actions 
that a human individual projects and lives out. For one thing, if this were so, a community or 
society could never change over the course of its history, which is obviously false. For another, it 
is not by accident that Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes the important qualification that the one 
– initially and mostly (zunächst und zumeist), or primarily and usually – determines what we 
understand and do in our lives. This qualification implies that there are indeed possible 
experiences and actions that do not fall under the purview of the one. Indeed, the lengthy 
discussion in Division Two of Being and Time of what it takes for a human being to genuinely 
individualize herself and thereby achieve self-ownership (eigentliches Selbstsein, Eigentlichkeit) 
examines the possible experiences and actions of an individual that emphatically do not conform 
to the public norms of the one. In a less existentialist vein, we can well imagine how events can 
occur in individuals’ lives (e.g., in extreme circumstances such as the experience of war, political 
oppression, natural disasters, economic hardships, severe health problems, personal tragedies, 
etc.) that can dramatically condition the particular self-interpretations that they have; these 
events can readily alter their projects and commitments in ways that diverge from or challenge 
                                                 
35 This conclusion agrees in substance with Schatzki’s, which he puts in more Heideggerian terms: “… [D]ifferent 
Daseins are thrown into the single publicness of the One [Man] and … each [Dasein] projects and presses forward 
into the possibilities composing this publicness. There is one space [of intelligibility] but multiple happenings of 
being thrown into and projecting it; one there [i.e., one common Da in Da-sein (literally: being-there), insofar as 
Dasein understands itself and acts in light of the public norms of the one], but multiple lives carrying on in its 
terms.” (Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Sociality”, p. 241)    
36 Ibid., p. 242.  
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received social norms.37 It is thus clearly the case that the one only circumscribes the typical 
(normal) possible experiences and actions that make sense to us in daily life.  
The question we are left with, then, is how our predominant existence in the mode of the 
one at once normalizes situational possibilities and yet enables novel ones to arise and become 
feasible. The beginnings of an adequate response to this question will be given in 2.3 below, a 
response that will be further developed at length in the discussion of the nature of rule-following 
in Ch. 5. For the moment, I think we do well to keep in mind that the normative intelligibility of 
the everyday world that the one supplies should be understood to serve as an enabling condition 
of novelty and creativity, not as something statically restrictive and in relation to which 
individual human beings are wholly passive (cf. SZ 153, 179, 382-6, 391f.)38 Once we come to 
see how there is no tension between the normalization that the one effects and the possibility of 
novelty or resistance given this normalization, this should defuse the worry that the human 
individual’s predominant existence in the mode of the one precludes the possibility that she can 
conceive and undertake projects that break with or challenge those circumscribed by the one.  
To conclude this section, I have argued that different individuals share a common world 
by primarily and mostly projecting situational possibilities that are common among them because 
such possibilities are normalized by their predominant existence in the mode of the one. With 
this conclusion established, we have now justified my proposal at the end of the last chapter 
regarding how Pettit’s formulation of the thesis of social holism (the social constitution of the 
human individual) should be modified: 
Individual human beings are not entirely self-sufficient. (1) They must depend upon one another for the 
possession and exercise of some basic capacity – namely, the capacity to be-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) 
– that is central to the flourishing of the human being. (2) Furthermore, no one can come to possess and 
exercise this basic capacity – no one can be properly human – except by sharing the world, not primarily 
by interacting with other human beings. 
 
It is in this precise manner that the human individual is socially constituted.  
                                                 
37 Note that if these conditions persist long enough in people’s lives, they may well become aspects of the normative 
(normalized) intelligibility of the one (“the new normal”). As I have been emphasizing, we should not understand 
this intelligibility in a static way, but as something dynamic and capable of evolution.   
38 “The One [Man] is a space of acceptable possibilities. Anyone thrown into it differs from everyone else so thrown 
by way of realizing a different combination of the acceptable ways of proceeding and thinking. Hence, there is 
plenty of room for different deeds and words. The existence of a single pool of anonymous possibilities does not 
negate significant plurality. Given, moreover, that One spaces are parceled out at least one per generation, there 
exists a plurality of One spaces (in any tradition) and across them.” (Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Sociality”,  
p. 244, emphasis in the original) 
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2.2 THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A SITE 
The conception of the social constitution of the individual for which I have just argued agrees 
considerably in sympathy and outlook with the “site” social ontology (or “site ontology” in 
short) that Theodore Schatzki has recently articulated in great detail, so much so that it is 
appropriate to call the former a “site” conception of this constitution.39 Although it is clear that 
one of the major sources of Schatzki’s site ontology is Heidegger’s Being and Time, he deploys 
his own terminology and makes Heidegger’s conception of the social more concrete by 
abstracting site ontology from the wider concerns of Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” (i.e., 
his account of human existence as being-in-the-world).  
Schatzki’s most general claim is that the nature of human social life is best understood by 
way of seeing how this life is rooted in and transpires at “the site of the social”, conceived as the 
specific context of human coexistence. A site in this sense goes beyond its more familiar 
understanding as either an area of sheer physical space or, more broadly, a context in which 
things are arranged in ways that enable the performance of certain activities (e.g., a store, a 
classroom, an office, an airport, a website, etc.).40 Strictly speaking, a context qualifies as a site 
in Schatzki’s stipulated sense of this term if and only if (at least) some subset of the phenomena 
or activities occurring in it do so as intrinsic parts or aspects of such a site. This implies that 
these phenomena or activities cannot be intelligible and exist apart from their embeddedness in a 
site. More precisely, he determines a site in this sense as a mesh of practices and material 
arrangements.41 Practices are defined as temporally evolving, open-ended sets of doings and 
sayings linked by practical understandings, rules, and teleoaffective structures,42 while material 
arrangements are composed of configurations of entities (i.e., people, artifacts, organisms, and 
natural things) with which practices are closely interwoven. Practices and material arrangements 
                                                 
39 Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology” and The Site of the Social; cf. also his Social Practices.  
40 Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 176f.; The Site of the Social, pp. 63-5. 
41 Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 194f. 
42 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p. 87. Schatzki actually adds a fourth component of practices, namely, what he 
calls “general understandings” (ibid., p. 86). They pertain to the sense of community (“common enterprise, concern, 
and fate” [ibid.]) that permeates the doings and sayings bound up with a given array of practical understandings, 
explicit rules, and teleoaffective structures. It strikes me, however, that general understandings in this sense, unlike 
the case with the other three components of practices, are not always present whenever an individual or a plurality of 
individuals engage(s) in practices. For want of space, I choose to omit it without argument in my sketch of 
Schatzki’s conception of practices.    
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are meshed because they pervasively implicate each other and do not just “interface” at discrete 
points of contact.43  
It is helpful to explicate this conception of practices not just because of its inherent 
interest, but because it will be invoked and put implicitly to use in this dissertation. To begin 
with, a practice, at a bare minimum, is a doing or saying (utterance), or a set of doings or 
sayings, that people perform over an extended period of time.44 Thus, a doing or saying does not 
count as a practice unless it is repeatedly performed over time. This determination has the virtue 
of capturing the ordinary understanding of what a practice is and its distinction from an action. 
But not any action or utterance that is repeatedly performed over time qualifies as a practice. For 
example, mundane actions or activities such as eating, sitting, standing, walking, sleeping, etc. – 
as such, considered completely apart from the significance they have that derives from the 
contexts in which they occur – are not practices even though they are obviously repeatedly 
performed. Rather, what constitutes a repeatedly performed action or activity as a practice is that 
it is performed by the agent(s) with a sense of how the doings and sayings that instantiate the 
practice are organized by practical understandings, explicit rules, and teleoaffective structures. I 
use the word ‘sense’ here for two reasons. First, as a mere stylistic point, even though the word 
‘understanding’ captures more precisely what is meant here, it occurs at least one more time in 
the specification of what a practice is; in order to prevent possible confusion, ‘sense’ is 
preferable. Second and more importantly, ‘sense’ here expresses how someone can have a grasp 
or understanding of things without knowing explicitly how or why, let alone being capable of 
explaining how or why, she understands them. For this reason ‘sense’ here can be used 
interchangeably with ‘tacit grasp or awareness’, as long as the latter is not understood as 
something like transparent, self-conscious awareness in a quasi-Cartesian way, but rather as a 
general capacity that functions like the “background monitoring” of things. Consequently, 
whenever an individual performs (enacts, participates in, etc.) an action/activity or makes an 
utterance that instantiates a genuine practice, she performs it with some sense (some tacit grasp 
                                                 
43 Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 195; cf. The Site of the Social, pp. 96-101, 106-8. 
44 Later Wittgenstein also insists on this as a general defining feature of a practice. (See my discussion of this in  
Ch. 5.) For the sake of simplicity, I will initially focus on practices that are instantiated by a single doing or saying. 
But the import of my explication applies equally to practices that are constituted by a set of doings or sayings that 
qualify as practices.  
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or awareness) of how her action/activity or utterance is intelligible in connection with a certain 
array of practical understandings, explicit rules, and teleoaffective structures.  
Some remarks are in order before we explicate what practical understandings, explicit 
rules, and teleoaffective structures are. First, it will turn out that practices that are intelligible in 
connection with this array of items are “integrative practices”, which is distinct from what are 
called “dispersed practices”.45 Integrative practices are “thicker” by encompassing a complex of 
items, whereas dispersed practices are “thinner” by revolving almost always around the 
situational performance of a single type of repeated action. Because the nature of dispersed 
practices is better understood once that of integrative practices is explained, I will postpone my 
explication of dispersed practices until that of integrative practices is in place. Second, although 
the repeated performance of an action/activity or utterance is usually necessary for the latter to 
qualify as an instance of a practice in general, there may be occasions when performances 
diverge, at least initially and at times even deliberately, from past performances. But these 
divergent or novel performances may come with time to be seen not only as being continuous 
with past performances, but extending their significance by casting these in a new light. For 
example, the practice of Anglo-American common law, which is based on the interpretation of 
legal principles as expressed in precedents and applied to current circumstances, is a paradigm 
example of this.46 But this type of phenomenon occurs in many different areas of human history. 
We need only think of revolutionary movements in the sciences (e.g. the Newtonian paradigm 
vis-à-vis the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics), in the arts (e.g., tonal vis-à-vis atonal 
music), in politics (e.g., the meaning and practice of democracy in ancient Athens vis-à-vis its 
meaning and practice in the modern world), etc. These examples show that although repeated 
performance is a general defining feature of practices, it involves a sort of repetition that also 
opens up the possibility of divergence and novelty.47 For this reason, it is more careful to say that 
practices are temporally evolving, open-ended (sets of) actions/activities or utterances, for “fresh 
actions are continually perpetuating and extending practices temporally”, rather than simply 
repeatedly performed actions/activities or utterances that are static over time.48 As long as we 
                                                 
45 Schatzki, Social Practices, pp. 91-110 and The Site of the Social, pp. 70-88. 
46 Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism”, pp. 230-3.  
47 The intelligibility and significance of the novel performances can only show up against the background of 
repeated past performances (see 2.3 below).   
48 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, pp. 72, 83.  
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bear this caveat in mind, conceiving practices as (sets of) repeatedly performed actions/activities 
or utterances over time is not incorrect.  
As mentioned, integrative practices are constituted by arrays of practical understandings, 
explicit rules, and teleoaffective structures. It is easy to give countless examples of such 
practices: practices related to one’s work or occupation, domestic practices, parenting practices, 
educational practices, political practices, commuting practices, shopping practices, practices 
having to do one’s leisurely activities, etc. To characterize an array of practices as integrative 
means that such practices are complexes of actions/activities or utterances that are necessarily 
organized. Most of the time in our everyday existence, we understand and act in the world, 
primarily and usually, by engaging in integrative practices, and sometimes in multiple ones at the 
same time. We engage in them either by directly embracing and participating in them, or else by 
intending and performing divergent or novel actions/activities whose intelligibility still traces 
back to their relation to ongoing integrative practices, even if these actions or activities are 
marginal to, swing free of, or even challenge the patterns, norms, or values that participation in 
these practices usually (re)establish.   
The practical understandings of an integrative practice are the abilities that an individual 
must be able to perform in order to engage in such a practice. Practical understandings depend on 
the exercise of three specific capacities: (i) knowing how to X (where X is some action); (ii) 
knowing how to identify instances of X; and (iii) knowing how to prompt or respond to instances 
of X.49 Examples of non-linguistic practical understandings are actions or activities that involve 
the execution of embodied skills (e.g., the set of motor or perceptual skills at work in performing 
some bodily activity, or using some set of equipment that requires the exercise of such skills); 
examples of linguistic practical understandings are actions/activities or sayings that are involved 
in, e.g., asking and replying to questions, asserting, explaining, ordering, reporting, attributing 
intentional states, etc. Moreover, two or more people share the same practical understandings 
involved in a practice when either person’s performances of X are mutually intelligible to one 
another, as well as when either person’s judgments of which doings and sayings count as X-ings 
                                                 
49 Schatzki, Social Practices, p. 91 and The Site of the Social, p. 77f. 
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are mutually intelligible (provided that in both cases they share knowledge of the circumstances 
of action).50   
The second sort of constituents of an integrative practice are explicit rules: “explicit 
formulations, principles, precepts, and instructions that enjoin, direct, or remonstrate people to 
perform specific actions. To say that rules link [and thereby organize] doings and sayings is to 
say that people, in carrying out these doings and sayings, take account of and adhere to the same 
rules.”51 Because the ways in which explicit rules guide the understanding of and engagement in 
integrative practices are relatively straightforward, we need not say anything more about them 
except to note that these rules are not the source of the normativity that makes intelligible and 
constrains practices, whether integrative or dispersed. At most, explicit rules codify what 
behavior is prescribed or acceptable to a multitude of people who participate in the practices to 
which such rules pertain; they cannot constitute, all on their own, the normativity of practices.52  
The third sort of constituents of an integrative practice is a teleoaffective structure. 
Because this component of such a practice is especially significant for site ontology, as well as 
for the understanding of the social constitution of the human individual worked out in the 
previous section, it requires greater elaboration. A teleoaffective structure is a range of 
normalized and hierarchically structured tasks, projects, and ultimate ends that can also be tied 
sometimes to certain emotions that are normalized.53 This conception of a teleoaffective 
structure overlaps significantly with that of the tripartite structure that constitutes the world in its 
worldliness as a space of intelligibility, as elaborated in the previous section. (Recall that the 
three components of the world in this sense are: (1) a totality of entities that show up as ready-to-
hand equipment, each of which is used for performing some specific task; (2) more 
encompassing short-term and medium-term goals which are accomplished by performing these 
tasks; and (3) the self-interpretations for the sake of which individual human beings realize who 
they are in some context by doing or saying things that contribute toward or enact these self-
interpretations.) Typically, any individual who occupies some role or self-interpretation, whether 
he has assigned himself that role or self-interpretation or else simply fallen into them, engages 
ipso facto in integrative practices that express teleoaffective structures, for the role or self-
                                                 
50 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p. 78.  
51 Ibid., p. 79.  
52 See my discussion of this in Ch. 5. 
53 Schatzki, Social Practices, pp. 100-2 and The Site of the Social, pp. 80-5. 
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interpretation serves as a focal point that binds together and thus organizes the normalized and 
hierarchically structured tasks, projects, and ultimate ends that make up a teleoaffective 
structure. As mentioned, the latter sometimes also demand or at least expect the possession and 
expression of certain emotions. For example, parenting practices evidently involve the 
understanding and performance of a range of tasks (e.g., those specific and rather tedious ones 
concerning the well-being of children), projects (e.g., teaching them how to manage their desires 
and emotions, how to deal appropriately with other children and adults), and ultimate ends (e.g., 
raising them to be healthy, considerate, and socially competent and engaged individuals). But 
parenting practices also involve, at least ideally, the possession and expression of certain 
emotions on the part of parents toward their children (e.g., parental love and affection, but also 
the requisite amount of sternness and disciplinary actions).54 Not all teleoaffective structures, 
though, require or expect the possession and expression of certain emotions on the part of those 
who act on the basis of such structures. In such cases, the various items of teleoaffective 
structures only concern the teleology (the goal-directedness) of a hierarchically structured range 
of tasks, projects, and ultimate ends.55  
The tasks, projects, and ultimate ends in a teleoaffective structure must be normalized 
because they form a teleological complex. Absent their normalization, these goal-oriented 
actions/activities would no longer be coordinated and thus aim, together as a package, to realize 
the overall telos of an integrative practice. In such a situation, the practice that encompasses 
these goals and actions/activities becomes either defective, parts of other practices, or is even 
destroyed.56 For example, a teacher who does not do, to a minimally competent and satisfactory 
degree, what he is supposed to do in relation to those whom he teaches and works with may well 
                                                 
54 Other teleoaffective structures that demand the possession and expression of a modicum of certain emotions, in 
addition to a range of normalized tasks, projects, and ultimate ends, occur in certain occupations such as being a 
medical doctor or a nurse, a teacher, a soldier, an athlete on a sports team, an entrepreneur, etc.  
55 Schatzki, Social Practices, p. 101. Teleoaffective structures that are typically indifferent to emotions are those that 
inform the practices, e.g., of sales representatives, office workers, assembly line workers. Note that this point does 
not express any evaluation of the worth of these occupations. Note also that although these structures in themselves 
do not require or expect the possession and expression of certain emotions on the part of those who act in their light, 
this does not imply that such individuals do not, as particular individuals, have emotional reactions to what they do 
in response to such structures. For example, although being an office worker or a bus driver in themselves may not 
require having certain emotions, an individual office worker or a bus driver can very well dislike or even hate her 
line of work.   
56 Consider the original significance of why brides in Western marriage ceremonies wear white dresses vis-à-vis 
their contemporary significance; or the original significance of why practicing Jews originally “ate kosher” vis-à-vis 
the contemporary significance of doing so for them.     
 75 
 
be doing other things, but he would no longer be genuinely engaging in teaching practices; such 
an individual would not be living up to the set of responsibilities that his occupation of this self-
interpretation expects of him. Generally speaking, then, the normalization of a set of tasks, 
projects, and ultimate ends into an organized complex is what binds them together into a goal-
directed and (when appropriate) affective complex of coordinated activities and (when 
appropriate) emotions. As Schatzki writes: 
The indefinite range of end-project-task combinations contained in a practice’s teleoaffective structure 
and realized in participants’ doings and sayings are either ones that participants ought to realize or ones 
that it is acceptable for them to do so: A practice always exhibits a set of [ultimate] ends that participants 
should or may pursue, a range of projects that they should or may carry out for the sake of these ends, and 
a selection of tasks that they should or may perform for the sake of these projects. Participants, moreover, 
typically carry out end-project-task combinations that are contained in the practice’s teleoaffective 
structure; that is to say, normativized [i.e., normalized] ends, projects, and tasks determine what is 
signified to them to do.57   
 
As also emphasized in the previous section, the normativity (normalization) that applies to the 
tasks, projects, and ultimate ends that make up teleoaffective structures is not primarily 
prudential or morally prescriptive, but figures as a constitutive aspect of the very organization 
(i.e., intelligibility) of such structures. Lastly, in contrast with explicit rules, it is evident that the 
normativity (normalization) of teleoaffective structures need not and mostly does not apply in a 
deliberate or self-conscious way, unless there is some sort of anomaly or breakdown concerning 
the realization of the tasks, projects, or ultimate ends that compose these structures.   
One final point should be especially emphasized regarding the nature of a teleoaffective 
structure. Such a structure is not a set of properties of an individual or a plurality of individuals, 
but of the practice they engage in as such. That is, they are properties of the “set of ends, 
projects, and affectivities that, as a collection, is (1) expressed in the open-ended set of doings 
and sayings that compose the practice and (2) unevenly incorporated into different participants’ 
minds and actions”.58 To put it in more Heideggerian terms, our predominant existence in 
everyday life as one-selves provides us with shared public teleoaffective structures on the basis 
of which we typically understand things and act. These are not the unique possessions of 
particular individuals, but their common possession because of their social constitution. In other 
words, once an individual learns to engage competently in practices, it is the normalized 
intelligibility that flows from the organization of the practices itself that provides and structures 
                                                 
57 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p. 80; cf. Social Practices, p. 101f. 
58 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p. 80 and “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 192f. 
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the typical contents of her particular intentional states or particular doings and sayings, not these 
states or doings and sayings in themselves: “the normativity that characterizes a practice’s 
teleoaffective structure shapes what makes sense to people to do by way of the example, 
instruction, and sanction to which neophytes (and veterans) are subject and in the context of 
which certain mental conditions arise in these individuals”.59 This point reinforces the one made 
in the previous section regarding the social constitution of the human individual. Initially and 
mostly, people understand (project situational possibilities) and act in terms of the normative 
intelligibility that they share with others just by becoming familiar and competent with the 
practices into which they are trained. Once they have mastered these practices, this mastery 
provides them with the situational leeway or room for maneuver on the basis of which they can 
adopt and modify these practices, from occasion to occasion, in response to the distinctive 
circumstances in which they find themselves.60  
What we have before us, then, is a version of holistic individualism. On this view, it is 
only individuals who understand things and act on particular occasions, not any entities (e.g., 
social regularities, forces, structures, or systems) that exist above and beyond them and allegedly 
coerce them to behave in certain ways. But what individuals understand – i.e., the practices on 
the basis of which they usually make sense of the world – is not initially and mostly their 
individual possession, but something that they always already share with others just by virtue of 
having learned (having been trained into) these practices. When other people, e.g., evaluate how 
well someone understands and performs a practice, they are also guided initially by their 
understanding of the normative intelligibility that applies to the practice in question. This 
understanding, again, is not initially and mostly their individual possession, but something they 
learned on the basis of their social constitution. In sum, the social constitution of the individual, 
understood here in a way that converges with site ontology, is individualistic to the extent that it 
holds that it is only individuals who actually understand things and act, from occasion to 
occasion. But it breaks with reductive forms of individualism by arguing that individuals’ 
                                                 
59 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p. 81. 
60 I expand on this point in much greater detail in Ch. 5.  
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understandings of the world are thoroughly socially constituted in the sense that such 
understandings are always initially shared and public.61    
As mentioned above, dispersed practices differ from integrative practices in that they 
revolve around the repeated, though still situationally attuned, performances of a single type of 
action. Unlike integrative practices, dispersed ones are only carried out through the exercise of 
practical understandings and almost never involve taking into account or adhering to explicit 
rules or teleoaffective structures. For example, the activities of raising and responding to 
questions, explaining, etc., occur across an enormously wide variety of circumstances, not all of 
which always involves connections to explicit rules and teleological structures. The same goes 
for the exercise of nonlinguistic practical understandings like sitting, standing, walking, raising 
one’s arm, etc., in certain contexts. Practices are “dispersed” in the sense that they are more or 
less performed in the same way, even though they are performed across multiple, widely diverse 
contexts of human existence.  
It is important, though, not to think of dispersed practices as the “building blocks” of 
integrative practices.62 A repeated bodily activity as such is not the performance of a practice, 
whether dispersed or integrative, unless it takes place and is understood in some context. There is 
a world of difference, for example, between performing the dispersed practice of sitting on a 
chair and the integrative one of sitting on the benches of the British Parliament; or between the 
dispersed practice of walking on a sidewalk and the integrative practice of walking in a protest 
march; or between the dispersed practice of telling someone what my name is in informal 
conversation and the integrative practice of doing the same under oath. Although the same bodily 
activity occurs in the performances of these actions, it can count, depending on the circumstances 
in which they happen, as performing a dispersed practice on one occasion and performing an 
integrative practice on another. Finally, one can simultaneously perform multiple integrative 
practices, interspersed perhaps also with the performance of various dispersed ones. For 
example, one can be performing various tasks involved in one’s occupation and still be engaged 
in eating/drinking practices at a restaurant. Into this mix can also come the performance of 
various dispersed practices like “making small talk” or answering questions unrelated either to 
                                                 
61 Although “site ontology converges in many regards with individualism, the central component of sites, namely, 
practices, defies individualist analysis. Practice organization is ‘out there’ in the practice; only versions of different 
parts of it are ‘in here’ in different individuals’ minds.” (Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 194) 
62 Schatzki, Social Practices, p. 99. 
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one’s occupational or eating/drinking practices at a restaurant with other customers. It is very 
easy to imagine other scenarios where such “multitasking” happens often in ordinary life. The 
point is that we should not think that there exist rigid boundaries between the actual 
performances of these different types of practices that separate them, even though we can 
distinguish them analytically in theory.63       
So much for the explication of Schatzki’s conceptions of practices. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, a site in his stipulated sense is a mesh of practices and material 
arrangements. Such arrangements are composed of configurations of entities (i.e., people, 
artifacts, organisms, and natural things) with which practices are closely interwoven. Practices 
and material arrangements are meshed because they pervasively implicate each other and do not 
just “interface” at discrete points of contact. It is worth elaborating briefly the nature of the 
mutual implication that holds between human practices and material arrangements.  
We can focus the issue by asking which pole of this relation is primary. On the one hand, 
it is clear in the constitution of the site of the social that human practices are primary in the order 
of explanation to the material arrangements with which they deal, for it is the engagement in 
practices that confers intelligibility on the entities composing some material arrangement at that 
site. On the other hand, such practices in so doing also enable the entities that they make 
intelligible to be objective over against these practices, sometimes even to such an extent that the 
constitutive standard that has hitherto rendered these entities initially intelligible must itself alter 
in light of changing circumstances.64 As noted above (though for a somewhat different reason 
there), scientific revolutions are a paradigm case,65 but this also occurs in other domains of 
human activity such as politics, art, and much else.66 The sense of objectivity in question 
concerns the ability of entities in the world to challenge and undermine our understanding of 
them: to show, by giving us evidence or even challenging what we count as evidence, that we 
can be wrong about their natures and connections with other entities. Once entities are 
                                                 
63 Schatzki, Social Practices, p. 104 and The Site of the Social, pp. 88, 154. 
64 Haugeland, “Truth and Rule-Following”. 
65 The locus classicus is Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. See Rouse, Knowledge and Power, Ch. 2 and 
Engaging Science, Ch. 6 for insightful accounts of what goes on in scientific revolutions in a way that is congenial 
to the perspective advanced in this dissertation. For a more general and instructive account, see again Haugeland, 
“Truth and Rule-Following”. 
66 Consider as examples the development of mass democracy in politics and various artistic movements in the 20th 
century. 
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intelligible, then, how they actually are and their relations to other entities can affect or challenge 
our conceptions of them. Thus, while the intelligibility of entities and their associated 
phenomena depends on practices, they can acquire the standing of being independent from us 
with regard to what and how they are, thereby showing themselves to be objective in relation to 
those practices.67 Consequently, the primacy of practices in relation to material arrangements 
should not be understood as implying that human beings can arbitrarily create or fully control the 
behavior of entities in material arrangements. Although human practices and material 
arrangements play different roles in constituting a site, the former have a delicate pride of place 
over the latter.   
I have discussed thus far in this section how Schatzki’s conception of the site of the social 
converges considerably with the conception of the social constitution of the human individual 
elaborated in the previous section. In particular, it should be clear how the social constitution of 
the individual is intrinsically tied to a site because the intelligibility of the activities that take 
place at that site presupposes an individual’s ongoing understanding of what actions are 
intelligible and feasible against the background of her immersion in some mesh of practices and 
material arrangements. I will not further explicate site ontology at this juncture and turn now to 
address a possible specific divergence between Schatzki’s site ontology and my account of the 
social constitution of the individual. This concerns the conclusion that human beings, existing 
predominantly in the mode of the one, are fundamentally socially constituted by projecting the 
situational possibilities that the one makes available. In Schatzki’s terminology, our existence as 
one-selves thereby “prefigures” our agency by enabling and constraining the field of possible 
actions that we can perform in a situation.68 This is a thought with which we should by now be 
familiar, for I argued in the previous section that it is an individual’s projective understanding of 
the world which initially and mostly opens up and closes off typical ranges and types of possible 
actions on any occasion. Schatzki is skeptical, however, of the explanatory usefulness of this 
thought. He argues that the invocation of fields of possibility, and thus, by implication, of fields 
of impossibility, fails to explain what individual agents actually do in a situation. As he writes: 
                                                 
67 I note in passing that Heidegger’s position regarding the issue of realism vs. idealism, specifically, regarding how 
entities can be independent as purely present-at-hand objects vis-à-vis Dasein, is just such a view; see SZ §§43-4. 
See Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, Clearing, and Realism”, pp. 91-6; Cerbone, “Realism and Truth”.  
68 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, pp. 44f., 140-6, and 210-2. 
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By itself, the fact that various paths are impossible casts no light on why particular paths are taken: It 
indicates only that certain actions are not going to occur. The exclusion of activities makes a difference to 
social life only when people are aware that certain courses are impossible and act on this basis. Similarly, 
saying that phenomena that exclude paths also open others by itself says nothing about why particular 
courses of action are pursued – it indicates only that certain paths can be taken. If, consequently, 
prefiguration has a more than minimal bearing on actuality, it must consist of more than the exclusion and 
enablement of activity. Conceiving of prefiguration as the delimitation of fields of possibility is the thinnest 
analysis possible.69  
 
His purpose in minimizing the significance of prefiguration sets the stage for the larger point he 
wishes to make concerning the explanation of action. This is that   
nothing prior to [the actual performance of] action settles what is going to have made sense to someone to 
do. … This fact does not imply that action is undetermined. It entails only that what determines action itself 
remains indeterminate until action occurs – only then will what will have determined agency have done so. 
… The determination of action, in other words, is a past or future perfect tense phenomenon.70 
 
Now, does this judgment about the minimal significance of prefiguration for action 
explanation undermine the emphasis I have placed on how our predominant existence in the 
mode of the one enables and constrains individual agency? I think not, for Schatzki’s criticism 
here seems misplaced by saddling an explanatory demand on this way of thinking that it is not 
designed to satisfy. This demand is that an adequate account of agency must be able also to 
provide explanations of actions that are actually performed, rather than just articulate how 
agents’ familiarity with the intelligibility of fields of (im)possible actions conditions what they 
do.71 There is nothing wrong, of course, with wanting to combine what can be described as a 
phenomenology of action with a theory of action. Indeed, this should be one of the ultimate aims 
of a complete account of the nature of human agency. But we need to draw a distinction between 
the way in which prefiguration figures in the social constitution of the individual and the way in 
which it figures in the explanation of action. While Schatzki makes a convincing argument that 
prefiguration has minimal relevance when we want an explanation of why agents actually do 
what they do, this conclusion does not diminish the significance of prefiguration as the starting-
point, no more but also no less, of explanations of action.72 For in order to explain agents’ 
actions, we cannot help but draw initially on some background information concerning the 
psychological motivation and social context in which they perform their actions, which is not to 
say that agents themselves must be consciously aware of this information. More importantly, 
                                                 
69 Ibid., p. 219; cf. pp. 220, 225f.  
70 Ibid., p. 232, emphasis in the original.  
71 Schatzki makes this demand most explicitly in ibid., p. 230. 
72 Cf. MacIntyre, “The Idea of a Social Science”, pp. 223-6. 
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since our topic is the social constitution of the individual and not the explanation of action, the 
use of the idea of prefiguration plays different theoretical roles in these two lines of inquiry. As I 
argued in the previous section, the social – more specifically, our familiarity with and immersion 
in the one – prefigures the capacity of an individual as an agent by serving as the intelligible 
background on the basis of which she actually performs actions. What Schatzki seeks here in 
effect is not only the background but also the foreground of action, i.e., the set of causal factors 
that actually explains why agents do (or did) what they do (or did). This desideratum is not 
directly relevant, however, for the conception of the social constitution of the individual for 
which I argued, which concerns the way in which such an individual is fundamentally social in 
his or her very way of being in the world. This constitution is, strictly speaking, related to but 
distinct from the explanation of action.      
2.3 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
In this section I anticipate and reply to some likely objections to the Heideggerian or site 
conception of the social constitution of the individual put forward in the previous two sections.  
There exists a familiar and understandable set of objections against the Heideggerian 
conception of human social existence in Being and Time.73 In summary form, these are that this 
conception of human social existence, despite Heidegger’s assertions to the contrary (SZ 118, 
121, 125), seriously distorts the nature of this existence by still ultimately construing other 
people as ready-to-hand things, not sui generis beings with a special ontological and moral 
standing who (should) encounter us in their genuine distinctiveness. This is alleged to be so 
because the Heideggerian conception of being-with renders other people significant only by way 
of their involvement in the projective understanding of a single individual. This supposedly 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 333-7, 534-56; Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 193-215; 
Theunissen, The Other, Part II, Ch. 5; Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?” and Totality and Infinity, esp. pp. 35-
52, 79-101, 194-219 (though Levinas’s critique is mostly implicit in this book); Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, pp. 149-52 and “Work and Weltanschauung”; McGuire and Tuchanska, Science Unfettered, 
pp. 64-71. Rentsch gives probably the most succinct statement of this set of objections in “Interexistentialität: Zur 
Transformation der existentialen Analyse Heideggers”; for his more extensive and constructive critique of 
Heidegger, see Die Konstitution der Moralität, Ch. 2, esp. §§11-2.   
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monadic or monological conception of the individual is flawed because it fails to recognize and 
appreciate how genuine dialogue and engagement with other people can be the source of 
mutuality and solidarity, let alone of the ethical dimension of human coexistence. According to 
this reading of Being and Time, the Heideggerian conception of human social existence, because 
of its existentialism, is blind to how other people can make a positive impact on the significance 
of an individual’s existence. For it conceives human social existence as mostly shallow because 
it is oriented toward the attempt to conform to social pressures that cater to the banal whims and 
tastes of the masses. On this reading, in the face of this negative indictment of the value of 
human social existence, the Heideggerian view cannot help but be drawn to a Kierkegaardian 
conception of radical freedom as the attempt on the individual’s part to detach herself as much as 
possible from her social environment in order to actualize her possibility of becoming an 
“authentic” individual.74 As Thomas Rentsch puts it succinctly: “The moment [i.e., dimension] 
of the interexistential constitution of a human world is not structurally examined in Heidegger’s 
description of the form of all human practice in terms of the existential [framework] of care.”75  
It is imperative for any defense of a Heideggerian conception of the social constitution of 
the human individual to address this familiar set of objections.76 I will do so at both the 
interpretive and philosophical levels, because it is the prevalence of the existentialist reading of 
Being and Time that obstructs the philosophical insights about the nature of human social 
existence that I wish to work out and defend in this dissertation.  
Let us begin with the interpretive disputes by making explicit some common ground that 
a defender of Heidegger’s conception of the social like me shares with critics who make the 
objection in question. First, despite his repeated denials in the text (SZ 42f., 167, 175f.), it is 
certainly true that the rhetoric of Heidegger’s discussion of the social cannot help but evince a 
disdain for human social existence, at least with regard to its impact on an individual’s 
possibility of realizing his or her genuine individuality (“authenticity”). Given that we exist 
predominantly in the mode of the one, his emphasis on our tendency to concern ourselves with 
                                                 
74 Many critics of Heidegger also locate this negative view of the social as the root cause of Heidegger’s official 
support of Nazism in the early to mid-1930s and, even worse, his reprehensible failure to take moral responsibility 
for this support after the war; see esp. Habermas, “Work and Weltanschauung”. This is a charged and complicated 
issue that I cannot examine here.  
75 Rentsch, “Interexistentialität”, p. 37, translation mine.  
76 To the extent that site ontology is inspired by Heidegger’s Being and Time – in particular, in its emphasis on the 
normalization of teleological structures – it too would be subject to this set of objections. 
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how we measure up in comparison with others (the pressure and concern for social conformism, 
averageness, and “leveling down”, etc.) drips with contempt for the shallowness of ordinary 
human social existence (SZ §27). Furthermore, there can also be no doubt that he seriously 
underdevelops the positive aspects of this existence. In particular, he does not discuss ways of 
being-with-others, e.g., ways of coexisting with and caring for others (Fürsorge) that need not be 
perniciously subject to the social pressures exerted by others (e.g., the care of dependents like 
children, love, friendship, being an engaged citizen of a community, etc.). And even when he 
does explicitly discuss specific ways of caring for others, he does so in terms of two extreme 
ways that only matter from an existentialist perspective (SZ 122).77 Lastly, given Heidegger’s 
aim of articulating his fundamental ontology (his analysis of human existence as being-in-the-
world), he completely ignores the multifaceted ways in which macro-level social structures 
affect, for better or worse, the life conditions of the human individual, often in ways that 
systematically obstruct genuine human liberation and autonomy.78   
These charges, if true, would be pretty damning. But even when one acknowledges (as I 
do) that they are legitimate, it does not simply follow that the Heideggerian conception of the 
social in Being and Time must be committed to a negative and distorted understanding of human 
social existence in general. Indeed, I think this conception is quite compatible with the criticisms 
mentioned above. On the interpretation presented below, this conception not only does not rule 
out any positive understanding of human social existence, but actually makes room for the latter, 
even if Heidegger himself chose not to examine this topic in working out his own philosophical 
project.   
At the interpretive level, my strongest disagreement with critics who make the above-
mentioned set of objections is that they too readily accept the common but simplistic reading of 
the early Heidegger as an existentialist, roughly in the vein of the early Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness.79 While there is no doubt that one of the central themes of Being and Time 
                                                 
77 From this perspective, one can care for an individual by either “leaping in” for her and thereby obscuring her 
possibility of coming to “own” herself (the einspringend-beherrschende Fürsorge), or by “leaping ahead of” that 
individual and thereby putting her in the position to achieve possible self-ownership (the vorspringend-befreiende 
Fürsorge).  
78 According to Habermas in “Work and Weltanschauung”, this is the major critique of Heidegger that Western 
Marxists like Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas himself make.  
79 Here I have benefited from and agree with Carman’s lucid and instructive discussion of this issue; see his 
Heidegger’s Analytic, Ch. 6 and “Authenticity”.  
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concerns what it is involved in achieving self-ownership (eigentliches Selbstsein),80 it is 
reductive to assume that this is the overarching theme in terms of which all other themes in 
Being and Time must be understood.81 But this is exactly what the critics in question assume 
without hesitation. On their reading, our absorption in the one cannot help but entail that human 
social existence is a mostly banal and negative state of affairs. By taking Heidegger’s 
disparaging rhetoric about the impact of this mode of existence on the individual at face value, 
this existentialist reading of the text thereby closes off any positive contribution that our social 
existence could make to our personal and collective flourishing.  
Admittedly, the fact that this is a common reading of Being and Time is to a large extent 
Heidegger’s own fault. The problem is that he often writes as if an individual can only relate to 
the sociality of his existence in terms of a mutually exclusive difference, namely, that between 
unownedness (Uneigentlichkeit) and ownedness (Eigentlichkeit). Here are two prominent 
examples: 
The self of everyday Dasein is the one-self [Man-selbst], which we distinguish from the owned self, i.e., 
from the self that takes hold of itself as its own [eigens ergriffenen]. As the one-self, Dasein is in each case 
dispersed into the one and must then [erst] find itself. (SZ 129) 
 
Later on in Being and Time he characterizes the everyday self in terms of the idea of the 
necessity of its “falling” (Verfallen) into the world: 
[The term ‘falling’], which does not express any negative evaluation, signifies that Dasein is initially and 
mostly in the midst [bei] of the world that concerns it. This “absorption in …” [Aufgehen bei …] has mostly 
the character of being lost in the publicness of the one. Dasein, as an ability-to-be-a-self that can own itself, 
has initially always already fallen away from itself and fallen into the world. This fallenness into the world 
signifies our absorption in being-with-one-another, insofar as this is guided by anonymous talk [Gerede], 
curiosity, and ambiguity. (SZ 175)    
 
The rhetoric in these passages expresses a stark distinction that clearly valorizes one of its poles 
(ownedness) to the detriment of the other (unownedness). Without entering into great details, the 
suggestion is that being an unowned, fallen self is not just something bad, but fails to live up to 
what any self can be, namely, an entity for whom, in its very being, its own being is a standing 
issue; in so doing, it does not “own” its particular way of existing by taking responsibility for it 
                                                 
80 As I mentioned above, this is often misleadingly translated into English (and French) as ‘authenticity’. Boedeker 
gives a convincing justification for why ‘self-ownership’ is the better translation; see his “Individual and 
Community in Early Heidegger”, p. 96, note 35.   
81 Although I do not do so here, one can argue that Heidegger’s concern with the possibility of self-ownership is a 
serious distraction and maybe even a mistake on his part if we are to appreciate his best thinking in Being and Time. 
Guignon provides a compelling, constructive critique of the ideal of authenticity in On Being Authentic, Ch. 8.   
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(Jemeinigkeit). The existentialist reading understandably feeds off the Kierkegaardian pathos of 
these remarks and cannot help but deem any entanglements with others (das Man) as 
impediments to one’s possibility of achieving genuine individual freedom.  
But this reading ignores Heidegger’s assertions, at important junctures in Being and 
Time, that there are actually three basic modes of human existence, not just two. In addition to 
ownedness and unownedness, there is also the “modally indifferent” or evaluatively neutral way 
in which an individual exists. Heidegger characterizes this mode of existence as the 
undifferentiatedness (Indifferenz) of everyday life (SZ 43; cf. 12). 
We have determined the idea of existence as understanding ability-to-be [verstehendes Seinskönnen], for 
which its own being is an issue. … But this ability-to-be, as something that is in each case mine, is free for 
ownedness, unownedness, or their modal undifferentiatedness. Thus far, the Interpretation [of Dasein’s way 
of existing in Division One of Being and Time] has restricted itself, through its treatment of average 
everydayness, to the analysis of undifferentiated or [beziehungsweise] unowned existence. (SZ 232)82      
 
Why does this matter? The reason is that drawing the distinction between undifferentiatedness 
and unownedness makes clear that human social existence not only need not be something 
deserving condemnation on existentialist grounds, but can be a dimension of human existence of 
which one can elaborate positive or at least evaluatively neutral forms.83 More specifically, a 
tenable distinction between undifferentiatedness and unownedness can be established as follows. 
An undifferentiated individual, in virtue of his familiarity with and absorption in the normativity 
of the one, projects the public roles and self-interpretations (for-the-sakes-of-which) that make 
his existence and activities significant. As just suggested, this mode of selfhood is neutral with 
regard to the assessment of the value of these identities, for it concerns the basic way in which 
we are human at all. By contrast, an unowned individual is presumably not only absorbed in the 
world, but exists furthermore in such a way that the entire content of his self-interpretation is 
exhausted by the possibilities and requirements that flow from the adoption of these identities. In 
other words, the apparent problem with being an unowned rather than just an undifferentiated 
                                                 
82 Heidegger notes in passing that his phenomenological analysis of being-in-the-world in Division One examines 
Dasein’s understanding of the world insofar as this understanding is unowned (uneigentlich) and, indeed (zwar), 
genuine (echt) (SZ 146, 148). This remark should receive more attention than it has gotten in most interpretations of 
Being and Time because it reveals how we need to have a more nuanced understanding of ownedness and 
unownedness. (Dreyfus’s reading is one of the few exceptions here; see Being-in-the-World, pp. 192-4.) It is further 
textual evidence that we should distinguish Dasein’s undifferentiated understanding of the world from its unowned 
understanding of it.    
83 In fact, he notes (unfortunately only) in passing that besides the two extreme forms of caring for others that 
concern him, there exist many other mixed forms of sociality that go beyond the scope of his investigation (SZ 122).  
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self is that the former lives in a wholly socially informed and prescribed way that obscures his 
possibility of achieving genuine autonomy.84 Unfortunately, Heidegger does not carefully 
distinguish undifferentiatedness from unownedness in Being and Time; or rather, he uses 
‘unownedness’ and its cognates in a persistently ambiguous way so that it sometimes describes 
the undifferentiatedness of average everyday human life, while at other times it clearly 
devalorizes this mode of existence by emphasizing how living an unowned life lifts the burden of 
existing from the individual.  
By taking seriously, however, the distinction between undifferentiatedness and 
unownedness (even if Heidegger himself fails to do so consistently), we can mitigate the 
objection that Heidegger possesses an irretrievably negative conception of human social 
existence. Although it is certainly true that he himself does not elaborate what evaluatively 
neutral forms of being-with-others can look like, this choice does not rule out any positive 
account of human social existence within the framework of Being and Time.85 Furthermore, if 
Heidegger were so contemptuous of human social existence, why does he nevertheless insist (in 
his terminology) that the one is an “existential”, i.e., a necessary enabling condition of Dasein’s 
basic way of existing that “articulates the referential nexus of significance” (SZ 129); and that 
self-ownership cannot consist in an individual’s radical detachment from the one, but only in an 
“existentiell” modification of it (SZ 130, 179, 383; cf. 144-6)? In short, although one can rightly 
criticize Heidegger for the incompleteness of his account of the positive significance of human 
social existence, it is mistaken as a matter of textual interpretation to conclude that his 
conception of the social categorically precludes this significance. Consequently, critics who 
raise the objection we are concerned with here are wrong in drawing this implication.  
Once we succeed in putting the significance of the existentialist interpretation of Being 
and Time in its rightful place, this puts us in a better position to reply to the set of objections 
raised above. The first three go hand in hand: Any Heideggerian conception of the social 
constitution of the individual is (1) fundamentally individualistic (i.e., monadic, indeed, 
                                                 
84 Consider, e.g., the self-understanding of the café waiter that Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness or the 
“selfless” housewife that Betty Friedan describes in The Feminine Mystique.  
85 Rentsch’s work in Die Konstitution der Moralität is interesting by working out what these positive forms of 
being-with-others are from within a broadly Heideggerian framework. It is an exemplary case of how to “think with 
Heidegger against Heidegger” (as contemporary German philosophers often like to say).  
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solipsistic86) because (2) it espouses a monological conception of the human individual and (3) 
unjustly overlooks or disparages the positive significance of human coexistence. Several replies 
can be made in response to these objections. To begin with, it is undeniable that Heidegger is 
primarily concerned with the social constitution of a single individual (Dasein),87 not with her 
concrete (or “ontic”) relations with other particular individuals, even if he does discuss briefly 
the relation of an individual to the communities, generation, or people to which she belongs (SZ 
§74). Heidegger’s account of being human (Dasein) is to this extent individualistic. But the fact 
that it is concerned with other people only insofar as they have an impact on the life of a single 
individual does not imply that this individual lives out a monadic or monological existence, 
much less one that is solipsistic. Because these objections have been already addressed 
elsewhere,88 I will direct my remarks below to what seems to me to be the source of these 
familiar objections. This is the complaint that Heidegger’s conception of human social existence 
does not assign a central and potentially positive role for our concrete, interpersonal interactions 
with other people.89  
This complaint is misplaced, however, because the Heideggerian conception of the social 
constitution of the individual aims precisely to explain how the presence of and interactions with 
other people can be significant in general. The misguidedness of the complaint stems from the 
failure to draw the important distinction (which was discussed above in 2.1) between the 
understanding and the actualization of situational possibilities. For example, in order for me, 
actually, to be (say) someone’s friend or someone who cares deeply for the well-being of 
significant others, that friend or those significant others must doubtlessly be present and interact 
with me in certain ways. But in order for me to understand these possible ways of being myself 
at all, which in turn opens up and constrains the possible ways in which entities, including those 
other people under those aspects, can show up as making sense to me from occasion to occasion, 
                                                 
86 Rentsch uses this term to characterize, in what seems to me in a tendentious way, Heidegger’s conception of 
individuality; see “Interexistentialität”, p. 35f. See also McGuire and Tuchanska, Science Unfettered, p. 70. 
87 Haugeland’s reading is to my knowledge the only one that claims that ‘Dasein’ is used as a mass noun (like, e.g., 
‘sand’ or ‘water’) and refers to a communal way of life, not to a particular individual; see Haugeland, “Heidegger on 
Being a Person” and “Dasein’s Disclosedness”. Despite the instructiveness of this reading, it is ultimately untenable; 
see Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism”, pp. 82-4 and Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 
pp. 37-43.  
88 Schatzki, “Early Heidegger on Sociality”, pp. 236-8.  
89 See Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 334; Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 201f., 207; and Levinas’s concise 
early article, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”.  
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I must already project the relevant referential nexus of significance on the basis of which those 
people show up with these particular significances. This must be done regardless of whether 
others are actually present so as to enable me to realize some of these situational possibilities. 
The projective understanding of situational possibilities is prior in the order of explanation to 
their actualizations because this understanding is a necessary condition of the intelligibility of 
such actualizations. Indeed, I think it is a virtue, not a defect, of the Heideggerian conception of 
the social constitution of the individual that it reveals how an individual remains social (more 
precisely, socially constituted) despite the fact that others are not present. For this conception 
does justice to our sense that our sociocultural upbringing and ongoing social existence 
fundamentally permeates our self-understanding and comportment toward the world, regardless 
of whether others are on the scene. Of course, this upbringing only occurred through interactions 
with other people (paradigmatically, parents, teachers, and other caregivers) when we were still 
infants and young children. But this concerns the social origins, not the continuous social 
constitution, of the human individual, for the latter concerns how the very existence of a human 
individual is constitutively social even after this upbringing has been completed.90 The 
Heideggerian conception of the social constitution of the individual tries to show precisely how 
this can be: We are initially and mostly one-selves, meaning that we always already understand 
ourselves and deal with the world against the background of our grasp of the public norms into 
which we are socialized. It is the contents and usual bindingness of these norms that condition 
the typical situational possibilities that we project as intelligible on any particular occasion.  
A number of critics have also objected that (4) the Heideggerian conception of the social 
is mistaken by envisaging a mediated conception of human social relations. Michael Theunissen, 
for example, objects that  
Heidegger robs the Other of his alienness and contrariness by capturing him, as it is with the remaining 
intraworldly [ready-to-hand] entities, within [an individual’s] projection of the world.91 … [I]n the 
analysis of being-with, the immediacy of the encounter with the Other is discounted [because] the medium 
of the ‘world’ is interposed between ‘me’ and Others.92 
 
                                                 
90 This issue requires more careful and fuller treatment than I give it here. I discuss it much more extensively in  
Ch. 5 in connection with whether the later Wittgenstein espouses a social view of rule-following, and if so how.    
91 Theunissen, The Other, p. 179, translation modified.  
92 Ibid., p. 182, emphases in the original. Theunissen’s central aim in The Other is to show how Buber’s conception 
of human existence as essentially dialogical is superior to the transcendental, mediated conception of this existence 
that (according to Theunissen) Heidegger shares, at a certain level of abstraction, with Husserl and Sartre.  
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This objection is unconvincing, however, because it exploits an understandable but overly 
idealized picture about what “unmediated” or supposedly genuine social interactions can be. This 
picture is that the purest form of sociality occurs when two or more individuals engage in open, 
face-to-face dialogue such that the genuine “otherness” of the other can be encountered 
“immediately” (i.e., in an unmediated way) and hence without distortion.93 The claim is that true 
mutuality (reciprocity) can only be achieved in such circumstances. In everyday life, it is true 
that we do occasionally experience such episodes of mutuality with others, especially when the 
topic of conversation concerns matters that are of great significance for our lives. But notice that 
such experiences are always only meaningful against a background of our working 
understanding of the (life)world. It is seriously misleading to characterize this situation in terms 
of how the world “mediates” the mutuality that can come about between individuals in dialogue, 
as if our involvement in the world contaminated the pure reciprocity realized by the 
interlocutors. But what would pure mutuality look like in the absence of its situatedness in and 
involvement with the world? How could the experience of the other be contentful if this were 
completely worldless? How can an individual experience or be “summoned” by the genuine 
otherness of the other if there is no worldly context at all that makes initially intelligible what is 
being experienced? To be sure, the other could not be experienced and recognized as genuinely 
other if he or she were completely undifferentiated from the world.94 But it does not follow that 
this experience and recognition of the other requires that the engagement with him or her be 
completely worldless. In the same vein, although it is true that the pragmatic and normalizing 
dimension of the world recedes into the background when interlocutors establish mutuality, it 
does not follow that this dimension is completely absent when such episodes occur. Moreover, 
where can the contentfulness of unmediated mutuality come from if it is not derived from one’s 
involvement in the world? Unless the determinateness of unmediated mutuality can get its 
content otherwise than by way of negating its “mediated” worldly instances, it remains 
                                                 
93 Buber, Between Man and Man, pp. 115-9; Theunissen, The Other, pp. 271-94; McGuire and Tuchanska, Science 
Unfettered, pp. 64-8. Although Levinas clearly rejects the possibility of mutuality or reciprocity and emphasizes 
instead the asymmetrical and “infinite” (unending, inexhaustible) demand and responsibility that the (“face” of the) 
other puts on each of us whenever we encounter the other, he holds that this demand and responsibility is 
experienced, at least paradigmatically, through face-to-face encounters between single individuals; see “Is Ontology 
Fundamental?” and Totality and Infinity, esp. pp. 39f., 79-81, 68f., 194-219. For a very lucid, instructive, and 
sophisticated interpretation of Levinas’s philosophy as a whole, see Perpich, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. 
94 Cf. Ralph Ellison’s novel, Invisible Man.  
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mysterious what positive content it can have. I conclude, therefore, that mutuality is intelligible 
only if it is already worldly.95 While it surely deserves to be a regulative ideal of being-with-
others that is worth achieving on some occasions, this ideal cannot be the foundation of our 
fundamental sociality. The world in its worldliness, including our comportment toward the world 
as one-selves, should not be conceived as an obstruction to genuine reciprocity among 
individuals. It instead functions, initially and mostly, as the space of intelligibility within which 
they can pursue and realize these ideals at all.   
 The further charges that (5) the Heideggerian conception of the social fails to articulate 
its positive forms and the ethical dimension of human coexistence, as well as (6) ignores the 
multifaceted effects of macro-level social structures on the life condition of human beings, are 
much more tenable as criticisms. Indeed, I think that these are genuine lacunae in Heidegger’s 
conception of human social existence and potential points of weakness. Heidegger himself 
presumably would have nothing to say in response except to emphasize that addressing these 
issues goes beyond the scope of his project in Being and Time. If this were his response to these 
objections, one can easily understand why it can be regarded as unsatisfactory. But those who 
find his conception of the social in that work fruitful for an adequate social ontology or practical 
philosophy need not confine themselves to this self-imposed restriction, nor should they 
articulate their theories in explicitly Heideggerian terms.96 Once again, the point here is that we 
should not infer, without further argument, the fundamental inadequacy of a philosophical 
framework merely from its choice not to address certain related topics. Since my topic in this 
dissertation concerns the social constitution of the human individual and not the nature and 
characteristics of the social in its entirety, let alone in its ethical dimension, it is beyond the 
                                                 
95 Theunissen himself concedes this point in his instructive explication of Buber’s conception of unmediated 
mutuality; see The Other, pp. 291-4. It is also noteworthy that Gadamer, who clearly appreciates the significance of 
being open toward the other in dialogue (whether this other is a text, a person, or a tradition), does not make this 
mistake in his philosophical hermeneutics. For Gadamer, genuine mutuality is always realized with regard to some 
Sache, some self-standing matter of common concern to parties in a conversation that has always already been 
shaped by the historical (i.e., worldly) situation that conditions both the Sache and its interpreters. Indeed, he argues 
that the sort of supposedly genuine mutuality that floats free of the Sache actually expresses an extreme form of 
subjective individualism, as opposed to enabling the experience of being genuinely open to the other and possibly 
learning something from him or her; see Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 268f., 290-300, 367-79.  
96 In addition to Rentsch, some other prominent thinkers who have done so are Spinoza/Flores/Dreyfus, Taylor, 
Bourdieu, Giddens, Rouse, Schatzki, and H. B. Schmid. Schatzki engages extensively and critically with the site 
ontologies of some of these theorists in Social Practices, Ch. 5; “A New Societist Social Ontology”, pp. 190-7; and 
The Site of the Social, pp. 138-57.    
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scope of this dissertation to examine the social ontologies that take their point of departure, at 
least in part, from Heidegger’s thinking about human social existence in Being and Time.              
Lastly, there is the charge that some critics have raised concerning the emphasis on 
normativity qua normalization in the conception of the social constitution of the individual for 
which I have argued. This is the objection that (7) the Heideggerian conception of the social 
implies that the individuals who live in some lifeworld must accept as morally or politically 
correct the norms and values that inform this lifeworld.97 The objection is that this conception is 
critically impotent because it fails to provide some external normative standpoint from which we 
can evaluate the morality or political legitimacy of the practices of a community or society, for 
instance, by reference to a set of norms or principles that can be demonstrated as universally 
binding. According to this objection, Heidegger cannot avail himself of such a standpoint 
because he argues that each individual human being primarily and mostly understands herself as 
one-self and acts accordingly, i.e., understands herself in terms of the communally based and 
historically situated range of publicly intelligible roles and norms that our predominant existence 
in the mode of the one expects. It seems that such an individual will find it hard, if not 
impossible, to break free of and criticize those roles and norms, for it is the one that articulates 
the referential nexus of significance in terms of which this individual can make sense of the 
world at all.  
Does the Heideggerian view really imply the blanket and uncritical endorsement of the 
norms and values of some particular lifeworld? To see how it does not, we only need to 
understand how our absorption in the one also makes non-normal phenomena possible, as well 
as the situational possibilities that flow from them. Although the typical way in which we exist 
and act in the world is normalized by our conformity to the one, this global or structural 
normalization does not preclude the creativity, non-conformism, or resistance that individuals 
can achieve in concrete local contexts. In fact, the significance of these creative or rebellious 
achievements can only stand out as such against the background of global conformity to the one. 
                                                 
97 Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, pp. 205-18, esp. 213-8; Habermas, The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, pp. 148-50 and “Work and Weltanschauung”, p. 191. As a side note, it seems to me that 
those who make this charge often come close to conflating the rhetoric and personal political conservatism of 
philosophers like Heidegger (or, for that matter, Gadamer) with the allegedly political conservatism of their 
philosophies. This is especially true in the politically charged atmosphere of post-war German philosophy, in light 
of the catastrophic history of Germany in the first half of the 20th century. This again is a complicated issue that I 
will pass over here.  
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Thus, emphasis on the normalizing force of the one does not imply any endorsement of the 
legitimacy or justice of the various specific norms and practices that govern the ethical or 
sociopolitical arrangements of a culture, e.g., those that unjustly produce socioeconomic 
inequalities or determine what it is to be a gendered or racialized human being. If the rhetoric 
about the subversion of norms in various domains of human life is not to be an empty gesture, 
there must be something sufficiently entrenched and normalizing so as to make such acts of 
subversion meaningful and worth undertaking.98 More generally, revolutions in different spheres 
of human activity (art, science, politics, self-understanding, race or gender relations, etc.) are 
never totally innovative, but significant precisely by critically transforming some aspects of their 
inheritance, even if this is done by way of rejection or destruction (SZ 130, 179). Normalized 
comportment (the one) does not preclude the exercise of individual freedom, but is precisely 
what makes the latter possible and significant as a fundamental situational possibility.99   
I suspect, however, that this reply would not placate critics who make the charge in 
question. For they would presumably insist that the issue does not concern the intelligibility of 
non-conformism or resistance, but, again, the absence in Heidegger’s conception of human social 
existence of an external normative standpoint that can legitimate social practices by recourse to a 
set of universally binding norms or principles.100 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
deal sufficiently with this objection. Nevertheless, the following remarks can at least gesture at a 
possibly adequate reply to it. First of all, this charge would have much greater force if Heidegger 
is read primarily as a “decisionistic” existentialist, i.e., one who holds that there are ultimately no 
consistently binding, universal normative principles that can determine how any human 
individual should live his or her life. On this view, the best that anyone one can do is to be 
“resolute” once one has made momentous decisions in one’s life. But as I argued above, 
                                                 
98 Even a radical proponent of subversive performances such as Judith Butler acknowledges this constitutive 
constraint on what is involved in subverting norms; see Gender Trouble, pp. 145-8. Gadamer makes the same point 
by insisting that belongingness to a tradition always involves the possibility of criticizing it; see “On the Scope and 
Function of Hermeneutical Reflection”.    
99 Kuhn’s contrast between normal and extraordinary science illustrates this nicely. Indeed, he emphasizes how the 
internal dynamic of normal scientific practices sows the seeds of its own possible supersession; see The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. For insightful articulations of this point, see MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic 
Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science”; Rouse, Power and Knowledge, Ch. 2 and Engaging Science, Ch. 6.  
100 Many critical social theorists have made this charge; see, e.g., Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, Band I, 
Introduction, p. 39f.; Honneth, “On the Destructive Power of the Third”. This charge and the response to it show up 
explicitly in the debate between Gadamer and Habermas regarding whether hermeneutical reflection can and should 
claim universal scope or not. See Warnke, Gadamer, Ch. 4, for an informative account of this debate.    
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Heidegger’s best thinking about the nature of human social existence should not be understood in 
a way that leads inescapably to this existentialist conception of human agency. Still, even if 
critics who make the charge in question accept this suggestion, they would presumably remain 
dissatisfied until the external normative standpoint that they seek to obtain or construct is in 
view.  
Is it really so clear, however, that such a standpoint is necessary in order for critical 
reflection and the critique of ideology in social philosophy to be possible and efficacious? 
Without pretending to settle this question, it seems to me that hermeneutically minded 
philosophers and political theorists have at least articulated a viable conception of social 
criticism that deliberately does not rely on the supposed normative force that flows from the 
availability of an external standpoint.101 Roughly speaking, what they try to show is that the 
belief that we have finally attained the external normative standpoint from which we are entitled 
to make evaluations that validate the legitimacy of some set of social practices can itself be 
partial, anachronistic, or ethnocentric. As they see it, one of the root problems in this context is 
the unjustified belief that moral relativism and subjectivism will inevitably ensue unless we can 
criticize our practices, as well as those of others, on the basis of a stable and universal normative 
foundation for our evaluative standards.102 Once this conviction is shown to be untenable, doing 
so makes available a contextualist model of normative evaluation that can make ethical demands 
on us and others. More specifically, the activity of first coming to understand and then evaluating 
others, especially those who are quite different from oneself, requires the subtle exercise of 
reflective judgment (a modern descendant of Aristotelian phronesis) that can decide right from 
wrong in a situationally sensitive way.103 There are, of course, difficulties with this 
hermeneutical conception of social and practical philosophy, and its claim that it can muster 
sufficient critical potential remains quite contested. But this state of affairs does not as such 
                                                 
101 Gadamer, “On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection”; Taylor, “Understanding and 
Ethnocentricity”, “Rationality”, and “Explanation and Practical Reason”; Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Ch. 1 and esp. 
Interpretation and Social Criticism. Warnke does a good job of working out the critical resources available to 
hermeneutical practical philosophers; see Gadamer, Ch. 3 and 4, “Social Interpretation and Political Theory”, and 
esp. Justice and Interpretation.  
102 Richard Bernstein would characterize this as an instance of what he calls “Cartesian Anxiety”; see Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism, pp. 16-20. A good deal of Gadamer’s and Taylor’s work in general focuses on defusing 
the felt need for such a standpoint; see Gadamer, Truth and Method and Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences 
and “Overcoming Epistemology”.  
103 For a clear overall sketch and critical examination of what this involves in different areas of philosophy, see 
Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. 
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make the hermeneutical conception more critically impotent in comparison with other competing 
conceptions, which have problems of their own.                   
To conclude this section, I have raised and replied to some familiar objections to a 
Heideggerian conception of human social existence. In doing so I have focused narrowly on 
whether or the extent to which these criticisms directly apply to this conception, not on the 
independent plausibility or compellingness of the various accounts of human sociality or 
coexistence from which these criticisms flow. Having worked out the Heideggerian or site 
conception of the social constitution of the human individual, the main aim of Part II of the 
dissertation is to put this conception to critical use in its evaluation of several prominent accounts 
or invocations of the social in contemporary analytic philosophy. My hope is that the 
significance of the Heideggerian or site conception of human social constitution will be even 
clearer and more enriched by bringing it into critical contact with the latter.  
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3.0  THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 
With the Heideggerian or site conception of the social constitution of the individual in place, I 
turn now in Part II of this dissertation to the assessment of versions of what I characterized in the 
Introduction as interpersonal interactionism (IPIA). Although IPIA is by all appearances silent 
about the social constitution of the human individual, it assumes at least that the key to 
understanding the nature of human sociality is examining modes of interpersonal interaction. I 
believe that this assumption is taken so much for granted so as to remain nearly invisible and 
hence rarely questioned. Recall that the understanding of human sociality according to IPIA is 
defined in terms of two more specific assumptions: 
The Assumptions of Interpersonal Interactionism (IPIA):  
(I) There exists a prevalent mode of human sociality that is realized when (i) two or more 
individuals are present in some context (ii) who interact with one another in accordance 
with some implicit set of constraints that (should) govern in that context.  
(II) This mode of human sociality suffices for understanding both the fundamental way in 
which human beings are social and all forms of sociality. Accordingly, any account or 
invocation of human sociality should begin with this mode of sociality as its key datum 
and point of departure. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, IPIA seems to inform much of the work in the philosophy of 
sociality (to use Raimo Tuomela’s label), especially in contemporary analytic philosophy.1 
Philosophers of sociality in that literature seem to think that it is unproblematic to investigate the 
nature of social phenomena independently of any consideration of the social constitution of the 
individual. Indeed, they seem to believe not only that they do not need to address the latter, but 
that doing so would be a serious mistake.2  
As announced in the Introduction, one of the main aims of the dissertation is to show that 
this understanding of human sociality along the lines of IPIA, in particular its assumption (II), is 
untenable precisely because it fails to take into account the social constitution of the individual. 
                                                 
1 As he conceives the philosophy of sociality, it “include[s] at least the study of collective intentionality, social 
ontology, and metaphysics, as well as social epistemology. Philosophy of sociality also branches into normative 
fields of study such as moral philosophy (think of collective responsibility) and political philosophy (think of social 
contracts and collective acceptance of basic social institutions as we-notions).” (The Philosophy of Sociality, p. viii) 
2 Hans Bernhard Schmid suggests that this view traces back to an unnuanced rejection of the specter of the group 
mind; see his Plural Action, Ch. 2. I will discuss this issue in 3.3.  
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This chapter takes a first step towards justifying this conclusion by scrutinizing, to begin with, 
theories of collective intentionality, which are a currently fashionable way of analyzing social 
phenomena in contemporary analytic philosophy. I will show that the conception of sociality that 
informs these theories is indeed a version of IPIA. For this very reason, I will then argue that 
they are unable to make good on their claim to give an adequate account of the nature of human 
sociality and, by extension, certain aspects of human social reality.  
3.1 THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 
The core idea of collective intentionality, which I use as an umbrella term under which more 
specific concepts fall such as joint commitments and plural subjecthood (Gilbert), we-attitudes 
and collective commitment (Tuomela), and the construction of social reality (Searle), addresses 
the following set of questions: Is there a difference in kind between groups or collectives 
(organizations, institutions, etc.) on the one hand and aggregations of interrelated individuals on 
the other? What conditions must be satisfied in order for collective agents such as groups or 
collectives – conceived as unitary entities – to exist, have intentional attitudes, and act in the 
world? What distinguishes the intentional attitudes and actions that are attributed to a group or 
collective from those attributed to an aggregation of interrelated individuals?3  
Before we examine the answers of these three theorists of collective intentionality to such 
questions, it is revealing first to lay bare their motivations. To begin with, such theories accept 
ontological and, to a lesser extent, explanatory individualism as the dominant paradigm in the 
metaphysics and explanation of social phenomena. These two sorts of individualism tend to go 
together as a package, both as a general theoretical framework and as the dominant way of 
thinking in Western culture in general since the second half of the last century.4 As a reminder, 
ontological individualism holds that social phenomena are ultimately composed only of human 
                                                 
3 For instructive surveys of theories of collective intentionality, see Tollefsen, “Collective Intentionality”; Schmitt, 
“Socializing Metaphysics”, pp. 1-37; and Roth, “Shared Agency”. For an extensive and critical examination of 
them, see Schmid, Wir-Intentionalität, Part I and Plural Action, Part I.  
4 The loci classici for this intellectual package are Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, esp. pp. 13-8 and Popper, 
The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2, esp. p. 98.  
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agents and their (inter)relations and (inter)actions, while explanatory individualism contends that 
all explanations of social phenomena must in the final analysis be given in terms of the attitudes 
and actions of individual human beings. Although it is often assumed that forms of individualism 
must be reductionist, some philosophers have recently made strong arguments that reductive 
explanatory individualism in particular is neither possible nor desirable with regard to social 
phenomena.5 
Given this intellectual context, it would seem at first glance that theorists of collective 
intentionality can be viewed as natural allies of explanatory anti-reductionists about social 
phenomena. For they argue that phenomena like collective intentional states (e.g., collective 
beliefs, intentions, goals, etc.) and collective actions (as ascribed to collective agents like teams, 
organizations, institutions, etc.) are not reducible to aggregations of the intentional states and 
actions of interrelated human individuals. As Searle emphasizes: “The crucial element in 
collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something together, and the 
individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective intentionality that 
they share.”6 Although Gilbert, Tuomela, and Searle have different accounts of how collective 
intentionality is possible or shared, they all endorse this basic claim, which is common to most 
theories of collective intentionality.7 Speaking generally, such theorists claim that what 
distinguishes collective intentionality from individual intentionality is that the former has a 
special character of irreducible togetherness that cannot be explained by the aggregation of 
individual intentionality. I will sketch below their respective accounts of what this special 
character consists in. What they all oppose is “singularism”: the view that it is only single agents 
to whom we can truly ascribe intentional states and agency.8 Singularism about collective 
intentional states and collective agency is the standard form that ontological and reductive 
explanatory individualism take with regard to the metaphysics and explanation of social 
phenomena.   
                                                 
5 See my discussion of these arguments in Ch. 1.2.  
6 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 24f., first and third emphases added.  
7 The notable exception here is Michael Bratman. He acknowledges that his view is “reductive in spirit” because he 
tries to analyze shared intentionality, or at least shared cooperative activity, “in terms of the attitudes and actions of 
the individuals involved” (Bratman, Faces of Intention, p. 108).  
8 Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 12, 419-25; “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 53. 
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In the course of defending the irreducibility of collective intentionality, however, it is 
worth noting that these theorists are worried that this defense could be taken to imply the specter 
of group minds.9 Thus, Gilbert writes that such an implication would be unacceptable because it 
“could lead to a belief in independent group minds or spirits, for which there is no empirical 
warrant, and which has given [social] holism a bad name”.10 Tuomela shows that he shares this 
sentiment by claiming that “all social notions are in principle reconstructable in an 
individualistically acceptable way. … Ontological interrelationism [Tuomela’s social ontology] 
does not postulate any social wholes and serves to give a naturalistic account of the social 
realm.”11 Last but not least, Searle conceives his social ontology as navigating explicitly between 
two implausible options: reductive explanatory individualism about collective intentionality and 
the idea of a group mind (“a super mind floating over individual minds”12). What is telling is that 
Gilbert, Tuomela, and Searle cannot envisage the contrast to reductionism in this context except 
as the postulation of the existence of group minds. As we will see below in 3.3, it is this specter 
of group minds that blocks an alternative understanding of the contrast to reductionism about 
collective intentionality. I will take up Schmid’s suggestion that we can appropriate Heidegger’s 
conception of human social existence (as I interpreted this in Ch. 2) so as to present not only the 
proper contrast to reductionism, but to show how collective intentionality can be indeed shared. 
(Having said this, I will reject Schmid’s existentialist interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of 
this existence in Being and Time.)     
It is useful at this juncture to have before us some illustrations of the irreducibility of 
collective intentional attitudes and collective actions.13 Consider first the case of collective 
belief, especially in associations or organizations where voting takes place from time to time to 
decide what positions (collective beliefs) the associations or organizations take regarding certain 
issues. The intuitive (“summativist”) view is that if a group or collective of people believe a 
                                                 
9 I am indebted to Schmid for this point; see his Plural Action, pp. 30-2. 
10 Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 430; Sociality and Responsibility, p. 3. 
11 Tuomela, The Importance of Us, p. 376. This summary description of his social ontology comes close to casting it 
as a form of reductive explanatory individualism, depending on what he means by the “reconstructability” of social 
notions in “individualistically acceptable ways”.     
12 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 25.  
13 For a very lucid discussion and illustration of different kinds of social agents and their characteristics, and why 
they are not reducible to individual agency and attitudes, see Stoutland, “Why are Philosophers of Action so Anti-
Social?”, pp. 46-51.  
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proposition, all or most people in this group or collective, as individual persons, believe it too.14 
For example, suppose a vote takes place in the US Senate about whether the US government 
should sign a certain international treaty. Suppose also that the result of this vote is that it should. 
There is now a reason to ascribe this collective belief to the US Senate. On a summativist 
understanding, we are entitled to ascribe this collective belief to the US Senate only because a 
two-thirds majority of its members (i.e., US Senators) who voted on that occasion held this belief 
as individuals, which led them to cast their votes on that basis.  
According to a non-summativist understanding of collective belief, however, it cannot be 
so analyzed. The reason is that once a vote has been taken and recognized in the scenario in 
question, only the US Senate as such has the authority to reaffirm or alter the result of this vote, 
say, in a future vote. To be sure, the Senate cannot exist, let alone believe and act as a body, 
absent the attitudes and actions of its constituent members. But it does not follow that the 
attitudes and actions ascribed to the Senate itself are identical to the sum of the individual 
attitudes and actions of its constituent members. For example, during the initial vote, the votes of 
the minority obviously expressed disagreement with the proposal that the US government should 
sign the treaty in question. But once the result of the vote is known and sanctioned as 
procedurally legal, such voters must accept that this is the decision of the US Senate as such, 
even though they themselves personally disagreed then with this decision in the vote that 
sanctioned its collective acceptance. This shows that there can be a divergence between a 
collective belief and the aggregation of the individual beliefs of the persons to whom this 
collective belief is attributed. Moreover, there may be those Senators who voted initially with the 
majority but subsequently changed their minds as individuals about the proposition in question. 
This change does not alter, however, the collective belief ascribed to the US Senate since the 
initial vote was taken and recognized, unless there is a new vote that gives occasion for the 
Senate as a body to change the result of its initial vote on the treaty. Indeed, it can even be that 
since the initial vote on it took place, there will remain no single Senator who personally concurs 
with the initial vote of the Senate and would vote for it in the future. In this case, a collective 
belief is still ascribed to the Senate even though none of its current constituent members continue 
individually to hold this belief. Such states of affairs can occur especially when there are large 
                                                 
14 Quinton, “Social Object”. See Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 257-88, for an extended discussion of this view.  
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gaps in time between the discrete actions of collective agents (e.g., courts, legislatures, faculty 
meetings, etc.).15 These are just some of the possible scenarios in which the collective beliefs 
ascribed to a group can diverge from the beliefs ascribed to its individual constituent members as 
an aggregate. This set of possibilities presents considerations that at least support the distinction 
between the ascription of collective beliefs to groups as such and the ascription of beliefs to the 
constituent members of those groups as individual persons.    
Something analogous is at work in understanding the nature of collective intentions and 
actions. Consider the example of a symphony orchestra. A summativist about its collective 
intentions and actions would analyze them in terms of its constituents’ individual intentions and 
actions, as these figure in shared cooperative activity. Bratman, for example, would analyze the 
shared intentions of different individuals, say, in carrying out a coordinated activity like playing 
music together, in terms of a special form of individual intentionality. This special form is 
expressed by intentions with the propositional form ‘I intend that we J’ on the part of the 
individuals involved, where ‘we J’ means that you and I intend jointly, say, to play music 
together in an orchestra on the basis of our common knowledge16 of the meshing subplans and 
interdependent intentions that pertain to jointly carrying out this activity.17 On Bratman’s view, 
the “we” that is formed here is not a single unitary collective agent, but a collection of 
interrelated individuals enmeshed in an interlocking web of intentions and actions. His view is 
thus a sophisticated form of singularism: He argues that a shared intention is not something that 
any single individual can have by or for himself, but rather only something that he can have 
through interrelations with the other individuals with whom he shares the intention.18  
                                                 
15 Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 290. For another set of vivid examples, consider the case of some past rulings of US 
federal courts (e.g., that sanctioned the legality of racial segregation) in relation to the current, surely dissenting 
opinions of the judges who serve on those courts today. Until these judges are given occasions – as current members 
of these courts – to strike down those past rulings, however, the latter will continue to be at least formally legal, 
despite the fact that no single judge today on these courts would concur with those rulings.    
16 The concept of common knowledge is a technical term and refers to the epistemic situation of individuals in 
relation to each other’s intentional attitudes. Its generic definition is as follows: For any two agents A and B, there 
exists common knowledge that p among A and B if and only if A knows that p, B knows that p, A knows that B 
knows that p, B knows that A knows that p, and so on. It is easy enough to see how this definition can be iteratively 
applied to more than two individuals; see Gilbert, Living Together, p. 36n4. The use of ‘common knowledge’ in this 
chapter will henceforth express this meaning.   
17 Bratman, Faces of Intention, Ch. 5 and 6.  
18 Ibid., pp. 9, 114. Because Bratman’s view is peripheral to my concerns, I will minimize my discussion of it except 
where this is relevant for my purposes. For forthright criticisms of Bratman’s view, see Baier, “Doing Things with 
Others”, esp. pp. 21-9; see also Stoutland, “Why are Philosophers of Action so Anti-Social?”, pp. 56-8 and Schmid, 
Plural Action, p. 36f. 
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By contrast, a non-summative analysis of the collective intentions and actions of the 
orchestra argues that what gives overall sense and point to the individual intentions and actions 
of each member of the orchestra is precisely that they are carried out from the perspective that it 
is we who are playing a piece of music together, not just you and I, individually or severally, 
even under conditions of common knowledge. The claim is that we are each playing our 
individual part for the sake of our playing a piece of music together as a unified group.19 To be 
sure, each member of the orchestra can also play her individual part in solitude, say, when she is 
practicing the music that she plays as an individual musician. But the ultimate aim of this sort of 
solitary playing is how it fits into and is performed for the sake of the collective intentions and 
actions of the collective agent of which she is a constituent member. Theorists of collective 
intentionality, then, argue that we should draw a distinction between the composition of a 
collective agent on the part of its constituent members and their coordinated activities (what the 
collective agent is made of), and the identity and meaning of the collective intentions and actions 
of this collective agent as such (what it intends and does as a unitary body).  
Having illustrated the sort of phenomena that theorists of collective intentionality are 
keen to highlight and analyze, I will now briefly sketch in the remainder of this section three 
theories of collective intentionality that are currently influential in contemporary philosophy of 
sociality. I will postpone my criticisms of them until the next section.  
To begin with, Gilbert contends that what is necessary and sufficient for the distinct 
existence of a group or collective qua a unified agent is its status as a plural subject. On her 
view, the following conditions must be satisfied in order for two or more individuals to form a 
plural subject, say, with a set of collective beliefs.20 (1) Two or more individuals each 
conditionally express their personal readiness (willingness) to commit jointly to hold a set of 
beliefs. (2) There exists common knowledge among them about their conditional personal 
readiness (willingness) to commit jointly to doing so. (3) Once (1) and (2) are satisfied, the 
individuals in question become jointly ready (willing) as a unified agent to undertake the joint 
commitment to hold the set of beliefs in question: 
                                                 
19 This point is a central element of Tuomela’s analyses of collective notions; see Philosophy of Sociality, pp. 4, 
16ff.   
20 Gilbert, Living Together, pp. 7-15. For her extensive account of what it takes to form a plural subject, see On 
Social Facts, pp. 185-203.  
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The expression of quasi-readiness [i.e., the sort of personal readiness gearing up for joint readiness] 
involves a conditional commitment of one’s will, made with the understanding that if and only if it is 
common knowledge that the relevant others have expressed similar commitments, the wills in question 
are unconditionally and jointly committed.21 
 
(4) When the individuals in question actually jointly undertake this joint commitment, they 
constitute a plural subject to which a set of collective beliefs is ascribed, which in turn engenders 
a set of associational rights, obligations, and entitlements concerning the regulation of the 
behavior of the individuals who constitute the plural subject in question.  
These conditions also hold, mutatis mutandis, of the way in which two or more 
individuals come to share collective intentions and perform collective actions. Take Gilbert’s 
favorite example of what is involved when two or more individuals go for a walk together. Here 
the topic is what it takes to form a plural subject that intends to achieve a particular goal. In order 
to understand Gilbert’s account of this type of phenomena, it helps to have a contrast, which she 
calls the “strong shared personal goal analysis”.22 According to this analysis, it is logically 
necessary and sufficient for two or more individuals to walk together if and only if there is 
common knowledge among the individuals involved that each individual participant has this goal 
in common and acts accordingly to do his or her part in order to achieve this goal.  
Gilbert argues, however, that this analysis cannot explain why two or more people who 
are really walking together have certain rights and obligations that naturally arise in the course of 
performing this activity (e.g., stopping to wait, under normal conditions, for the other person in 
the course of walking together, etc.). Nor can this analysis explain, according to Gilbert, why 
they are entitled to rebuke each other for their failure to perform certain actions (e.g., chiding 
those who stray not to walk too far away, etc.).23 To generalize, her claim is that whenever 
people (intend to) do something genuinely together, this activity always generates a certain set of 
associational norms to which its participants can appeal for the purpose of accomplishing and 
regulating the collective activity in question. This is what (she claims) the strong shared personal 
goal analysis cannot explain, which shows this analysis to be inadequate as an account of what it 
is for two or more individuals really to do something together. In effect, the crucial criterion for 
the formation and continuous existence of a plural subject according to Gilbert is precisely that 
                                                 
21 Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 198, emphasis in the original.  
22 Gilbert, Living Together, p. 179. Bratman’s conception of shared intentions is a sophisticated version of this 
analysis; see his Faces of Intention, Ch. 6, esp. pp. 121ff. 
23 Gilbert, Living Together, pp. 180-4. 
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its constituent members can appeal to the relevant associational norms in order to regulate the 
behavior of the other constituent members of the plural subject in question. She has lately called 
this “the permission point or requirement”:   
To generalize: if certain persons [who jointly undertake joint commitments in advance] are engaged in a 
particular joint activity with one another, it follows directly from that fact that a participant who 
withdraws from the joint activity does something wrong if he (or she) has failed to obtain permission 
from the other members so to withdraw.24 
 
A few further remarks are in order regarding what is involved in forming a plural subject 
according to Gilbert. First, the key concept involved in plural subjecthood is that of (conditional) 
joint commitments, which are “foundational for plural subjects … [and] may be regarded as the 
core of human sociality”.25 What makes joint commitments distinct from a conjunction of 
personal commitments with the same content is that individuals who jointly undertake joint 
commitments must do so “as a body (as a unit, as one)”.26 The example of the US Senate 
discussed above illustrates this point quite well: Once a vote has been taken by the Senate as a 
body, such a vote can only be changed by another session of the Senate as such, not by the 
attitudes and actions of the individual Senators themselves apart from their participation in such 
a session.  
Second and more controversially, Gilbert argues that once a joint commitment is 
undertaken, no single individual, nor a subset of the individuals, who is a constituent member of 
a plural subject can unilaterally rescind this commitment; a joint commitment can only be 
rescinded by everyone who enters into it. As she writes, a “joint commitment does not in the 
relevant sense, have parts. A joint commitment is not a sum or aggregate of commitments such 
that each of those committed through it ‘holds sway’ over his or her part of that sum, and is in a 
position to rescind it.”27 She lists and comments on some central features of joint commitments 
as follows: 
Dependent “individual” commitments. When there is a joint commitment, each of the parties is 
committed through it. One may, therefore, speak of the associated “individual commitments” of the 
parties. These commitments exist through the joint commitment: they are dependent on its existence for 
their own. 
 
                                                 
24 Gilbert, “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 42; cf. pp. 42-6; Sociality and Responsibility, pp. 4f. and 17. 
25 Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility, p. 4.  
26 Gilbert, Living Together, p. 8, emphasis in the original; cf. “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 54. 
27 Gilbert, Living Together, p. 10, emphases in the original.  
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Dependent commitments not personal. Given their existence through the joint commitment, these 
“individual commitments” are not personal commitments: they are not, or not ultimately, the unilateral 
creation of the respective persons, they cannot be unilaterally rescinded …. 
 
Interdependence of dependent commitments. The dependent individual commitments are interdependent 
in the sense that there cannot be a single such commitment, pertaining to a given individual, existing in 
the absence of any other such commitments. Thus given a two-person joint commitment, and ceteris 
paribus, one person’s dependent individual commitment cannot exist unless the other’s does. These 
commitments must arise and fall together. Again, this is because of the dependence on [sic] each of these 
individual commitments on the joint commitment. 
 
Simultaneity of dependent commitments. The dependent individual commitments of the parties come into 
being simultaneously at the time of the creation of the joint commitment … [at least with respect to] those 
creating an original joint commitment de novo.28  
 
In short, Gilbert’s argument here seems to be that because the joint undertaking of joint 
commitments (which constitute plural subjects) is simultaneous and interdependent, any 
rescission by one or a subset of the individuals who has undertaken them must also be 
simultaneously and interdependently approved by everyone who initially jointly undertook the 
joint commitments.29 If this claim is justified, the fact that an individual or a subset of 
individuals could rescind the joint commitment unilaterally would actually reveal, according to 
Gilbert, that the joint commitment in question was not one that genuinely formed a plural subject 
in the first place.  
Third and finally, it is clear that she takes the phenomenon of plural subjecthood to be 
central to the nature of human sociality: “to understand the structure of joint commitment is to 
understand the deep or underlying structure of the smallest carrier of genuine sociality – the 
social atom. … This concept [of joint commitment] is of fundamental importance for all who 
seek to understand human behavior in both general and particular circumstances.”30 On this 
basis, she then tries to show the explanatory power of plural subject theory by using it to explain 
the possibility of certain social phenomena (besides the ones already mentioned) like the social 
                                                 
28 Gilbert, “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 49f., emphases in the original. I have only cited the features that 
are relevant here.   
29 I say “seems to be” because Gilbert oftentimes simply asserts, in numerous places in her writings, the truth of this 
point without explicit argument. She seems to take it to be rather obvious. The present argument is thus my gloss on 
how it seems to go.   
30 Gilbert, “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 41. She expresses the scope and ambitions of her plural subject 
theory through the titles of articles intended to provide paradigmatic statements of this theory. In addition to ibid., 
the subtitle of which is “The Foundation of Human Social Behavior”, see also esp. “Walking Together: A 
Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon” and “Concerning Sociality: The Plural Subject as Paradigm”.      
 106 
 
basis of group languages, social rules and conventions, everyday agreements, collective 
emotions, and collective responsibility and collective guilt.     
Tuomela’s account of collective intentionality starts from the truism that one common 
and important way in which human beings are social is that they live and act as members of 
groups or collectives, in addition to thinking and acting as single individuals. Like Gilbert, he is 
interested in particular to make explicit the conditions under which they can join together to form 
collective agents to which collective beliefs, intentions, and actions can be ascribed in ways that 
are irreducible to the aggregation of the attitudes and actions of interrelated individuals. Gilbert 
and Tuomela diverge, however, with regard to their explanatory strategies of collective 
phenomena. Whereas Gilbert takes what can be described as a “bottom up” approach to 
establishing the explanatory necessity and usefulness of collective agents in terms of the joint 
commitments that form plural subjects, Tuomela takes what can be described as a (moderately) 
“top down” approach to analyzing the nature of such agents, along with that of their intentional 
attitudes and actions. As he writes: “the elements in my analysis [of collective intentionality] are 
not independently existing ‘building blocks’ of joint intentions but are only analytically isolated 
parts that presuppose the whole of which they are parts”.31 It is for this reason that he thinks he 
can begin his analysis of collective intentionality by assuming that we human beings are already 
familiar in practice with what is involved in thinking and acting as members of groups.32  
More specifically, this explains why he thinks he is entitled to begin his analyses of 
collective phenomena by treating his crucial notion of the “Collectivity Condition” as 
explanatorily primitive. This condition is the requirement that single agents who think and act as 
members of a group or collective do so for the sake of achieving the group’s or collective’s 
goals, i.e., do so (in Tuomela’s words) for “group reasons” rather than for “private [non-group] 
reasons”.33 Basically, if the attitudes and actions of a set of interrelated individual agents satisfy 
                                                 
31 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 97. Tuomela’s theory seems to have become more anti-reductionist with 
age. One of his earliest papers on the nature of collective intentionality (Tuomela and Miller, “We-Intentions” , 
published in 1988) is clearly reductive in spirit; and he does not hesitate to use “building block” talk by asserting in 
another book (published in 2002) that: “We-attitudes of these kinds [i.e., we-intentions and we-beliefs] are the 
underlying building blocks of social practices, and they are also causally relevant to the initiation and maintenance 
of both social practices and social institutions.” (The Philosophy of Social Practices, p. 3)  
32 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 98: “Generally speaking, they [i.e., the individual agents who are 
members of a group] must be able to act together (perform X [as a member of a group or collective]) before being 
able to form the joint intention to perform X. So practice is central – the intention requires the practice.”  
33 Ibid., p. 4. 
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this condition, this indicates that they are thinking and acting for genuinely “group reasons” as 
opposed to the “private reasons” of single agents; in such a circumstance, they are “in the same 
boat”, “stand or fall together”, or “share a common fate”.34 The main set of questions that he 
tries to answer revolves thus around the multifaceted ways in which single agents think, intend, 
and act as members of a group or collective, given that we already know how to do so in 
ordinary life.     
In addition to the Collectivity Condition, which he uses in effect as a test for whether 
competing accounts of collective phenomena are genuinely concerned with collective 
phenomena, the other basic concepts central to Tuomela’s account of collective intentionality are 
those of collective commitment and the distinction between an individual’s attitudes and actions 
in the “I-mode” and in the “we-mode”.35 In order for group members to really think and act as 
such, they must be collectively committed to doing so. A commitment for Tuomela’s purposes 
“primarily means being bound to something in a way that gives a sufficient reason for action 
related to the object of commitment (which object typically gives a group reason in the case of 
collective commitment)”.36 Collective commitment is important for two reasons.37 First, it is 
what binds (“glues”) group members together around an ethos, “the set of the constitutive goals, 
values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices and/or traditions that give the group motivating 
reasons for action”.38 Collective commitment to an ethos creates the foundation for the unity and 
identity of the group. Second, this commitment serves to give authority to group members so that 
they can each do their part in achieving the goals that their commitment to a relevant ethos 
makes intelligible and (on some occasions) requires from each of them. If the group in question 
is hierarchically structured (e.g., in a corporation), the distribution of the authority to each 
member, depending on his or her role in the group, is likewise so structured.39   
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Tuomela deploys a host of technical terms and formalisms for his theory, which makes a brief exposition of it 
challenging. For this reason, I will focus only on the most basic concepts that he uses for it. There are also various 
nuances and qualifications regarding these concepts that I do not have the space to explicate.   
36 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 27.   
37 Ibid., pp. 5, 35-42.   
38 Ibid., p. 16, emphasis in the original.  
39 Although Tuomela himself treats the concepts of the Collectivity Condition and collective commitment as 
interdependent (see ibid., p. 5 and Ch. 1), it seems to me that collective commitment is more explanatorily basic. For 
without it, no genuine group or collective can be constituted, let alone sustained over time. If so, the question of 
whether the attitudes and actions of interrelated individuals satisfy the Collectivity Condition would be moot absent 
the realization of collective commitment.  
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The distinction between an individual’s attitudes and actions in the “I-mode” and those in 
the “we-mode” flows straightforwardly from the idea of what it takes to think and act as a 
member of a group. If an individual thinks or acts as a member of a group, i.e., for group reasons 
and not for private (non-group) reasons, she expresses attitudes or performs actions in the “we-
mode”.40 To return to the examples used above, US Senators who consider possible legislation 
and take votes when the US Senate is in session, as well as the individuals who really are 
walking together, are cases of single agents who think and act in the we-mode.  
The we-mode is the mode of the thick we-perspective (or group perspective), and it gets a central part of 
its content from for-groupness, which means thinking and acting for the group so that all the activities 
and results of them that are collectively accepted by the group are group “shareware” and thus for the use 
of, and collectively available to, the group members in their thinking and acting as group members.41     
 
To put this a bit more schematically, an individual has an attitude A in the we-mode (i.e., a 
shared we-attitude A) if and only if:  
(1) She has A as a functioning member of (i.e., as playing her appropriate part in) a group or 
collective.  
(2) A has been collectively accepted, with collective commitment, under conditions of 
mutual belief (i.e., common knowledge), by other members in this group or collective. 
(3) Therefore (because of (2)), she is participating in the members’ collective commitment, 
with attitude A, at least in part for this group or collective (i.e., for the benefit and use of 
this group).42  
 
By contrast, when an individual has attitudes or performs actions in the “I-mode” in relation to a 
group, she expresses attitudes or performs actions either (i) in the purely private (singular) I-
mode, (ii) in the plain I-mode, or (iii) in the progroup I-mode.43 We need not clarify their 
differences for our purposes, except to say that what is lacking in them, to various degrees, is 
precisely thinking and acting from the group perspective (the property of “for-groupness”). To 
his credit, Tuomela provides here a precise taxonomy of the different ways in which an 
individual can be seen to believe or do something for the group. In particular, he explains nicely 
how it is unproblematic for a single individual simultaneously to have attitudes and perform 
actions under individual and collective descriptions, showing thereby that expressing attitudes 
and performing actions in the I-mode and in the we-mode are not mutually exclusive.44  
                                                 
40 Tuomela, “The We-Mode and the I-Mode”, p. 97.  
41 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 52, emphases in the original.    
42 Ibid., p. 52f. I have omitted some formal details from this definition for the sake of clarity.  
43 Ibid., p. 53; cf. “The We-Mode and the I-Mode”, p. 104. 
44 Tuomela, “The We-Mode and the I-Mode”, pp. 104-9.  
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Lastly, when shared we-attitudes are further combined with collective acceptance, this 
makes possible the creation and maintenance of social institutions and the ascription of 
intentional attitudes and agency to the latter.45 For instance, a group or collective intends to bring 
about a goal if all its “operative” members set this goal as a collective goal of the organization. 
“Operative” members are those individuals who are authorized to make decisions and set 
policies for collectives like organizations and corporations (as, e.g., their mid- or higher-level 
managers or administrators). If an organization is large, it will surely also contain “non-
operative” members, who differ from “operative” ones because they tend not to have the 
authority to make decisions and set goals in a strategic sense. “Non-operative” members tend to 
play their part in performing collective actions by receiving tasks and carrying them out; they 
are, so to speak, the “underlings” or “worker bees” of the group. Collective acceptance is the 
means through which interacting individuals with shared we-attitudes can construct macro-level 
social entities like social institutions without reifying them as self-subsistent wholes that exist 
completely above and beyond the workings of individual intentionality.  
Although Searle’s social ontology puts much less focus on the precise mechanism 
involved in constituting collective agents, he shares Tuomela’s interest in showing how social or 
at least institutional reality should be understood. Searle’s social ontology is in some ways more 
intuitive than those of Gilbert or Tuomula, so its exposition here can be more brief.46 There are 
four conceptual building blocks in Searle’s theory: collective intentionality, the assignment of 
functions, constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in context C”, and the Background (in 
his sense of that term). He argues that collective intentionality is the key to his analysis of social 
reality: “The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and 
the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional 
imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition.”47  
To illustrate with one of his favorite examples, money is instituted as a social entity only 
when members of a society collectively assign to certain artifacts (metal, paper, electronic data, 
etc.) the function of being a means of economic value and exchange. The collective assignment 
                                                 
45 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, pp. 43f., 129. 
46 For more extensive summaries and critical assessments than the one given here, see, e.g., Carsten’s, Hund’s, and 
Wettersten’s essays in “Review Symposium on The Construction of Social Reality”; and Hornsby’s, Tuomela’s,  and 
Ruben’s essays in “Book Symposium on The Construction of Social Reality”.  
47 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 41.   
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of such a function to entities is possible only when individuals follow the constitutive rule that 
such artifacts count as money (in a certain society). Because the rule in question is constitutive 
and not merely regulative, perceiving and using something as money necessarily implies that 
individuals who do so conform to the relevant set of constitutive rules if they are to encounter 
entities as money at all, for otherwise money cannot exist as such. Instituted entities like money 
have thus, on the one hand, the status of being (in Searle’s terminology) ontologically subjective: 
their existence as whatever they are, i.e., as having the function they perform, depends wholly on 
their acceptance and treatment as such by a community of individuals. On the other hand, Searle 
argues plausibly that the ontological subjectivity of instituted entities like money does not imply 
their “epistemic” (better: explanatory) subjectivity.48 For example, once something is instituted 
as money by a community of individuals, there are objective facts that govern what can be taken 
and used as money, facts that no single individual or a plurality of individuals can arbitrarily 
ignore or alter, even though money is an ontologically subjective entity. Searle’s view is thus 
that social entities, or at least institutional ones, have the status of being ontologically subjective 
and yet explanatorily objective.  
In order to prevent an infinite regress of rule-following from generating, Searle invokes 
his concept of the Background, i.e., the set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that are 
the conditions of the possibility of intentionality in general, whether individual or collective.49 
The Background structures our capacity to have collective intentionality because this capacity 
“requires something like a preintentional sense of ‘the other’ as an actual or potential agent like 
oneself in cooperative activities”.50 This suggests that an individual’s socialization in communal 
practices is necessary for the possibility of having collective intentionality. Moreover, like 
Gilbert and Tuomela, Searle argues that collective intentionality is not reducible to the sum or 
aggregation of individual intentionality. Similarly, he argues that adding the condition of 
                                                 
48 Ibid., Ch. 1-2, esp. p. 7f. I put ‘epistemic’ in quotes because I find it misleading of Searle to characterize the point 
he has in mind in this way. The right adjective is ‘explanatory’, not ‘epistemic’, because this point concerns the 
condition under which institutional facts and phenomena are explained in an objective way, not those under which 
we come to know them. For this reason I will replace in this chapter the uses of ‘epistemic subjectivity or 
objectivity’ and their cognates with those of ‘explanatory subjectivity or objectivity’ and their cognates.    
49 Searle, Intentionality, Ch. 5; Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Ch. 6. “The Background … is not a set of 
things or a set of mysterious relations between ourselves and things, rather it is simply a set of skills, stances, 
preintentional assumptions and presuppositions, practices, and habits. And all of these, as far as we know, are 
realized in human brains and bodies.” (Intentionality, p. 154) 
50 Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions”, p. 413. He has some suggestive remarks, but no more, about what this 
involves in the section in which this thought is expressed (ibid., pp. 413-5).   
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common knowledge (or mutual belief) to the coordinated interactions of a plurality of 
individuals does not result in non-singularist collective intentions and actions.51 On his view, 
collective intentionality is instantiated whenever the contents of an individual’s intentions or 
actions are intelligible only as part of some collective intentions or actions (e.g., playing my part 
as a member of an orchestra or fulfilling my obligations as a member of a committee, etc.). 
Searle’s commitment to methodological solipsism,52 however, compels him to hold, 
controversially, that access to the contents of collective intentions and actions is completely 
intelligible from within the purview of each individual who instantiates it, so that 
the structure of any individual’s intentionality has to be independent of the fact of whether or not he is 
getting things right, whether or not he is radically mistaken about what is actually occurring. … [T]he 
account must be consistent with the fact that all intentionality, whether collective or individual, could be 
had by a brain in a vat or by sets of brains in vats.53 
 
If this is right, a single individual could still have collective intentions (“We intend …”) even if 
there are no others present, either actually or virtually, with whom he can share them.  
To conclude this section, it should not be hard to see how Gilbert’s, Tuomela’s, and 
Searle’s theories of collective intentionality instantiate conceptions of human sociality along the 
lines of IPIA. This is clearest in the case of Gilbert’s conception of joint commitments as the 
core of plural subjecthood. According to this view, if there is to be collective phenomena and 
collective agents, understood in non-singularist ways, two or more individuals must interact 
jointly in accordance with the structure of what is involved in undertaking joint commitments. 
Moreover, once a plural subject is formed in this way, this engenders the set of rights and 
obligations that regulate the behavior of the constituent members of such subject. According to 
Gilbert, the fact that a plurality of individuals can assert certain rights and incur certain 
obligations that govern how they (should) associate with one another derives from their mutual 
creation and maintenance of a plural subject. Tuomela’s theory of collective intentionality also 
resembles Gilbert’s in this respect. For it too analyzes what it is for two or more individuals to 
think and act as members of a group or collective in terms of how they must undertake collective 
commitments in order to come to share attitudes and perform actions in the we-mode. The 
                                                 
51 Ibid., pp. 402-6.  
52 Searle misleadingly uses the label of ‘methodological individualism’ to characterize this commitment. But no sane 
methodological individualist in social ontology or the philosophy of social explanation needs to be committed to 
Searle’s understanding of what this position entails. Rather, what he actually means when he uses this label is 
methodological solipsism. (This will become clear shortly.) 
53 Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions”, pp. 406-8. 
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crucial constraint that must be satisfied in these cases is the Collectivity Condition; its 
satisfaction constrains the respective roles that members of a group or collective are supposed to 
play in them (e.g., what functions and responsibilities they have as members in them) in the 
course of sharing collective intentions and performing collective actions. Although it takes a bit 
more effort to discern how Searle’s social ontology instantiates a form of IPIA, we can see how 
this is so by highlighting the role that following constitutive rules plays in this ontology. For this 
activity is the basic manner in which two or more individuals collectively impose functions on 
entities so as to confer institutional significance on them. Searle’s conception of collective 
intentionality is peculiar, however, because it makes room for the logical possibility that 
collective intentionality could be had by a single individual qua a brain in a vat. Even if she were 
actually alive in this circumstance, however, Searle’s view is that the virtuality of her experience 
of collective intentionality has no bearing on its collective character. Methodological solipsism is 
a constraint on intentionality in general (as Searle conceives this), not one that applies only to 
collective phenomena.  
In sum, Gilbert’s, Tuomela’s, and Searle’s theories of collective intentionality are 
versions of IPIA. They understand human sociality in terms of (I) how two or more individuals 
interact in ways that are constrained by the specific norms that these theories specify as 
implicitly governing such interactions. Furthermore, they clearly assume (II) that their theories of 
collective intentionality suffice for understanding the fundamental way in which human beings 
are social and all forms of human sociality. Accordingly, they take it as self-evident that their 
theories of collective intentionality should begin with this mode of sociality as its key datum and 
point of departure.  
3.2 PROBLEMS WITH THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 
Although I have not elaborated the extensive details of Gilbert’s, Tuomela’s, and Searle’s 
accounts of collective intentionality, I hope to have given readers a sufficient sense of their 
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motivations, concerns, and arguments. Ignoring the specific disagreements among them,54 they 
exhibit a broadly similar approach to clarifying the nature of collective phenomena. What unites 
them is their shared commitment to what can be called non-singularist constructionism about 
collective phenomena and collective agency: non-singularist because they reject singularism 
(though not explanatory individualism as such) about collective agency and collective 
phenomena; constructionist because they each attempt to isolate a set of conceptual raw 
materials from which social and institutional phenomena are built up, or at least analyzable 
(“reconstructable” in Tuomela’s sense), by means of certain sorts of interactions among single 
agents.  
Despite the ingenuity and analytical rigor that these theories of collective intentionality 
display, however, they are problematic both in their own terms and on external grounds. To 
begin with, because Gilbert and Tuomela (unlike Searle) apply the method of conceptual analysis 
in their investigations of social and collective phenomena, the immediate internal problem they 
are faced with is the circularity of their analyses.55 We saw above how Gilbert argues that two or 
more individuals form a plural subject just in case they are jointly ready (willing) to undertake 
the joint commitment, as a body, to believe that p or achieve the goal that p. It is crucial to point 
out that she adds the requirement that they do so as a unified body or subject, for otherwise her 
account would collapse into a sophisticated form of reductive explanatory individualism about 
collective phenomena. But it is hard not to understand this condition of believing or doing 
something “as a body” as anything but a notational variant for the idea of a plural subject, which 
is what her theory intended to analyze in the first place. In effect, she is arguing that the set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for the existence of a collective agent 
requires that its constituent members think and act as a unified collective subject. But the latter 
notion is precisely what is in need of explanation and may not figure in the explanans.  
In the face of this charge of circularity, Gilbert could respond, first, by denying that she is 
giving complete conceptual analyses of collective phenomena (even if the spirit and style in 
which she articulates her theory suggests otherwise). Instead, she could weaken her position by 
claiming that she is primarily concerned with how collective subjects can come to exist by means 
of interpersonal interactions of a certain kind. For what she actually does in her theory is 
                                                 
54 For a helpful discussion of what these are, see Tollefsen, “Collective Intentionality”. 
55 Cf. Tollefsen, “Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences”, p. 28f.  
 114 
 
articulating the mechanism through which interacting individuals can constitute unified 
collective subjects, not undertaking the more difficult task of giving a complete conceptual 
analysis of them. She writes: 
I do, of course, posit a mechanism for the construction, so to speak, of social groups [qua plural subjects]. 
And this mechanism can only work if everyone involved has a grasp of a subtle conceptual scheme, the 
conceptual scheme of plural subjects. Given that all have this concept, then the basic means for bringing 
plural subjecthood into being is at their disposal. All that anyone has to do is openly to manifest his 
willingness to be part of a plural subject of some particular attribute.56   
 
This reply cannot sufficiently deflect, however, the charge of circularity. The reason is that the 
individuals who jointly undertake the joint commitments that form various plural subjects, as she 
explicitly admits in the passage just cited, must still grasp the conceptual scheme of plural 
subjecthood in order to effect plural subjects. But this modification goes nowhere as a response 
to the charge of circularity because it is simply another way of saying that they must already 
think and act as constituent members of such subjects in order to constitute them. The fact that 
she can change her topic from that of giving a complete conceptual analysis of plural subjects to 
an account of how they are formed through an interpersonally interactive mechanism only 
elaborates what single agents must do, step-by-step, to form such subjects. It does not alter the 
presupposition that they must already think and act as constituent members of such subjects in 
order to bring them into being.    
Another problem concerns the sense in which ordinary individuals “grasp” the conceptual 
scheme of plural subjecthood. If Gilbert means that they have a working theoretical 
understanding of this scheme, this claim is surely false, for the battery of concepts in this scheme 
is much too complicated for ordinary people to have in mind whenever they come to share 
collective beliefs or undertake collective actions. More plausibly, Gilbert may mean that they 
grasp this scheme in practice whenever they believe or do things together in genuinely collective 
(non-singularist) ways; she may mean that they do not already need to self-consciously 
understand and apply her theory of plural subjecthood in order to form collective subjects to 
which collective beliefs and actions can be ascribed. This more charitable understanding of her 
claim that ordinary individuals understand, in practice, the conceptual scheme of plural 
subjecthood renders this claim more plausible. But even if this is the case, this still would not 
lessen the vulnerability of her theory to the charge of circularity.  
                                                 
56 Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 416; cf. Living Together, p. 185.  
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Moreover, while Gilbert is right to emphasize the permission point that governs the 
behavior of the individual participants in a plural subject, it is too strong to claim that a 
participant or subset of participants therein cannot unilaterally rescind their initially joint 
commitment to form such a subject. For in an ordinary sense, such rescissions go on all the time 
as a matter of fact. Suppose you and I, for example, agree to have dinner together tonight. I 
decide later in the day, however, not to show up and can provide no good reason for “standing 
you up” in subsequent communication. Obviously, I unilaterally broke our joint commitment to 
have dinner together. I can be, of course, criticized in all sorts of ways for having done so. And 
Gilbert is right that the basis for such criticism rests on non-moral associational rights and 
obligations that derive from our initially joint undertaking of joint commitments. Nevertheless, it 
is clear, as a factual matter, that unilateral rescissions happen. Of course, once an individual 
jointly undertakes joint commitments with others, he should not unilaterally break them unless 
he has good reasons. The problem with Gilbert’s formulation of the permission point is that she 
often puts matters in a factual mode, when it is more appropriate that she put them in a 
prescriptive mode. Thus, instead of specifying the non-rescission feature of joint commitment as 
follows:  
Once a plural subject has been formed, the joint commitments that underpin it is not 
rescindable by either party unilaterally, but only by the parties together,57  
 
she ought to give it a prescriptive formulation:  
Once a plural subject has been formed, the joint commitments that underpin it should 
not be rescindable by either party unilaterally, but only by the parties together (unless 
this possibility of unilateral rescission has already been built into the initial joint 
commitments).   
 
Lastly and more problematically, Gilbert seems to suggest (in her comment on the central 
features of joint commitments) that unilateral rescissions are somehow, conceptually speaking, 
incoherent. As I noted (in 3.1 above), her argument seems to be that because the joint 
undertaking of joint commitments is simultaneous and interdependent, any rescission by a single 
individual or a subset of the individuals who has undertaken them must also be simultaneously 
and interdependently approved by everyone who initially jointly undertook those joint 
commitments. If so, this claim is also too strong as it stands. As Gilbert often emphasizes, one 
                                                 
57 Cf. Gilbert, “The Structure of the Social Atom”, p. 50.  
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can attribute a sort of wrongdoing to someone who is a constituent member of a plural subject 
but who subsequently unilaterally breaks a joint commitment that constitutes the latter. This 
action is not wrong, however, because it is somehow conceptually incoherent. It is simply wrong 
because one has broken a commitment made in advance, not wrong in some intrinsic or 
conceptual sense. One can be accused of not living up to this original commitment, but not of 
failing to sustain a plural subject as such, i.e., of failing to do so under that description. Given 
that Gilbert holds that the formation and persistence of a plural subject consists in nothing more 
than that of sustaining initially jointly made joint commitments by its constituent members, it is 
unclear what exactly is amiss when a participant to this subject withdraws unilaterally from it, 
other than his failure to live up to his initially jointly undertaken joint commitments. The rights 
and obligations that participants in a plural subject have to one another derive from their mutual 
commitments to one another, not from their commitments to a joint “we” that is somehow 
additional to such commitments, even after these commitments engender, as a matter of 
conceptual status, plural subjects.   
The problem of circularity also troubles Tuomela’s conception of an individual’s 
attitudes in the we-mode. Recall that an individual has an attitude A in the we-mode (i.e., a 
shared we-attitude A) if and only if:  
(1) She has A as a functioning member of (i.e., as playing her appropriate part in) a group or 
collective;  
(2) A has been collectively accepted, with collective commitment, under conditions of 
mutual belief (i.e., common knowledge), by other members in this group or collective; 
(3) Therefore (because of (2)), she is participating in the members’ collective commitment, 
with attitude A, at least in part for this group or collective (i.e., for the benefit and use of 
this group).58  
 
Notice that this analysis of what it is for an individual to have an attitude in the we-mode uses 
the notions of her functioning as a member of a group, as well as her collective acceptance of 
and collective commitment to this attitude for the sake of the group (i.e., for group reasons). 
Again, it is hard not to see this analysis as anything but circular, because the specification of 
what it is for an individual’s attitude to be in the we-mode is given in terms of ideas that make 
implicit use of just that idea. Almost all the work of the analysis is already done by the crucial 
idea of an individual agent’s self-understanding and activities as a member of a group, for this 
                                                 
58 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 52f.; cf. The Philosophy of Social Practices, p. 36f. 
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membership is what supplies the bulk of the explanatory power of the notions used in the 
analysis. 
Now, Tuomela acknowledges this point of criticism in effect by treating the notion of the 
Collectivity Condition (i.e., thinking and acting for group reasons, for the sake of the group) as 
explanatorily primitive. He is thus aware that the charge of circularity can be raised against his 
account of collective intentionality (in his terms, of the we-perspective). In his reply to this 
charge, although he concedes that his account is strictly speaking circular, he maintains that it is 
not viciously so.59 He gives two reasons for this view. First, he contends that his account is still 
informative by showing how we can seamlessly transpose collective phenomena at the group 
level (the macro level) into the interrelated commitments and shared goals of single agents at the 
level of their “jointness” (the intermediate level).60 Second, he emphasizes that this account 
allows for the possibility that human beings in ordinary life often act as members of groups 
without it being explicit to them that they are so acting (e.g., in lifting a table up the stairs 
together, in playing tennis together, etc.).61 In other words, his reply is that the battery of 
concepts introduced and deployed (e.g., the Collectivity Condition, collective commitment, 
thinking and acting in the we-mode, etc.) for philosophical analysis need not be explicit to single 
agents in ordinary life who think and act as members of groups in the course of understanding 
and carrying out collective actions. Instead, these concepts “can be regarded as underlying 
conceptual presuppositions that philosophical analysis has revealed” about the structure of 
collective intentionality.62  
I think these two replies to the charge of the circularity of his account are well taken. For 
it is true that his account does supply us with a seamless way of redescribing collective 
phenomena in terms of the interrelated attitudes and activities of individuals. More importantly, 
his analytical framework, at least of late, is not meant to be reductive, but clarificatory, and is in 
this sense informative.63 This must be the case if one assumes from the outset, as Tuomela does, 
that human individuals often think and act, in non-singularist ways, as members of groups or 
                                                 
59 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, pp. 97f., 139f.  
60 The micro level is just that of the actions and commitments of single agents, considered apart from their relations 
to other single agents.  
61 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 97f. 
62 Ibid., p. 98.  
63 Ibid., p. 97: “the elements in my analysis [of collective intentionality] are not independently existing ‘building 
blocks’ of joint intentions but are only analytically isolated parts that presuppose the whole of which they are parts”. 
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collectives. Having said that, I think critics can still make the following objections to Tuomela’s 
and, for that matter, Gilbert’s theories of collective intentionality. 
To begin with, one can take issue with how their theories privilege, without defense, one 
specific mode of social existence, namely, interpersonal interactions among a plurality of 
individuals that establish collective attitudes or achieve collective goals, as the general or core 
form of human sociality.64 This starting-point is quite questionable, however, for the following 
reasons. (1) There are clearly other modes of human coexistence that not only do not fall under 
this category, but are more explanatorily basic. These modes concern above all the social 
heritage and attachments that individuals have simply in virtue of the concrete contingencies that 
shape and matter to their lives as individual persons. Thus, facts concerning the particular era, 
families, languages, communities, cultures, traditions, and nationalities to which individuals 
belong obviously condition their existence prior to, in the order of explanation, their actual 
interpersonal interactions with others to constitute collective attitudes, agents, and institutions. 
Tuomela concedes this much when he writes that his account of collective intentionality requires 
the prior understanding and use of the concept of group ethos: 
My analysis of thinking and acting as a group member will assume that we are dealing with normal 
human beings to whom propositional attitudes, other mental states, and actions can meaningfully be 
attributed. In general, such agents must [already] understand what group membership means and must 
also know to which groups they belong. In my technical developments, this will require that they 
[already] understand what the group ethos is, that is to say, what its central or constitutive goals, values, 
beliefs, norms, and standards are and what it is to take it, or its ingredients, as one’s reason for action.65  
 
As we can see, the concept of group ethos contains quite a lot of content (!). The fact that 
Tuomela helps himself to this concept at the outset of his theory shows that the generic 
framework of theories of collective intentionality at best only examines one single, admittedly 
important, form of human social existence that shows itself, nevertheless, not to be its most basic 
one. More specifically, the fundamental limitation of these theories is their fixation on the active 
(constructive) dimension of individuals’ choices and commitments, while ignoring the equally 
important passivity of such choices and commitments, i.e., the background social conditions that 
already shape the range of concretely possible experiences and actions that at once enable and 
                                                 
64 For similar complaints, see Baier, “Doing Things with Others”, pp. 20ff. and Stoutland, “Why are Philosophers of 
Action so Anti-Social?”, pp. 45-58.  
65 Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 5. Recall that he defines a group’s ethos as “the set of the constitutive 
goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices and/or traditions that give the group motivating reasons for action” 
(ibid., p. 16, emphasis in the original). 
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constrain the exercise of individual agency.66 It is precisely the nature and ramifications of these 
conditions (their structure and basic character) that the Heideggerian understanding of human 
social existence seeks to bring into the foreground and articulate as the necessary enabling 
conditions for the choices and commitments of individuals.67   
(2) This fixation connects directly with a related problem with theories of collective 
intentionality: There is a bias toward an overly voluntaristic conception of human sociality. But 
clearly human beings just as often find themselves coexisting with others in ways that they have 
not freely chosen. The most dramatic examples are the social identities attributed to individuals 
by the social environment in which they are born and live (e.g., those determined in terms of 
race, gender, socioeconomic class, sexual orientation, etc.). Most individuals do not freely 
choose these identities, but simply find themselves with them as aspects of their self-
understanding and agency that may either enable them to realize or prevent them from realizing 
their particular goals and life-projects. The examples used by theorists of collective 
intentionality, however, assume that human beings typically coexist and interact with one 
another on the basis of symmetrical power relations among free agents.68 But more often than 
not, this is the exception rather than the rule and depends crucially on the character of the 
sociopolitical order of the communities or societies to which they belong. 
In response to this criticism, Gilbert, for one, tries to accommodate it by emphasizing that 
the sort of voluntary choice and commitment in play in forming plural subjects is special because 
it allows for a good deal of coercion: “Clearly people may be pressured into joining a particular 
conversation, into getting married, into fighting in a particular war. The type of ‘volunteering’, 
then, is such that it is possible to be coerced into it.”69 If this is so, however, the sense and 
manner in which individuals express their personal “readiness” (or “willingness”) to undertake 
joint commitments becomes either misleading or vacuous because we start to lose our grip on 
how such commitments can be really jointly undertaken. For if they are not really jointly 
undertaken, it becomes unclear whether the interpersonally interactive mechanism that engenders 
                                                 
66 This is a central theme in Baier’s “Doing Things with Others”.  
67 See Ch. 2 of this dissertation. 
68 Schmid, Wir-Intentionalität, p. 15 and Plural Action, Ch. 3. Cf. Baier, “Doing Things with Others”.  
69 Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 410; cf. esp. Living Together, Ch. 12. 
 120 
 
joint commitments really creates plural subjects rather than plural objects.70 It seems, then, that 
Gilbert’s theory of plural subjecthood has a serious problem in distinguishing between plural 
subjects into which individuals freely agree to enter and people who are members of involuntary 
social groups and treated – without their consent – as a collective. Note that this is not an 
objection about the intelligibility of coerced choices or commitments itself, which I think is an 
important and useful way of explaining human exploitation and oppression despite the existence 
of formally free choices or commitments. It is rather an objection about the plausibility of 
Gilbert’s conception of what is really involved in jointly undertaking joint commitments to form 
plural subjects, if this conception is unable to distinguish between the creation of plural subjects 
and plural objects.      
(3) The general orientation of theories of collective intentionality also distorts the nature 
of human coexistence by focusing primarily on what it takes for individuals to form small groups 
that can share collective intentions and perform collective actions.71 The paradigms that such 
theorists use as illustrations are telling: to mention only a few, walking together, managers 
setting a company’s policies together, making hollandaise sauce together, painting a house 
together, pushing a car with a mechanical problem on the road together, etc. But this orientation 
toward what is involved in the formation of small groups is faced with a number of problems. (i) 
Depending on the example chosen, many of these actions are merely contingently social, in the 
sense that they are social only insofar as it is simply easier or more efficient when another person 
or a number of people help an individual achieve some goal. But there is no reason in principle 
why an individual could not achieve this goal if he possessed sufficient power to do so on his 
own. (ii) Moreover, theories of collective intentionality make it too easy on themselves by 
selecting examples of interpersonal interactions that do not, at least initially, involve institutional 
significance. One can wonder as an empirical question, however, whether interactions involving 
institutional significance are more prevalent than ones without this significance when individuals 
interact. To anticipate, the problem here is that collective intentions and actions are analyzed in 
                                                 
70 It would amount to what we can call a “Mafia conception” of voluntary choice and commitment, where the head 
of a Mafia family says to someone: “I’m gonna make you an offer you can’t refuse. I would like you to join our 
Mafia as an important member. But it’s really up to you what you wanna do.”      
71 Baier makes the same objections that I do here in “Doing Things with Others”, esp. pp. 22-9; see also Stoutland, 
“Why are Philosophers of Action so Anti-Social?”, pp. 45-58. 
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isolation from their embeddedness within the relevant nexus of background practices that make 
them intelligible and have a point at all.  
Now, Searle’s social ontology avoids the problem of circularity that troubles Gilbert’s 
and Tuomela’s accounts of collective intentionality because he eschews giving a conceptual 
analysis of it. But this comes at the cost of leaving ultimately unexplained how it is that 
individual minds can share collective intentions in general, let alone perform collective actions, 
for Searle asserts that collective intentions are explanatorily primitive.72 To state his view a bit 
more accurately, he holds that there are limits to how much philosophical reflection can explain 
the existence and sharing of collective intentionality, for ultimately this can only be given by an 
evolutionary explanation. Be that as it may, problems still remain with his conception of the 
nature of collective intentionality at the philosophical level. 
To begin with, given Searle’s commitment to methodological solipsism, according to 
which the contents of collective intentions are intelligible and accessible from entirely within the 
purview of individual minds (brains) alone, he is confronted in effect with the problem of other 
minds.73 As noted in my brief sketch of his theory above, he stipulates that a necessary constraint 
on what he conceives as an adequate account of collective intentionality is that individual minds 
can have this intentionality even if they are actually a collection of brains in a vat. If so, 
however, how can such minds know with confidence that the other minds to which they are 
intentionally related can share, whether actually or virtually, the same understanding of the 
content of some collective intention?74 We are left with a situation where it seems rather 
accidental or lucky that a plurality of minds can have the same understanding of collective 
intentions and actions. Since Searle appeals to evolution as revealing the “brute fact” that we just 
have collective intentionality, I suppose he can circumvent this objection in this way.75 
Nevertheless, the convenience of such an appeal just at the moment when this objection is raised 
seems rather unsatisfactory.     
                                                 
72 Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions”, pp. 402-7. 
73 For another line of objection to Searle’s commitment to methodological solipsism that goes in a different 
direction, see Schmid, Plural Action, pp. 38-40.  
74 The diagram that Searle gives on p. 26 of The Construction of Social Reality does not solve this problem, but 
actually exacerbates it.   
75 Ibid., pp. 23f., 37f. 
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Searle could also presumably reply to this objection by emphasizing that his concept of a 
constitutive rule is conceived in part to address the very problem that this objection highlights. 
For what ensures that a plurality of individuals can share the same understanding of a collective 
intention is that each of them must follow the same constitutive rule that imposes some 
collectively assigned status function on something that would otherwise not have this status 
function. Although Searle himself does not put this point in the way that I just did on his behalf, 
what he writes in the following passage implies it in connection with the role that constitutive 
rules play in his account of the construction of institutional reality. Recall that constitutive rules 
have the form “X counts as Y in context C”. He writes: 
So the application of the constitutive rule introduces the following features: The Y term has to assign a 
new status that the object does not already have just in virtue of satisfying the X term; and there has to be 
collective agreement, or at least acceptance [emphasis added – JJK], both in the imposition of that status 
on the stuff referred to by the X term and about the function that goes with that status. Furthermore, 
because the physical features specified by the X term are insufficient by themselves to guarantee the 
fulfillment of the assigned function specified by the Y term, the new status and its attendant functions 
have to be the sort of things that can be constituted by collective agreement or acceptance [emphasis 
added – JJK]. Also, because the physical features specified by the X term are insufficient to guarantee 
success in fulfilling the assigned function, there must be continued collective acceptance or recognition of 
the validity of assigned function; otherwise the function cannot be successfully performed.76   
 
This passage clearly implies that if individuals did not share collective agreement about, or at 
least collectively accept, what is instituted by following the same constitutive rule, phenomena 
like money could not exist because they would then not (continue to) fulfill the status function 
that the collective agreement or acceptance has imposed on them on the basis of people 
following the same constitutive rule in a society. Thus, conformity to constitutive rules is what 
guarantees that individual persons have the same understanding of the content of a collective 
intention when they share it.  
But this reply is subject to its own problem of circularity, one that differs, however, from 
the one that troubles Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s accounts of collective intentionality. This can be 
seen when we examine how Searle’s appeal to the necessity of conforming to constitutive rules 
itself presupposes the prior availability of collective intentionality. As he writes: 
Collective intentionality presupposes a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative 
agency; that is, it presupposes a sense of others as more than mere conscious agents, indeed, as actual or 
potential members of a cooperative activity. … What you must suppose [in order to have or act on 
collective intentions] is that the others are agents like yourself, that they have a similar awareness of you as 
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 44f., emphases in the original unless noted otherwise.   
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an agent like themselves, and that these awarenesses coalesce into a sense of us as possible or actual 
collective agents.77      
 
This train of thought seems circular, however. We want to understand the possibility and nature 
of collective intentionality. Although Searle gives us an account of how social or at least 
institutional reality is constructed on the basis of individuals who have collective intentionality, 
collective intentionality itself (as the passage just cited above states) presupposes that people are 
at least ready to cooperate with one another so as to make collective intentionality possible: 
“they must have the type of communal awareness that is the general precondition of collective 
intentionality”.78 In order to fully understand the possibility and nature of collective 
intentionality, then, we need to understand the structure or character of the kind of cooperation or 
communal awareness that makes collective intentionality possible. If so, however, we cannot 
appeal to notions like cooperation or (even more vague) communal awareness to explain 
collective intentionality, for these notions might very well presuppose that something like 
collective intentionality is already available and operative if the appeal to these notions is 
supposed to be illuminating. This is not to deny that this appeal can work. But in order for this to 
be the case, Searle owes us at least an account of how exactly cooperation or communal 
awareness helps to enable collective intentionality as its precondition, as opposed to treating 
cooperation or communal awareness as explanatorily primitive phenomena.  
At this juncture, Searle appeals (if I understand him correctly) once again to evolution as 
providing the ultimate explanation for existence of cooperation and communal awareness: “the 
capacity for collective behavior is biologically innate”.79 Indeed, “[m]any species of animals, our 
own especially, have a capacity for collective intentionality … not only [in the sense] that they 
engage in cooperative behavior, but [in the sense] that they share intentional states such as 
beliefs, desires, and intentions”.80 It is undeniable that many species of animals engage in 
cooperative behavior. The question of whether they are also able to have intentional states such 
as beliefs and intentions is much more disputable.81 The question for Searle in the present 
                                                 
77 Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions”, p. 414, emphasis in the original. His more extensive discussion of the 
Background in The Construction of Social Reality aims at resolving other difficulties and does not address the 
problem I am pointing out here.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p. 37. 
80 Ibid., p. 23.  
81 See, e.g., Davidson, “Thought and Talk” and “Rational Animals”; McDowell, Mind and World, Lecture VI.   
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context does not engage him on those fronts, however. Rather, it concerns the issue of whether 
cooperative behavior or communal awareness, regardless of which species of animals we have in 
view, might not already implicitly rely on the prior availability of collective intentionality. To 
appeal to evolution as a response to this query is not satisfactory because such a response does 
not address the particular problem of circularity that I have pointed out here, even if the 
evolutionary basis of collective intentionality is true enough.  
3.3 COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF 
THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL 
I have argued that three of the most prominent theories of collective intentionality currently on 
offer are beset by a number of problems that arise from an examination of these theories in 
mainly their own terms. From the standpoint of a Heideggerian conception of the social 
constitution of the human individual (as I have presented this in Ch. 2), though, their most 
serious flaw is that they take individual agency for granted by failing to take into account the 
worldly context (site82) that makes the exercise of this agency intelligible, and in this sense 
possible, at all. Clearly, they assume without hesitation that human sociality consists primarily in 
the interpersonal interactions of individuals. But what they fail to see, let alone examine, is how 
the social can be already at work in the individual prior to such interactions. What they overlook 
is that there is a dimension of human social existence that constitutes the individual by 
structuring the situational possibilities of experience and action that make sense to him or her as 
a necessary condition of the exercise of his or her agency in general. As I argued in Ch. 2, this 
dimension of the social permeates and makes intelligible an individual’s very comportment 
toward the world because this comportment is normalized, primarily and usually, in accordance 
with the public norms of the one (das Man). This conformity to the public norms of the one is 
prior in the order of understanding to the actualization of interpersonal interactions by 
constraining the latter’s very intelligibility.  
                                                 
82 See 2.2 for a detailed explication of what a site is, as well as of some of the remarks in this section. 
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In order to see how this Heideggerian approach pertains to the concerns of the three 
theories of collective intentionality examined in this chapter, let us take some favored examples 
used by Gilbert, Tuomela, and Searle and show how the intelligibility of the interpersonal 
interactions that they privilege depends on individual agents’ prior and shared understanding of 
the world.83 This is fairly easy to do with regard to collectively instituted entities like money 
(Searle) and the collective intentions and actions, e.g., of employees in corporations (Tuomela). 
As Searle himself acknowledges, something functions as money only when it is situated and 
used “in a whole network of practices: the practices of owning, buying, selling, earning, paying 
for services, paying off debts, etc.”.84 In other words, collectively instituted entities like money 
depend on their involvement within the relevant nexus of practices and material arrangements 
that must already be in place as a complex whole if such entities are to be intelligible as what 
they are at all. Absent this involvement, money cannot be what it is, not even when nothing 
physical has changed regarding the artifacts that are token-identical with money. More generally, 
Searle is surely right in stating that: “In the case of social objects, … process is prior to product. 
Social objects are always … constituted by social acts; and, in a sense, the object is just the 
continuous possibility of the activity.”85 Although he would presumably not put it as follows, 
what he emphasizes in effect is that collectively instituted entities like money can only be what 
they are at a site. That is, such entities exist inherently as part of the worldly context, i.e., the 
relevant nexus of human practices and material arrangements, to which they belong because their 
very intelligibility depends on their placement and meaning in this sort of context. This 
placement and meaning is what enables socially instituted entities like money to be what and 
how they are.  
We can make the same point in a more concrete fashion in connection with Tuomela’s 
analyses of collective phenomena. The claim here is that collective intentions and actions are 
only intelligible and thereby realizable on the basis of an understanding of how a nexus of 
practices and the material arrangement with which they are interwoven hang together, i.e., on the 
basis of an understanding of how individuals coexist and carry out their activities at a site. In 
                                                 
83 Although the focus and terms of analysis are different, the criticisms of Searle and Tuomela that follow below 
overlap in significant ways with Mandelbaum’s criticisms of reductive explanatory individualism in “Societal 
Facts”, esp. pp. 107-13.  
84 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 52. 
85 Ibid., p. 36, emphasis in the original.  
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other words, the claim is that understanding what it is for individuals to exist and act at a site is 
prior, in the order of understanding, to understanding analytically how individuals at that site can 
join together to have collective intentions and actions. To take an example to which Tuomela’s 
account of collective phenomena surely applies, consider the collective intentions and actions of 
the operative and non-operative members of a bank. The chief manager of this bank, who is an 
operative member of it because she is authorized to make strategic decisions and set collective 
policies concerning the long-term goals of her bank, can only do so by drawing on an ongoing 
understanding of banking practices. This includes (inter alia) understanding: that a bank is the 
site where money in various forms is deposited, borrowed, invested, converted into other 
financial instruments, etc.; that engaging in banking practices requires the cooperation of a host 
of bank employees not just at her own bank, but also at other banks and other banking-related 
institutions; that the employees at her bank and elsewhere must in turn play their appropriate 
roles by carrying out the various tasks assigned to or expected of the occupants of these roles in 
instituting and sustaining the collective intentions and actions of her bank (i.e., in Tuomela’s 
words, they must be “functioning” members of the bank); that the material arrangement of the 
bank (e.g., the constellation of banking equipment like computers, their software, deposit slips 
and receipts, spreadsheets, contracts, ATMs, certain furniture, etc.) is organized, both physically 
or virtually on the Internet, in ways that facilitate the functioning of the bank; and so forth.  
It should not be hard to see that the way in which all these banking practices and the 
material arrangement with which they are interwoven hang together (how they make sense as a 
whole) must be already understood by those who carry out their activities at this site. These 
practices and their concomitant material arrangement are only intelligible as inherent parts or 
aspects of this particular site, such that they cannot be what they are (cannot function in their 
appropriate roles) when they are abstracted from their place or role at that site. Furthermore, 
what institutes and sustains them as inherent parts or aspects of that site is the specific set of 
public norms to which its participants by and large conform when they assign themselves in 
practice the roles of being bank managers, bank employees, bank customers, etc. Moreover, in 
the course of engaging in banking practices at the particular site that renders them intelligible, 
there will also surely be some possible intentions and actions that are collective in nature, in 
Tuomela’s sense that those who have these intentions and perform the corresponding actions will 
do so only as members of the bank or other organizations or institutions. The present point is that 
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they can have such intentions and perform such action in the we-mode only by availing 
themselves of a background understanding of how various phenomena hang together as inherent 
parts or aspects of a particular site (in this case, a bank). Absent the possession and exercise of 
this understanding of a site, individual agents cannot even make sense of the collective intentions 
that are only meaningful thanks to their inherent connections to this site, let alone realize them 
by performing certain actions that are expected of them as members of a group or collective.            
Gilbert’s example of two or more individuals walking together may seem to present the 
toughest case for the Heideggerian or site conception of the social, for it lends itself more readily 
to a much “thinner” description of the doing in question by being seemingly devoid of the 
“thicker” sort of significance that flows from its embeddedness at a site. But even in this case, 
the individuals involved must still at least understand what they are doing in terms of some role 
or self-interpretation, even if the latter can be utterly mundane (e.g., as a pedestrian, hiker, etc.). 
As a reminder, this understanding need not be and often is not self-conscious or reflective; it is 
simply something they find intelligible in the course of doing something else, e.g., going for a 
walk together. As I argued in Ch. 2, the world that practically concerns individuals has three 
components, of which (3) roles and self-interpretations (Worum-willen) form one constituent. 
The other two components are (1) a totality of entities that show up as ready-to-hand equipment, 
each of which is used for performing some specific task; and (2) more encompassing short-term 
and medium-term goals which are accomplished by the execution of these tasks. These three 
components are mutually dependent, even if there is a certain primacy that accrues to the 
projective understanding of the world that flows from individual agents’ roles or self-
interpretations.  
Given that this is the case, Gilbert’s example of two or more individuals walking together 
must be worldly in the rich sense that the Heideggerian or site understanding of the world 
emphasizes. In this example, this means not only that there must be some ongoing understanding 
among them of how their joint intentions and actions fit into the worldly context (i.e., the 
particular site) in which such joint intentions and actions make sense and have a point, but also 
that this understanding is normalized by its participants’ absorption in the one, even in 
undertaking a mundane activity such as walking together. Why must this be so? The reason is 
that this activity always occurs somewhere (e.g., on the sidewalk, on a path in the woods, in a 
park, etc.). Where it occurs specifically determines which public norms constrain their activity of 
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walking together, even though their conformity to these norms need not be at the forefront of 
their conscious awareness of what they are doing while they walk together. Thus, two or more 
individuals constitute themselves as a plural subject who walks as a unified body only by already 
practically understanding how relevant ready-to-hand entities (e.g., sidewalks, paths in the 
woods, sign-posts, etc.) make sense in connection to the nest of mundane short- and medium-
term goals that they accomplish in the course of performing this activity (e.g., avoiding other 
pedestrians or hikers that they encounter, using road signs to get to where they want to, etc.). 
Clearly, these are aspects of the world to which these individuals pay the barest attention while 
they walk together, so much so that this skillful coping with their environing world may seem 
trivial in comparison with their joint goal of walking together. But it should be obvious that the 
individuals in question could not go for a walk together unless they could exercise these basic, 
worldly skills as they navigate their way through their environing world with the joint goal of 
walking together. Moreover, the associational rights, expectations, and obligations that are 
central to Gilbert’s conception of plural subjecthood cannot be intelligible unless they too are 
situated within a nexus of human practices and material arrangements. If, e.g., one person walks 
on ahead for a stretch, misreads a sign-post, and goes thus in the wrong direction, her companion 
can rebuke her when or if they meet back up at a later time by noting that she should have 
understood the sign-post in this particular (correct) way; that she could have asked someone else 
for directions or called the person left behind to tell him where she has ended up, etc. Thus, a 
member of a plural subject cannot be in a position to admonish her fellow pedestrians for not 
playing their appropriate part in carrying out their activity of walking together if they do not 
show the requisite competence involved in skillfully and fluidly navigating their way through the 
world, in this instance under the aspect of how the world shows up to them as affordances for 
walking together. Some practical understanding of the worldly (normalized) context must be 
already available to the individuals who participate in some joint activity if such individuals take 
themselves to be sensitive and subject to the associational rights and obligations that come with 
their participation in that collective activity.  
From the Heideggerian or site conception of the social, then, the source of the problems 
pointed out in the foregoing remarks is the failure of Gilbert, Tuomela, and Searle to consider 
how human individuals are already socially constituted, in the order of understanding, prior to 
their actual engagement in interpersonal interactions. This implies that the most basic way in 
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which human beings are social cannot be modes of interpersonal interactions or their products, 
contra the non-singularist and constructionist spirit of Gilbert’s, Tuomela’s, and Searle’s 
accounts of collective intentionality. The logical order of dependence is the other way around: 
Collective intentionality is possible and realizable because human individuals must always draw 
on their very understanding of the world on each occasion – a world in which they are already 
involved as engaged agents and which makes intelligible the exercise of their individual agency, 
not one that is incidental or extraneous to their interpersonal interactions.   
This culminating point connects now directly with Schmid’s resolution of the dilemma 
that he ascribes to theories of collective intentionality. The dilemma is this: 
On the one hand, the[ir] aim was clearly to break with individualism [qua singularism] in the sense of the 
orthodox limitation to purely individual intentionality, which is recognized as being overly restrictive and 
unfit for our understanding of the social world. On the other hand, however, individualism (in the broad 
sense of an emphasis on the role of the individual) seemed to be the only effective defense against the 
specter of the group mind. Thus, in a sense, the theory of collective intentionality had to reject and to 
endorse individualism at the same time.86   
  
That is, theorists of collective intentionality endorse non-singularist constructionism about 
collective phenomena because they envisage singularism (reductive explanatory individualism) 
and the specter of the group mind as the only two conceivable options on offer, both of which 
they reject as flawed. Schmid argues that this state of affairs reveals a blind spot that these 
theorists share regarding the nature of intentionality in general. This is the assumption that 
whenever we encounter phenomena that exhibit intentionality, there must be somebody – some 
subject, whether individual or collective – that “has” it. Adapting a suggestive phrase from 
Annette Baier, Schmid calls this assumption the “Cartesian brainwash”, in the sense that many 
theorists remain so accustomed to thinking about the nature of intentionality in a Cartesian 
fashion, even when they reject some of its central tenets,87 that they cannot conceive how there 
can be intentionality without assuming that there must be someone who possesses it.88 Such an 
assumption is clearly at work when theorists of collective intentionality feel immediately 
                                                 
86 Schmid, Plural Action, p. 34. 
87 Cf. Dennett’s description of many cognitive scientists as “Cartesian materialists” because they cannot resist the 
intuition that consciousness is a “Cartesian Theater” where whatever is present to the mind must introspectively 
come together, as it were, on a central stage; see Consciousness Explained, pp. 107ff. 
88 Schmid, Plural Action, p. 32; see Baier, “Doing Things with Others”, p. 18. Following Pettit, I noted (in 1.1) how 
this assumption is mistaken: It is a fallacy to think that sharing thinkable contents must presuppose sharing, literally, 
a group mind or collective consciousness that enables the sharing of thinkable contents to take place. I will pursue, 
however, another line of response to this assumption in what follows.  
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compelled to dismiss the specter of the group mind upon their rejection of singularism about 
collective phenomena, for they assume that if there are group or collective intentional attitudes 
that are irreducible to the aggregation of individual ones, then there must be the existence of 
group or collective minds that bear these irreducible attitudes, even if such theorists dismiss this 
possibility as “spooky”.89 Schmid’s treatment of the “Cartesian brainwash” is interesting for our 
purposes because he argues that Heidegger’s conception of the social enables us to undermine 
the plausibility of this assumption and, in so doing, understand the nature of collective 
intentionality. Schmid does so by developing his key concept of inter-intentionality, which is 
coordinate with that of common or shared (gemeinsames) Dasein that he discerns in early 
Heidegger’s thinking about the nature of the social.90 He draws out the import of these concepts 
in connection with the specific concerns of theories of collective intentionality.   
To begin with a brief point of clarification, although Heidegger in Being and Time 
deliberately eschews the use of the term ‘intentionality’, let alone ‘inter-intentionality’, because 
of the mentalistic associations of the idea of intentionality in his mind, it is not incorrect on 
Schmid’s part to attribute the use of these concepts to Heidegger. For once intentionality is 
understood in accordance with Heidegger’s full conception of being-in-the-world, what is 
distinctive about this way of existing remains, after all is said and done, its particular manner of 
being directed at the world. It is just that this way of being directed at the world is no longer 
allowed to be conceived in ways that isolate it from its situated and practical engagement with 
the world in its concretion. As Heidegger writes: 
In directing itself at something and grasping it, Dasein does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere 
in which it has been initially enclosed, but rather its primary mode of being is such that it is always 
already “outside” in the midst of [bei: dealing with] an entity that makes sense in terms of a world that is 
discovered on each occasion. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein is particularly occupied 
[bestimmendes Sichaufhalten bei] with an entity that it comes to know. But even in this “being-outside” 
with [beim: being occupied by] the object, Dasein is still “inside”, if we understand this term correctly; 
that is, it is itself “inside” as being-in-the-world qua knower. And furthermore, the act of perceiving what 
is known is not one of returning with one’s acquired booty to the “container” [Gehäuse] of consciousness 
                                                 
89 Bratman and Searle clearly accept and work with this assumption; see Bratman, Face of Intention,  
p. 110f. and Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 25.  
90 Schmid, Plural Action, pp. 168ff. In terms of textual evidence, Schmid traces Heidegger’s emphasis on the 
communal character of Dasein mainly to the lecture course that Heidegger gave in the winter semester of 1928/29, 
published as Einleitung in die Philosophie (Band 27 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe). Although Schmid thinks he 
needs to draw attention to this character in Heidegger’s thinking in a way that diverges from its elaboration in Being 
and Time, I think that it is not only already in view in Being and Time, but required by Heidegger’s way of thinking 
in that text. (I will make this point in due course below.)  
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after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving [the way the world is 
in thought,] Dasein as knower remains outside as Dasein. (SZ 62, emphasis in the original; cf. 54)          
 
Thus, intentionality (though not under this particular description) remains a central theme for 
Heidegger in Being and Time. He prefers instead to use the term ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) as a 
substitute for ‘intentionality’ because the former better expresses human beings’ absorption in 
and direct engagement with the world; this way of putting things makes clear that intentionality 
and the world in its worldliness should be understood as a fundamentally unitary phenomenon 
(hence the use of hyphens in ‘being-in-the-world’ [SZ 53]). As long as we understand 
Heidegger’s conception of intentionality as something inherently bound up with the world – such 
that there could not be intentionality, not even notionally, absent its interwovenness with the 
world – it is innocuous for particular purposes to use ‘intentionality’ and its cognates to 
characterize early Heidegger’s thinking.  
Provided that same cautions are kept in mind regarding Schmid’s conception of inter-
intentionality, it offers a way of understanding the nature of shared intentionality that avoids the 
above-mentioned dilemma of theories of collective intentionality. With one notable exception, 
this conception strongly resembles the Heideggerian account of the social constitution of the 
individual that I provided in Ch. 2.91 In particular, both accounts emphasize and appropriate 
Heidegger’s important concept of possibilities (SZ §31). These possibilities are, primarily and 
mostly, those that are situationally intelligible to individuals in virtue of their understanding of 
and participation in the shared practices that constitute a common world on each occasion. 
Schmid has precisely this understanding of situational possibilities in view in his own 
interpretive appropriation of Heidegger’s thinking. As he argues with regard to the nature of joint 
activity or joint action:        
Inter-intentionality … is, above all, a matter of joint activity. Joint action implies a form of disclosedness 
of the surrounding world …. [It] is about our shared possibilities, and these are not merely a sum or 
aggregate of the individual possibilities of the participating individuals. There is no way of accounting for 
shared possibilities in terms of individual possibilities. The reason is not that individuals do not have 
individual possibilities when acting jointly, but that, in most cases, the individual possibilities they have 
are based on the shared possibility [sic], and not the other way around. To quote [sic] a trivial example, 
it’s only within the shared practice of an election that individuals can cast their votes. The possibilities 
that shape our shared being are the base and frame of many of the possibilities we have as individuals. As 
observed by Heidegger, possibility is what Dasein basically is [i.e., what it projects and lives out], the 
                                                 
91 Given that Heidegger’s philosophy around the period of Being and Time is a source of inspiration for both 
accounts, this is not surprising. I will discuss in due course what this exception is below.   
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very being of Dasein is not only my own being, but our common being. Dasein is not – or not exclusively 
– the being of an individual, as the individualistic setting of Being and Time makes us believe.92  
Schmid argues, then, that inter-intentionality derives from the shared possibilities of action that a 
multitude of individuals have (i.e., project) in virtue of their shared or common way of making 
sense of situational possibilities and acting in the world on that basis (as the example of 
participating in an election illustrates), i.e., their shared or common way of being in the world 
(their common Dasein). These shared possibilities cannot derive from the aggregation of 
individual ones because the latter presuppose the former for their very intelligibility.93  
But neither does it follow from this conclusion that there must then be collective or group 
minds that somehow “possess” shared possibilities of action or, more generally, collective 
intentional attitudes. Thinking that this must be the remaining implication only reveals one’s 
susceptibility to the “Cartesian brainwash”. Rather, these possibilities are not “possessed” by or 
“contained” in any sort of singular or collective mental realm but (to use a suggestive phrase of 
Charles Taylor) “out there in the practices themselves”,94 in the sense that these possibilities 
make sense and flow from individuals’ comportment toward the world as such, including how 
they comport toward one another as aspects of their overall comportment toward the world. 
More precisely, shared possibilities are “out there in the practices themselves” because their 
organization is not a set of properties that we can attribute to specific individuals as their 
particular possessions, even though, to be sure, it is such individuals who grasp the organization 
of practices “in their mental states” as their individualized understanding of what is going on and 
what makes sense for them to do on each particular occasion. As Schatzki writes: 
A practice is organized by an array of intelligibilities, rules, ends, projects, and ways things matter. … 
The “mental states” that organize a practice, qua components of the practice’s organization, are not the 
states of particular individuals. Qua organizing phenomena, they are distinct from whatever mental states 
actual participants possess. Participants’ states are, at best, versions of these organizing states, and many 
of their mental states are not even these. For example, the desire to earn profit that helps organize bank 
loan practices is distinct from both the desire of any given bank employee and the desires of any sum of 
employees to do so. That is to say, that this desire organizes the practices is distinct from either this or 
that or any specific set of actual participants desiring profit. As a set, moreover, the array of states that 
                                                 
92 Schmid, Plural Action, p. 171, emphases in the original. Charles Taylor argues in non-Heideggerian terms for the 
same point (and, indeed, uses the example of voting in an election for very similar purposes) in “Interpretation and 
the Sciences of Man”, esp. pp. 32-40.  
93 I gave an extensive argument for this conclusion in 2.1. Using his own vocabulary, Schatzki makes the same 
argument in “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 183f. 
94 Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”, p. 36.  
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organizes the practice is expressed in the entire open manifold of actions composing the practice. It is an 
affair (or feature) of the manifold and not of any subset of practitioners.95   
 
This line of thought explains well Schmid’s claim that shared possibilities are the “base and 
frame” of our individual possibilities: Shared possibilities supply the typical tasks, short- and 
longer term goals, and more generally the determinate significance and point of some action or 
activity, for the sake of which an individual acts. Individual possibilities not only do not come 
about ex nihilo, but emerge primarily and usually from an individual’s prior familiarity with 
some set of shared possibilities that the practices themselves make available. It is thus the 
understanding of and participation in shared practices and what this involves, not the sharing of 
some supposedly collective or group mind, that explains the nature of shared possibilities in 
relation to individual ones.  
Last but not least, Schmid’s conception of inter-intentionality also emphasizes the 
centrality of individuals’ conformity to norms in ensuring that they continue to share wide-
ranging commonalities regarding the possible actions that make sense to them. As he writes: 
In the authentic view, norms and conventions are not just restrictions and guiding lines [sic] for Dasein’s 
individual actions. Rather, norms are the infrastructure of our common Dasein. Norms are the instruments 
with which, with more or less circumspection [Umsicht: fluid coping with the world on each occasion], 
we “take care” of the Dasein we share. An authentic view of norms is sub specie communitatis, as it 
were.96 
 
This thought expresses another way in which Schmid’s conception of inter-intentionality and 
common Dasein strongly resembles the conception of the social constitution of the individual 
that I laid out in Ch. 2. It was argued there that the human individual is socially constituted 
because such an individual understands (projects) situational possibilities of experience and 
action that accord, primarily and usually, with the normative (normalized) intelligibility that the 
one (das Man) supplies.97 In short, human beings in everyday life are mostly one-selves (Man-
selbst) because they understand possibilities and perform actions or activities that realize these 
possibilities in accordance with, or else in reaction to, the public norms of the one.  
                                                 
95 Schatzki, “A New Societist Social Ontology”, p. 192f., emphasis in the original. I have inserted scare quotes 
around ‘mental states’ at the beginning of this quotation because this expression picks up a previous use of it 
surrounded by scare quotes. 
96 Schmid, Plural Action, p. 178, emphases in the original. I will discuss why he claims that this is the “authentic” 
view of norms and conventions below.  
97 As in Ch. 2, whenever I italicize ‘one’ in this chapter, I am using it in Heidegger’s loaded sense of das Man. 
When I do not italicize it, I am using it as this is standardly done in English.     
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Because Schmid is committed, however, to an existentialist interpretation of the 
significance of the one as social norms or pressures that hinder our attempt to achieve individual 
autonomy and personal flourishing, he would reject the way in which I discern and ascribe a 
positive significance to the one and criticize, more generally, the non-existentialist interpretation 
of the one that I elaborate and defend above in Ch. 2. In fact, he characterizes this interpretation 
rather tendentiously as a “conventionalist” understanding of the one, especially regarding the 
tight connection that it seeks to establish between social normativity and intentionality.98 This 
interpretation is alleged to be “conventionalist” because understanding oneself in terms of the 
public norms supplied and prescribed by the one implies (according to Schmid’s construal of this 
interpretation) not only understanding oneself and others in accordance with the shallow 
conventions and social norms of the crowd, but sanctioning this as an acceptable state of affairs. 
By contrast, when Schmid discerns and elaborates a Heideggerian conception of inter-
intentionality and common Dasein, he takes himself to be working out the way in which the early 
Heidegger (especially in his lecture course, Einleitung in die Philosophie) has the conceptual 
resources that reveal the positive significance of our social or communal existence. As Schmid 
asserts: “Heidegger [in this lecture course] outlines a non-individualistic account of intentionality 
… that does not depend on social normativity in terms of conventions, normative communal 
practices or social institutions, but is not an affair of single individual minds nevertheless. It is 
social, but not conventional.”99 In short, because Schmid thinks that Heidegger in Being and 
Time disparages the significance of human social existence, he seeks and succeeds in finding 
another source in Heidegger’s corpus that largely retains the insights of Being and Time but 
jettisons this negative understanding of the significance of human social existence. Schmid’s 
account of inter-intentionality and common Dasein is meant to reveal how Heidegger makes a 
positive understanding of this existence available that contrasts rather strongly with his remarks 
about it in Being and Time. In particular, Schmid argues that the “authentic” view of norms and 
conventions derives from the concepts of common or shared Dasein and inter-intentionality, 
whereas the “inauthentic” view of norms and conventions flows from the stifling character of the 
                                                 
98 Schmid, Plural Action, pp. 157-66. He explicitly attributes such a reading to Dreyfus and those who have found it 
to be fruitful (e.g., Haugeland, Brandom, Okrent, Carman, or, for that matter, Schatzki) for understanding not only 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, but a host of other philosophical issues. It should be clear that my own interpretation 
of this text falls into this camp.  
99 Ibid., p. 168.  
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social conformism that the one effects in the lives of human beings: “the inauthenticity of the 
One [das Man] should not be interpreted as standing in contrast to an individualistic idea of 
authenticity that is intrinsically alien to any form of social normativity …, but in contrast to a 
common or shared Dasein, a Dasein which is transparent to itself in its common, inter-intentional 
practices of shared ‘taking care’”.100 
For reasons given in 2.3, however, I think that this existentialist interpretation of 
Heidegger’s understanding of the significance of human social existence is not only simplistic 
and reductive, but also prevents Schmid’s positive evaluation of its significance from coming to 
light in Being and Time. If this judgment is right, Schmid does not need to find something else in 
Heidegger’s corpus that rectifies the distorting effects of the existentialist interpretation of 
human social existence in Being and Time. Rather, once we properly understand the import of 
being-with and the one in that text (see Ch. 2 as a whole), we equip ourselves to discern the 
contributions that these phenomena make to an account of human social existence that does not 
slight the positive significance of this existence. What Schmid identifies as the “authentic” view 
of norms and conventions in Heidegger’s early philosophy is in fact already encompassed by 
Heidegger’s understanding of the significance of the one. Contra Schmid, then, the “authentic” 
norms that express and sustain the common Dasein that a community of individuals share are not 
opposed to the normative (normalizing) function of the one, in the positive sense of this function, 
but actually serve to fulfill this function (in the way that Ch. 2.1 explains). In short, Schmid is 
wrong to hold that common or shared Dasein, along with the inter-intentionality that it enables, 
opposes the one. This view only makes sense, however, if one subscribes to an existentialist 
interpretation of the significance of the one. But this is a one-sided and hence flawed 
interpretation of Heidegger’s view of the social in Being and Time. Regardless of this mistaken 
interpretation, it is to Schmid’s credit that he has not only made astute observations and 
criticisms about the literature concerning the nature of collective intentionality, but finds a way 
in which Heidegger, of all people, can be seen as making a positive contribution to this literature.  
                                                 
100 Ibid., p. 178, emphases in the original. 
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4.0  THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN DAVIDSON’S APPEAL TO SOCIAL 
INTERACTION 
Although they have certainly not gone unchallenged, Davidson’s views have been influential 
with regard to an impressively wide range of issues central to the philosophy of action, language, 
mind, and interpretation. Moreover, his views are notable, especially in light of the spirit that 
animates this dissertation, for serving as a source of stimulation and discussion not only in 
analytic philosophy, but also among contemporary philosophers who work at the intersection of 
recent analytic and continental philosophy.1 My aim in this chapter, however, is not to survey the 
various ways in which Davidson’s philosophy is of general interest or of interest at such an 
intersection.2 I will focus instead on how his implicit commitment to interpersonal interactionism 
(IPIA) of a certain sort is problematic given the issues that he seeks to address with the help of 
IPIA.3 As a reminder, IPIA is a generic conception of human sociality that is defined in terms of 
two specific assumptions: 
The Assumptions of Interpersonal Interactionism (IPIA):  
(I) There exists a prevalent mode of human sociality that is realized when (i) two or more 
individuals are present in some context (ii) who interact with one another in accordance 
with some implicit set of constraints that (should) govern in that context.  
(II) This mode of human sociality suffices for understanding both the fundamental way in 
which human beings are social and all forms of sociality. Accordingly, any account or 
invocation of human sociality should begin with this mode of sociality as its key datum 
and point of departure. 
 
Although my criticisms of Davidson’s version of IPIA will stand in the foreground in what 
follows, I wish to register in passing at the outset that they are made against a wide background 
of underlying agreement regarding, e.g., the anti-reductive spirit of his philosophy, his defense of 
the holism of the mental, his conception of the a priori constraints that necessarily condition the 
                                                 
1 As noted in the Introduction of this dissertation, I am using ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ loosely.  
2 For general interpretations of Davidson’s philosophy, see Ramberg, Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Language; 
Malpas, Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning, “Locating Interpretation”, and “Gadamer, Davidson, and the 
Ground of Understanding”. Although Malpas is certainly right that there are important points of convergence 
between Davidson and hermeneutic philosophers like Heidegger and Gadamer, he also tends in my view to 
downplay points of divergence that are just as philosophically significant. See my discussion in this chapter for an 
instance of the latter.  
3 Davidson’s criticisms of Tyler Burge’s social externalism or anti-individualism will not figure in this chapter 
because they are not, as far as I can see, directly relevant to my concerns here.   
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objects and activity of interpretation (the constitutive ideal of rationality and the principle of 
charity), and his rejection of the dualism between conceptual scheme and uninterpreted content 
(the non-conceptual given). That said, the IPIA that informs Davidson’s philosophy deserves 
scrutiny because it exemplifies an influential way of thinking among contemporary philosophers 
who try to show that there must be an intersubjective dimension in how we should think about 
issues of standing philosophical concern like rationality, normativity, objectivity, and the relation 
of minded creatures to the world.4  
Davidson emphasizes the significance of social interaction with regard to two capacities 
that are clearly basic to what it is to be human: the nature of linguistic communication and the 
possibility of thought. His appeal to social interaction, however, differs somewhat in tone, if not 
emphasis, as it figures in his discussion of these two capacities. In what follows I will first lay 
out his argument that successful linguistic communication does not require that interlocutors 
share a language (in a particular sense of ‘language’ to be explicated below), but consists rather 
in the momentary sharing of what he calls “passing theories” in linguistic interactions.5 Second, I 
will examine his appeal to social interaction, under the guise of what he calls “triangulation”, as 
necessary for the possibility of thought as such.6 I conclude each of these sections with brief but 
general remarks concerning the appeal to the IPIA that informs his reflections on these two 
capacities.  
                                                 
4 Philosophers who emphasize the later Wittgenstein’s “social turn” are a paradigm; for sophisticated defenders of 
this line, see, e.g., Pettit, The Common Mind; Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind, and Meaning. I discuss how we should 
understand this “social turn” in Ch. 1.3 and 5. Other strands in contemporary philosophy that emphasize the social 
dimension of these phenomena are philosophical hermeneutics (e.g., Gadamer) and critical social theory (e.g., 
Habermas and Honneth). This does not imply that they agree about how exactly such phenomena are or should be 
social, especially in connection with the critique of ideology in contemporary Western societies. Witness the debate 
between Gadamer and Habermas that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s; for a good account of this debate, 
see Warnke, Gadamer, Ch. 4.   
5 Davidson gives and defends his argument for this conclusion, respectively, in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” 
and “The Social Aspect of Language”. The basic line of thought in these essays is already present in 
“Communication and Convention”, esp. pp. 276-80.  
6 Davidson argues for the significance of triangulation in a number of his later essays; see, e.g., “The Second 
Person”, “The Emergence of Thought”, “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, “Epistemology Externalized”, and 
“Externalisms”.  
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4.1 THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION 
Davidson’s appeal to social interaction as this figures in the achievement of successful linguistic 
communication gains its persuasiveness by opposing the standard conception of what a natural 
language is, one that many philosophers and linguists have taken for granted (or so he claims).7 
According to this conception, successful linguistic communication occurs when interlocutors 
have the ability to express and understand the literal (or first) meanings of one another’s 
utterances “in accord with a precise and specifiable set of syntactic and semantic rules; 
[furthermore] verbal communication depends on speaker and hearer sharing such an ability, and 
it requires no more than this.”8 More precisely, on such a conception, linguistic competence and 
successful linguistic communication require the satisfaction of three conditions on any 
interlocutor’s dealings with literal (first) meaning: 
(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own 
or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the 
structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings 
of utterances. 
(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, 
they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1). 
(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or 
competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is 
conventional in character.9  
 
The satisfaction of these three conditions is meant to be individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient for what it is to “know a language”. What is noteworthy in particular is the assertion 
that, once linguistic competence is acquired, interlocutors are able to understand the meanings of 
utterances in advance of the occasion of linguistic interaction on the basis of the shared 
knowledge (i.e., shared method of interpretation) of the relevant linguistic rules or conventions.  
More specifically, the picture we get of linguistic competence and successful linguistic 
communication is as follows. Once a speaker acquires linguistic competence, i.e., masters a set 
of precise and specifiable syntactic and semantic rules, and, moreover, once other interlocutors 
have mastered the same set of rules, linguistic communication becomes possible because each 
interlocutor now not only shares the same method of interpretation for the meanings of arbitrary 
                                                 
7 Henceforth the use of ‘language’ will only refer to natural language.  
8 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, p. 110.  
9 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, p. 93, emphases in the original.  
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utterances, they also each know that their interlocutors know this fact and know that their 
interlocutors know that they each know this fact (and so on). On this picture of linguistic 
communication, then, once interlocutors have mastered a language and know that others have 
similar mastery of the same language, all they have to do to ensure successful communication is 
to apply the set of linguistic rules that they each know that others can apply too. Thus, successful 
linguistic communication is by and large the direct result of the correct following of such rules. 
Conversely, if interlocutors fail to follow these rules, linguistic communication is either not 
achieved or significantly hampered. What is primary in the order of explanation, then, is the 
exercise of competence in a language so conceived. It follows that although the particular 
occasion of linguistic communication may be relevant in determining the meaning of utterances, 
this feature of communication is secondary to the fact that interlocutors share a language in the 
sense of having shared knowledge of linguistic rules or conventions.10 And when we consider 
the learning of foreign languages (more often than not in educational settings), it is 
understandable why this conception of linguistic competence and successful linguistic 
communication can seem quite plausible.11 In short, the standard conception of language is “the 
idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to 
cases”,12 the mastery of which enables them to internalize “portable interpreting machine[s] set 
to grind out the meaning[s] of … arbitrary utterance[s]”13 on actual occasions of linguistic 
interaction.  
It is this particular conception of language that Davidson means to reject. His eventual 
position regarding this conception is to retain (1) with one qualification, seriously modify (2), 
and reject (3) outright. Note that although he concludes the argument for his position with the 
provocative claim that “there is no such thing as a language …”,14 this claim is only correctly 
understood once one sees that he is only attacking the standard (mechanical and static 
conception) of language that is committed to (1)-(3). He does not deny the obvious existence of 
                                                 
10 Dummett, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments on Davidson and Hacking”, p. 474; cf. “The 
Social Character of Meaning”. 
11 Unless, of course, a speaker is already bilingual in virtue of his or her upbringing at home.  
12 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, p. 107. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
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language in the vague but practically useful sense in which ordinary people understand the word 
‘language’.   
Davidson’s strategy for rejecting the standard conception of language focuses on our 
unexceptional ability to deal with malapropisms, i.e., mistakes in the use of words, in the course 
of understanding ordinary linguistic communication. Mistakes in the spelling, pronunciation, or 
combination of words, ungrammatical or stylistically awkward utterances (e.g., those made by 
toddlers and some adults15), slips of the tongue (“There is a sex hour difference in time between 
Germany and the US”), idiosyncratic utterances (e.g., Yogi Berra sayings like “It’s like déjà vu 
all over again” or “When you get to a fork in the road, take it”), and other unfamiliar or non-
standard uses of words are all different kinds of malapropisms. Putting all amusement aside, 
Davidson’s preliminary goal highlights the ubiquity of malapropisms in ordinary 
communication, which is undeniable. Moreover, a person obviously cannot learn his or her 
mother tongue(s) as a child on the basis of the standard conception of linguistic competence. 
This is a simple point that theorists who overemphasize the stringency of the rule-following 
character of linguistic competence often forget.   
Most importantly, Davidson argues that our unexceptional ability to understand 
malapropisms reveals something fundamental about the nature of linguistic competence and 
communication that seriously undermines the standard conception of language. In his view, what 
matters above all in linguistic communication – however this is achieved – is not conformity to 
standard linguistic usage as such, but rather that speakers manage to get across what they intend 
their hearers to understand by their utterances and, correlatively, that hearers skillfully interpret 
speakers so as to understand the latter’s intentions in communicating.16 As Davidson writes: 
Success in [reliably] communicating propositional contents … is what we need to understand before we ask 
about the nature of meaning or of language, for the concepts of a language or of meaning, like those of a 
sentence or a name or of reference or of truth, are concepts we can grasp and employ only when the 
communication of propositional contents is established. Meaning, in the special sense in which we are 
interested when we talk of what an utterance literally means, gets its life from those situations in which 
someone intends (or assumes or expects) that his words will be understood in a certain way, and they are. 
                                                 
15 To my mind the most egregious case of an adult who commits malapropisms galore is our illustrious former 
President of the United States, George W. Bush, who has spawned a whole set of “Bushisms”. Here are some gems: 
“They misunderestimated me”; “I know how hard it is for you to put food on your family”; “See, in my line of work 
you got to keep repeating things over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the 
propaganda.” 
16 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, p. 118. 
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… Where understanding matches intent we can, if we please, speak of “the” meaning; but it is 
understanding that gives life to meaning, not the other way around.17  
 
Obviously, communication becomes vastly easier when interlocutors use words in ways that 
most people who speak their language (in the vague ordinary sense) do. This is probably what 
leads many philosophers and linguists to hold that linguistic competence and communication 
requires the shared mastery of a precise and specifiable set of linguistic rules or conventions. But 
the satisfaction of this condition is not necessary for linguistic communication to succeed, as the 
common occurrence and unproblematic understanding of malapropisms shows. For if the shared 
mastery in question is required for successful linguistic communication, it should not be possible 
or easy to understand speakers who commit malapropisms. But this is something that happens all 
the time in ordinary life.  
Even worse for the standard conception of linguistic competence, neither can the 
satisfaction of (2) and (3) suffice for successful linguistic communication. For suppose two 
interlocutors shared similar knowledge of linguistic rules or conventions for understanding the 
literal meaning of what they utter, i.e., suppose they shared a language in the way that the 
standard conception envisages. This would imply that they invariably hit upon the same meaning 
for every utterance made and heard, given that literal meaning is systematic in the way described 
in (1). But this idealized scenario ignores all sorts of contextual nuances and subtleties that we all 
know are in play in real-life linguistic communication (e.g., a speaker’s tone of voice and body 
language while speaking, etc.), ones that the study of the pragmatics of language (in a broad 
sense) has long emphasized. Further complicating the situation are the host of non-linguistic 
clues offered and actions performed by interlocutors that are meant to indicate how the audience 
is supposed to understand someone’s utterances. In addition, there may well be some 
sociocultural or historical background that informs the reasons why interlocutors say what they 
say on given occasions. Moreover, different interlocutors may draw different and perhaps 
incompatible inferences from the same set of utterances given their different understandings of 
the collateral commitments of these utterances. Lastly, all these factors are further complicated 
by the holistic nature of interpretation: We generally interpret people’s utterances in light of 
seeing how well the sense we make of these utterances coheres with the beliefs attributed to them 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 120f., emphases added. As we will see, what “gives life to meaning” is the construction of “passing 
theories” for interpreting one another’s utterances.  
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and the actions they perform.18 These are only the most obvious complications involved in trying 
to understand people’s utterances; there are surely more. It is thus far from clear that successful 
linguistic communication is possible solely on the basis of shared mastery of linguistic rules or 
conventions, even if we restrict the scenario merely to the understanding of utterances as such.  
Does this result imply that there is nothing that interlocutors share in the course of 
linguistic interactions? This would be rather odd since we are examining the nature of successful 
linguistic communication. But Davidson does not draw this radical conclusion. Although 
speaking a common language (as the standard conception envisages this) is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for achieving such communication, what is needed among interlocutors is the 
momentary sharing of what Davidson calls “passing theories”: ongoing but revisable 
interpretations of utterances that interlocutors each work out by continually adjusting their prior 
expectations (“prior theories”) about the meaning of the words contained in these utterances for 
the occasion.19 What distinguishes passing theories from the standard conception of language is 
their contingent and for this very reason dynamic character, for the interpretive adjustments that 
are necessary for the construction of passing theories include every successfully interpreted use 
of any word or expression for the purposes of communication, no matter how “mistaken” or 
idiosyncratic such use is by the lights of standard linguistic usage. As Davidson writes: 
Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for that moment (knowingly deviant, or not, 
on one, or both, sides), is in the passing theory as a feature of what the words mean on that occasion. Such 
meanings, transient though they may be, are literal: they are what I have called first meanings.20  
 
Malapropisms provide the most conspicuous cases when interpretive adjustments are most 
needed. But even when linguistic communication occurs without malapropisms, this process (as 
just emphasized above) still involves the making of subtle interpretive adjustments that effect the 
successful construction of passing theories. In short, the Achilles heel of the standard conception 
of language is its inability to deal satisfactorily with novelty and contingency in the 
understanding of utterances.   
                                                 
18 Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought”, pp. 123-7; cf. “Belief and the Basis of Meaning”. 
19 Davidson distinguishes “passing theories” from what he calls “prior theories” as follows: “For the hearer, the prior 
theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance of a speaker, while the passing theory is 
how he does interpret the utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior theory 
to be, while his passing theory is the theory he intends the interpreter to use.” (Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of 
Epitaphs”, p. 101, emphases in the original.)  
20 Ibid., p. 102. 
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The following objection may be raised at this point: Davidson’s argument that we 
construct passing theories concerning what interlocutors intend to say through their utterances is 
falsified by our actual experience of communicating with ordinary people, for we do not 
normally understand one another by self-consciously reflecting at every moment on the meaning 
of our words. That is, we do not normally apply a theory of meaning in light of the relevant 
linguistic and non-linguistic body of evidence from a perspective somehow removed from our 
involvement in linguistic transactions.21 This objection, however, misunderstands Davidson’s 
use of the word ‘theory’ in this context. Its use in ‘prior theory’ and ‘passing theory’ is not meant 
to suggest that we understand one another’s utterances from a disengaged, theoretical stance. 
Rather, the point is only that if philosophers or linguists want to have a satisfactory account of 
what interlocutors must be able to do in order to understand linguistic communication and 
meaning, then they (the philosophers and linguists) must work out a theory of meaning that 
describes what this ability consists in; the interlocutors themselves do not need to have explicit 
knowledge of the latter in order to show linguistic competence.22   
Davidson’s argument for why the standard conception of linguistic competence is 
mistaken, then, makes two general points about the nature of linguistic communication.23 First, 
given that most of what we say is new, in the sense of being combinations of words that no one 
has hitherto uttered before, passing theories must be constructed in order for interlocutors to 
make sense of these novel utterances. Second, the fact that interlocutors must only share passing 
theories in order to achieve successful linguistic communication shows that their success in 
achieving mutual understanding in past or present linguistic transactions, even with the same 
interlocutors, does not even guarantee future successful linguistic communication. For there is 
always an ineliminable moment of creative interpretation involved in the construction of passing 
theories: 
                                                 
21 Hacking, “The Parody of Conversation”, p. 450f.; Dummett, “Comments on Davidson and Hacking”, p. 471f.  In 
a related context, Charles Taylor makes an objection along similar lines with regard to Davidson’s earlier attempt to 
articulate a truth-conditional semantics. See Taylor, “Theories of Meaning”, esp. pp. 252-5, 273-92; cf. also Mulhall, 
On Being in the World, pp. 91-106.  
22 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, p. 112f. See also “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, p. 96 and 
“Appendix: Replies to Rorty, Stroud, McDowell, and Pereda”, p. 323f. I take this point to express Davidson’s 
modified acceptance of (1) of the standard conception of language.  
23 Bertram, Die Sprache und das Ganze, p. 90f. I am indebted to him for the following way of putting these two 
points.  
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We may say that linguistic ability is the ability to converge on a passing theory from time to time. … But if 
we do say this, then we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary [i.e., standard] notion 
of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around 
in the world generally. For there are no rules for arriving at passing theories, no rules in any strict sense, as 
opposed to rough maxims and methodological generalities. A passing theory really is like a theory at least 
in this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of 
the ways people get their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the 
dictionary are most likely. There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process than there is of 
regularizing or teaching the process of creating new theories to cope with new data in any field – for that is 
what this process involves.24  
 
If this line of thought is convincing, it follows directly that there is no such thing as a language 
according to the standard conception, for such a thing does no work in explaining how the 
creativity involved in making interpretive adjustments is an essential aspect of all successful 
linguistic communication.   
I have laid out at some length Davidson’s argument for the necessity of arriving at 
passing theories in successful linguistic communication, and more generally for the dynamic 
character of interpretation in this process, for the following reasons. First, I think there is much 
to be said for its persuasiveness, though it is not my aim here to adequately defend this claim.25 
Second, and more importantly for my purposes, we need to have a sufficient grasp of the 
conceptual apparatus that Davidson uses in this argument in order for the criticisms of it below to 
be significant (this will become clearer shortly). Third, it should be apparent that Davidson’s 
alternative conception of what is required for successful linguistic communication is an instance 
of IPIA, the specification of which was reiterated at the beginning of this chapter. For clearly 
such communication (I) requires (i) the actual presence of two or more people; and (ii) the 
linguistic interactions that they have with one another are constrained by certain normative 
principles of interpretation. Furthermore, he argues (II) that (i) and (ii) suffice as the sort of 
sociality that effects successful linguistic communication. Besides the principle of charity and 
the holistic-cum-normative character of interpretation with which it is coordinate, there is the 
additional constraint that interlocutors can best understand and communicate with one another by 
means of arriving at passing theories for one another’s utterances.26 Of course, the fact that 
Davidson’s own conception of the nature of linguistic communication instantiates IPIA does not 
                                                 
24 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, p. 107. I will return to the point about the erasure of the boundary 
between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world below.  
25 For an excellent defense, see Ramberg, Donald Davidson’s Philosophy of Language, Ch. 8. 
26 Davidson, “The Second Person”, p. 116. 
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as such imply that it is flawed. Having said this, I will now try to show how his interpretive 
interactionism, insofar as it is connected to his argument for dismissing the significance of 
shared practices for successful linguistic communication, is problematic for the following 
reasons. 
To begin with a simple observation that does not in itself undermine Davidson’s position 
about the nature of linguistic communication, it is evident that human beings also communicate 
successfully without using language (in the sense of solely using words to communicate). 
Otherwise, it would be mysterious how people who cannot communicate in other languages 
besides their own could ever understand other people who speak different languages. Of course, 
the degree of mutual understanding achieved through non-linguistic communication is much less 
fine-grained than that obtained through linguistic communication, not to mention that the 
absence of linguistic communication precludes a whole range of actions (speech acts) that are 
only possible through the use of language. But the fact that non-linguistic communication can 
and does occur shows that there is another mode in which communication among us is possible. 
How this can occur is evident: All human beings share some very basic but nonetheless 
important general interests and activities on which non-linguistic communication, say, through 
hand and other bodily gestures, can get its points of purchase (e.g., greeting gestures, sharing 
food or drink or shelter, indicating a need for protection or mutual aid, etc.). Lest there is any 
chance of misunderstanding, let me insist that it does not follow from this fact that the non-
linguistic mode of communication is somehow more basic than the linguistic mode. The relevant 
point is that non-linguistic communication among human beings is possible without the need to 
construct passing theories of any sort. As noted above, this observation does not undermine 
Davidson’s position, since he is only concerned with what is required for successful linguistic 
communication. But the reminder that non-linguistic communication is possible, and, more 
importantly, that the basis of this mode of communication lies in the sharing of some very basic 
but general human interests and activities, sets the stage for the following point. 
Davidson’s conception of the nature of successful linguistic communication correctly 
emphasizes the importance of the contingent and dynamic character of what is involved in 
arriving at passing theories. But what he persistently denies is the equally important role that 
shared practices play in this process:  
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The theoretical possibility of communication without shared practices remains philosophically important 
because it shows that such sharing cannot be an essential constituent in meaning and communication.27 … 
[M]eaning something requires that by and large one follows a practice of one’s own, a practice that can be 
understood by others. But there is no fundamental reason why practices must be shared.28 
 
To be fair to Davidson, it seems clear that the conception of shared (linguistic) practices which 
he disparages as unessential for linguistic communication is of a piece with the other notions that 
he attacks more explicitly, such as shared ways of speaking or a shared set of linguistic rules or 
conventions.29 If he identifies shared practices more or less with the latter, then he has good 
reasons (as we saw above) to criticize the plausibility of the static and mechanical conception of 
shared linguistic practices that informs his targets. But there is an alternative conception of 
shared practices that plays an important (albeit suppressed) role in Davidson’s own positive 
account of what is involved in achieving successful linguistic communication. Indeed, as I will 
argue below, this alternative conception of shared practices is fundamental to the sharing of 
passing theories for such communication, to such an extent that there can be no such sharing 
absent engagement in shared practices according to this conception. 
It should not come as a surprise that the alternative conception of shared practices that I 
have in view is the Heideggerian or site one that was articulated and defended in Ch. 2. Recall 
that according to this conception, engagement in shared practices is equivalent to sharing a 
world: a referential nexus of significance constituted by an interrelated complex of equipment, 
tasks, short- and longer-term goals and ends, all of which relate to and thereby make sense for 
the sake of enacting some ongoing self-interpretations on each of our parts as agents. More 
relevant for present purposes, we human beings share a world by projecting a normalized range 
of situational possibilities that renders our dealings with entities initially and mostly intelligible, 
including human beings and the linguistic and non-linguistic products that they bring about 
through their activities. The sort of sharing in play here differs fundamentally in character from 
the one that Davidson attacks, for his target is always the sort of sharing that is describable in 
terms of regularities, rules, or conventions supposedly governing how we speak as members of a 
population. By contrast, the sort of sharing involved when we share a world concerns how we 
initially and mostly make sense of the entities that show up for us in terms of their situational 
                                                 
27 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, p. 119. 
28 Ibid., p. 125. 
29 Ibid., p. 115. 
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possibilities, regardless of whether we in fact go on to actualize one or more of these 
possibilities, say, by actually speaking the same way as others do. As I argued in Ch. 2, the 
sharing of situational possibilities is what makes both agreement and disagreement possible, 
whereas the sort of sharing that informs shared ways of speaking or a shared set of linguistic 
rules or conventions does not. And what ensures that we by and large share a common world is 
our everyday existence as one-selves (Man-selbst): as individuals who know our way around in 
the world, initially and mostly, in terms of our understanding of the public norms to which our 
existence in the mode of the one must by and large (but not always) conform.   
To be sure, shared practices in this fundamental sense do show up in passing in 
Davidson’s conception of the role that prior theories play in linguistic communication. For 
instance, he acknowledges that “knowledge of the character, dress, role, sex [or gender], of the 
speaker, and whatever else has been gained by observing the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or 
otherwise”, are relevant factors that shape the prior theory (expectations) that we use for this 
speaker.30 More generally, he affirms that “understanding, even of the literal meaning of a 
speaker’s utterances, depends on shared general information and familiarity with non-linguistic 
institutions (a ‘way of life’)”.31 These remarks suggest that Davidson realizes that prior theories 
are themselves only intelligible in light of the sense that they make in connection with a familiar 
lifeworld. Because he is exclusively focused, however, on what is necessary for successful 
linguistic communication, he persists nonetheless in downplaying the contribution that prior 
theories play in communication as speakers converge on passing theories. In particular, one is 
left with the impression that the knowledge of the social roles or identities of speakers, along 
with the practices with which such roles or identities are intertwined, only plays a significant role 
at the outset of communicative encounters. But this cannot be right since the ongoing, successful 
construction of passing theories must continue to rely on such knowledge as interpretation 
unfolds.  
Now, Davidson could presumably rebut this objection by emphasizing that his positive 
conception of what is required for successful linguistic communication precisely erases “the 
boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally”, an 
erasure that makes room for the thought that the ability to converge on passing theories depends 
                                                 
30 Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, p. 100.  
31 Davidson, “The Social Aspect of Language”, p. 119. 
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in part on the knowledge that we have about the social roles or identities of particular speakers as 
we interpret their utterances. But the context in which he could make this possible 
acknowledgment (see the relevant quote above) indicates that its accent remains on the 
interpretive adjustments that hearers make about how to skillfully interpret the words of 
speakers, suggesting that this process could take place without any significant contribution from 
hearers’ familiarity with the social roles or identities of speakers as the latter’s utterances are 
interpreted. That is, the thought is that even though Davidson can well acknowledge that this 
familiarity remains operative in the background of communication, he would insist that this 
familiarity cannot be one of the primary factors involved. Whether this is exactly true or not, 
however, can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on how words are exactly 
used by interlocutors with regard to a particular subject matter in ongoing conversations. In any 
case, my point here is that familiarity with shared practices in the more fundamental sense turns 
out to be necessary not just for prior theories as they figure in the process of linguistic 
communication, but also for what it takes to arrive at passing theories and thereby to understand 
what speakers mean.32 The understanding of shared practices in the fundamental sense permeates 
the whole process of linguistic communication; it does not only enter and cease at discrete 
moments of communicative interaction. If this is correct, Davidson is right to dismiss the 
importance of shared practices only insofar as they figure in shared ways of speaking or a shared 
set of linguistic rules or conventions, but he is wrong to disparage the significance of shared 
practices in the fundamental sense for successful linguistic communication. 
At this juncture in the dialectic, Davidson could presumably concede this point, but 
continue to insist that it is after all still individual interlocutors who actually effect such 
communication. In other words, he could maintain that what is still primary in the order of 
explanation, even after all is said and done, remains the necessity of converging on passing 
theories on the part of individual interlocutors. I think this view, so qualified, is defensible 
without further objection from the perspective of the present dissertation, provided that he is 
mindful of the following cautionary point. As just argued above, although it is individual 
interlocutors who actualize successful linguistic communication through interpersonal 
                                                 
32 It is telling, for example, that the first sentence of “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” informs the reader that the 
lengthy passage she is about to read just below this sentence comes from a radio sitcom (a situational comedy 
playing on the radio). For as soon as the reader understands that what she is about to read has such a character, she 
puts herself in the right frame of mind to interpret (enjoy) the utterances quoted in that passage.   
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interactions (by way of converging on passing theories in the course of conversation), the 
intelligibility at work in such interactions, along with the products that result from them, is only 
partially the doing of individuals. If Davidson does not acknowledge this point, then he would be 
making a typical mistake that proponents of IPIA make. This is the inference from the fact that 
some particular mode of social interaction suffices for the creation and continued existence of 
some important phenomenon in human life to the conclusion that this mode of human sociality 
forms the basic way in which human beings are either social in general or interact socially within 
certain basic areas of human activities. I have argued that Davidson’s conception of what is 
required for successful linguistic communication commits a fallacy along these lines if he does 
not qualify this conception in the way that I urge. Absent this qualification, his appeal to social 
interaction qua IPIA is flawed insofar as it is intended as a complete account of the sort of 
sociality that is in play in successful linguistic communication. For the need to converge on 
passing theories would not be intelligible, much less necessary, unless interlocutors were already 
familiar with shared practices as these figure in the ongoing process of sharing a by and large 
common world.33  
4.2 THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THOUGHT 
As mentioned above, Davidson has also appealed to social interaction in a number of his later 
essays as a resource for his thinking about a different issue, namely, the possibility of thought. 
To begin with a clarification, he uses the term ‘thought’ broadly to include the host of 
propositional attitudes like beliefs, intentions, desires, doubts, hopes, worries, the mere 
entertainment of possibilities, etc. What is common to them is the fact that they all contain 
propositional contents, i.e., the kind of contents that are paradigmatically expressed in sentences. 
To be more precise, then, the issue that concerns him here is the possibility of propositional 
thought, not aspects of the mind that give pride of place to the phenomenology34 of experiencing 
                                                 
33 My criticism here agrees in spirit, though not in its details, with McDowell’s dissatisfaction with Davidson’s view 
in this context; see McDowell, “Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism”, pp. 181-7.  
34 As this term and its cognates are used in contemporary philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition. 
 150 
 
certain kinds of mental contents (e.g., “qualia”) that do not seem prima facie to have 
propositional structure. 
Before we assess Davidson’s argument for why a certain kind of social interaction is 
necessary for the possibility of thought, it is useful first to review what he holds to be the 
fundamental nature of thought. Time and again, Davidson has forcefully argued that in order for 
an entity to have thought, it is not enough for it to have the capacity to reliably discriminate 
various features of its environment. Rather, what distinguishes an entity as genuinely thinking is 
its ability to apply concepts correctly or incorrectly.35 This is equivalent to holding that such an 
entity must be able to make judgments that can be right or wrong about the various features of its 
environment.36 Applying concepts and making judgments are two sides of one coin. If an entity 
has this ability, it has eo ipso a grasp in practice of the concept of objectivity, the idea that its 
thoughts (i.e., the applications of concepts in its judgments) can be true or false. The concern 
here is not epistemological, i.e., not with how we can know that our thoughts are in fact true or 
can be possibly true, but with the conditions that must be satisfied if something is to qualify as 
having thought at all. For Davidson, the ideas of applying concepts, making judgments, having 
thoughts, and objective truth all go together as a package: 
To apply a concept is to make a judgment, to classify or characterize an object or event or situation in a 
certain way, and this requires application of the concept of truth, since it is always possible to classify or 
characterize something wrongly. To have a concept … is to be able to entertain propositional contents: a 
creature has a concept only if it is able to employ that concept in the context of a judgment. … These 
mental attributes, then, are equivalent: to have a concept, to entertain propositions, to be able to form 
judgments, to have command of the concept of truth. If a creature has one of these attributes, it has them 
all.37 
 
Aside from the obvious holism of this view, what is striking is Davidson’s emphasis that what 
distinguishes something’s activity as thinking is not shown when it “gets things right” in the 
sense that it has the reliable capacity to respond differentially to features of its environment, but 
only when it can put itself in the position also to “get them wrong” by making errors in 
                                                 
35 Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought”, p. 124; “What Thought Requires”, p. 136f.; “The Problem of 
Objectivity”, pp. 4-7; “Seeing Through Language”, p. 139.  
36 Davidson, “What Thought Requires”, p. 137, emphases in the original: “There is no distinction to be made 
between having concepts and having propositional attitudes. To have a concept is to class things under it. This is not 
just a matter of being natively disposed, or having learned, to react in some specific way to items that fall under the 
concept; it is to judge or believe that certain items fall under the concept.” Davidson already held this view in earlier 
essays; see esp. “Thought and Talk” and “Rational Animals”.  
37 Davidson, “The Problem of Objectivity”, p. 9, second emphasis added. This view about what constitutes thought 
is not universally accepted, especially by philosophers who demand or wish for a scientific explanation of the mind. 
But I need not address this issue for my purposes below.    
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judgment. More precisely, it must be able to make such errors as seen from its own point of view, 
not just from that of an intelligent observer.38 In short, a creature or entity shows that it thinks at 
all only when it can recognize that it can make mistakes in judgment about how things are.          
Davidson’s argument that social interaction of a certain sort is necessary for the 
possibility of thought takes its point of departure from this view about the nature of thought. He 
calls the sort of social interaction he has in mind “triangulation”, and describes it as follows: 
There is a prelinguistic, precognitive situation which seems to me to constitute a necessary condition for 
thought and language, a condition that can exist independently of thought, and can therefore precede it. 
Both in the case of nonhuman animals and in the case of small children, it is a condition that can be 
observed to obtain. The basic situation is one that involves two or more creatures simultaneously in 
interaction with each other and with the world they share; it is what I call triangulation. It is the result of a 
threefold interaction, an interaction which is twofold from the point of view of each of the two agents: each 
is interacting simultaneously with the world and with the other agent. To put this in a slightly different way, 
each creature learns to correlate the reactions of other creatures with changes or objects in the world to 
which it also reacts.39      
 
On Davidson’s view, such a triangle must be established for the possibility of thought because 
the relevant notion of error only makes sense from within such a space.40 What makes error 
possible is that two or more creatures first come to repeatedly share similar responses to some 
object, event, or feature in their common environment that each of them perceives. Once these 
correlations in similar responses are in place, this sets up not only the possibility of divergence in 
their responses to what they perceive, but also the possibility that a creature can notice that either 
its behavior or that of the other creature diverges from what usually happens.  
For example, suppose there are two dogs, Rex and Spot, that hear a bell ring and usually 
react by going to the food tray. On some later occasion(s), however, Rex hears the bell ring and 
reacts as usual but Spot does not, etc. In addition, Rex sees that Spot does not react to the bell’s 
ringing as he does and vice versa. According to Davidson, they each are now “in the position to 
sense” that something is “amiss” either in their own response or in the other dog’s response to 
the ringing of the bell. (The reason why this statement is put so vaguely will become clear 
shortly.) Something analogous is supposed to happen in some situations involving a young child, 
her parents, and some object or event in their shared environment.41 Since Davidson clearly 
acknowledges that nonhuman animals and small children can triangulate in this sense, and yet 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 8.  
39 Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought”, p. 128, emphasis in the original.  
40 Davidson, “Externalisms”, pp. 4-8. 
41 Davidson uses these examples in “The Second Person”, p. 117f.; cf. “Seeing Through Language”, p. 141. 
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holds that neither of them can have propositional thought (yet), he must be read as claiming that 
it is only in triangulation that there exists at least a mistake recognizable to an intelligent 
observer regarding their respective responses to the way the world is, not that nonhuman animals 
or very young children have the cognitive capacity to recognize that something among them has 
made a mistake.42 Regardless of whether we are dealing with nonhuman animals, very young 
children, or mature human adults, the relevant point is that involvement in triangulated 
interactions is what makes conceptual space, Davidson claims, for the very possibility of being 
wrong about the way the world is, as seen from the perspectives of those engaged in such 
interactions.  
More specifically, Davidson argues that we need the idea of triangulation in order to 
account for (i) the objectivity of thought and (ii) the empirical content of thought about the 
external world.43 Thought is objective in the sense that its content can be true or false (with rare 
exceptions) independently of the existence of the thinker or of his or her activity of thinking. He 
suggests that the only way in which we can get the idea that we may be mistaken about the way 
the world is comes from how other creatures like us can have different responses to that same 
way the world is, which we both perceive. This is what the situation of triangulation is supposed 
to put us in the position to notice. Absent at least another perspective that can diverge from ours 
about how things are, his claim is that we could have never acquired the distinction between 
appearance and reality, and hence the possibility, as seen from our own perspective, that our 
thoughts can be true or false. 
Furthermore, the empirical content of thought about the external world also depends on 
our triangulated interactions with others. The reason has to do, he thinks, with the “double 
ambiguity” involved in determining what in the world causes us to have the perceptual beliefs 
that we have on some occasion.44 First, there is a question of how much of the total cause of a 
perceptual belief is relevant to determining its content. Typically, we only regard a very small 
part of the total cause as relevant to what we perceive. Thus, even though the Big Bang can be 
said to be the cause of everything in our universe, we do not (with rare exceptions) think of it as 
causally relevant, say, for our perception that there is a car accident or that a field of grass is 
                                                 
42 Bridges, “Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism”, p. 294. 
43 Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought”, p. 129f.   
44 Ibid.  
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painted red. But then what part of the total cause should determine the particular content of our 
perceptual belief on some occasion? Second, there is a question about the proper locus of the 
stimulus that causes us to have a perceptual belief. Is my perception that there is a rabbit in front 
of me caused by something “proximal” within me like light rays striking my retina, or rather by 
something “distal” outside me like the light rays between the rabbit and my eyes or even farther 
out like the rabbit itself? The problem is this: “If we consider a single creature by itself, its 
responses, no matter how complex, cannot show that it is reacting to, or thinking about, events a 
certain distance away rather than, say, on its skin.”45 Davidson contends that we can answer 
these questions only by using the conceptual resources that triangulation supplies. As he writes 
regarding a circumstance involving a table, a child, and an adult:  
Given … three patterns of response we can assign a location to the stimuli that elicit the child’s responses. 
The relevant stimuli are the objects or events we [adults] naturally find similar (tables), which are 
correlated with responses of the child we find similar. It is a form of triangulation: one line goes from the 
child in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the direction of the table, and the third line goes 
between us and the child. Where the lines from child to table and us to table converge, “the” stimulus is 
located. Given our view of child and world, we can pick out “the” cause of the child’s responses. It is the 
common cause of our response and the child’s response.46       
   
To be sure, Davidson makes it clear that triangulation is at most necessary, but not sufficient, for 
the objectivity and the empirical content of thought about the world. Only the addition of 
linguistic communication with others can supply the further element that suffices for genuine 
thought, for only in this way can thought be objective and give determinate content to our 
perceptual beliefs in relation to a shared environment.47     
Two brief comments are in order before I evaluate Davidson’s argument here. The first 
concerns the relation between his appeal to social interaction, respectively, for successful 
linguistic communication and now for the possibility of thought. These may seem at first glance 
to be in tension with each other. The emphasis on social interaction as it figures in linguistic 
communication is geared to the occasion and hence contingent and punctual, for all that is 
required is the convergence on passing theories, no less but also no more. By contrast, the appeal 
to social interaction qua triangulation for the possibility of thought seems to require social 
interactions that are more fundamental or stable by comparison. But this tension is merely 
                                                 
45 Davidson, “The Second Person”, p. 119. 
46 Ibid. See also “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, p. 212f. 
47 Davidson, “Rational Animals”, p. 105; “The Second Person”, p. 120f.; “Epistemology Externalized”, p. 202; and 
“Three Varieties of Knowledge”, p. 213. 
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apparent. While the social interaction involved in bringing about passing theories presupposes 
the existence of propositional contents for purposes of communication, their existence is 
precisely what triangulation is supposed to make possible. The latter is therefore compatible with 
the former by being more basic in the order of explanation. Second, it should be discernible that 
Davidson’s idea of triangulation instantiates at least a loose version of IPIA. Once again, we 
have a conception of sociality such that (I) (i) two or more individuals in a situation (ii) interact 
with one another in accordance with a set of normative constraints. The normative constraints in 
operation in this context concern the conditions that must be satisfied for thought to be objective 
and directed at ordinary objects, events, or features in a common environment. Although 
Davidson acknowledges that (I) does not suffice for the objectivity and empirical content of 
thought, he does claim that (I) is a necessary condition of the latter.  
How convincing, though, is Davidson’s argument that we must have recourse to 
triangulation in order to understand the possibility of thought? Not very, if the criticisms below 
are telling. To begin with, his claim about the necessity of triangulation for the objectivity of 
thought is open to the following objections. As mentioned above, his claim here is that we can 
only get the idea of being mistaken about things when we compare our responses with those 
made by other creatures like ourselves to some object, event, or feature of a shared environment. 
But this reasoning seems to commit the genetic fallacy: Even if it is true that we did originally 
get the idea of error in this way (which is empirically true as a matter of human upbringing), it 
does not follow that mature human beings can only make sense of the very idea of getting things 
wrong by comparing their judgments with those of others like themselves. Of course, other 
individuals can evaluate and correct our judgments on any single local occasion. Moreover, it is 
a fact of human development that teaching anything to anyone in general, especially to young 
children, must involve triangulation. But once our cognitive abilities as human beings develop 
sufficiently, it does not follow that our judgments depend globally on the evaluation or 
correction of others in the sense that this is the basic way in which our judgments can be 
objective. Why can’t it be, at least sometimes and perhaps even most of the time, the world (in 
its worldliness) that shows whether our judgments are right or wrong? That is, once human 
beings understand the world in this way, why can’t the various situational features or aspects of 
the world be objective in relation to us?    
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Now, if Davidson’s argument is not empirical but rather conceptual, then the examples he 
chooses to illustrate it are at least misleading and may elicit the objection about genetic fallacy.48 
Moreover, if it is meant to be conceptual, it is far from obvious (as just suggested) that 
participating in triangulation is the only way in which thought can be objective at all, even if we 
grant that this may be one way in which this occurs. But a much stronger objection to Davidson’s 
argument does not turn on its status. Suppose two or more creatures each correlated their own 
reactions to something in the shared environment by triangulating. It is not clear at all, however, 
how this sort of correlation of reactions with the other creature(s) can matter in rendering the 
very idea of error intelligible to them. How can a similarity in response in two or more creatures, 
followed by the failure on a subsequent occasion on the part of either of them to respond 
similarly, create as such the intelligibility of error?49 The problem is that if such a correlation and 
the possibility of divergence that it sets up were to matter to either creature, then the very idea of 
error in question must already make sense to them, for this idea involves not just the fact that a 
mistake is made, but also that the creature either making or observing a mistake made by another 
creature is aware (i.e., judges) that it or the other is the one making this mistake.50 If they are 
each so aware, then correlations in similar reactions do no explanatory work and are thus 
redundant, for then they (the creatures) are already in the position to see whether they each make 
a mistake on their own. If they are not each so aware, then it is mysterious how correlations in 
similar reactions can engender the notion of error that applies within the purview of the creatures 
themselves. In short, Davidson’s conception of triangulation makes it quite unclear upon 
examination how the occurrence of divergence in light of a background of similarity in responses 
by two or more creatures can make conceptual space for the possibility of error, and hence of 
thought.51   
                                                 
48 I will examine the significance of the origins and nature of objectivity, in connection with later Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the normativity of rule-following, in Ch. 5. As we will see there (esp. in 5.4), there is a particular way in 
which the origins of objectivity and normativity are philosophically significant, though not in the way in which it is 
considered here.      
49 We saw how this objection applies to Pettit’s account of rule-following in 1.3. 
50 For this reason an evolutionary account of how creatures in triangulation can make mistakes in terms of doing (or 
not doing) things that decrease their chances of survival will not do for Davidson’s purposes. 
51 Bridges makes the same objection in “Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism”, p. 294f.; cf. Fennell, “Davidson 
on Meaning Normativity: Public or Social”, esp. pp. 149-51. Fennell argues that there is tension between a public as 
opposed to a social conception of the normativity of meaning in Davidson’s philosophy and, furthermore, that 
Davidson should ultimately jettison the former and embrace the latter. But Fennell’s conception of the sociality 
operative in his sketch of a social conception of the normativity of meaning turns on his particular construal of the 
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Perhaps the force of triangulation does not really consist in showing its necessity for the 
objectivity of thought, however, but rather for isolating a location for the common cause that 
fixes the content of the perceptual beliefs of two or more creatures in a shared environment. This 
seems to be the argument to which Davidson ultimately resorts when he defends the necessity of 
triangulation.52 Jason Bridges has argued convincingly, however, that this view presupposes a 
distorted conception of animal life, in particular, that of nonhuman animals.53 For if Davidson is 
right here, it would always be an open question whether an animal is reacting to stimuli that are 
proximal or distal, unless it has participated in triangulated interactions with others of its kind in 
the past. But this assumption is untenable. For example, when animals flee from threats, there 
will of course be proximal stimuli that cause them to react in this or that way. But animals are 
not fleeing from proximal stimuli when they feel threatened, but rather clearly from something in 
their distal environment (say, from predators). Moreover, this way of understanding what they do 
is not something isolated or unusual, but an integral part of our general understanding of how 
animals generally behave: e.g., that they are perceptually sensitive in a certain sort of way to 
their environment and react to what they perceive, that they are driven to act so as to satisfy 
certain biological needs that are particular to their species, to seek mates in order to reproduce, 
etc. None of these thoughts that we have about animals can make sense unless it is settled that 
they are reacting to the environment that is outside their skin surface. To be sure, this thought 
does not rule out at all that such reactions are closely connected to the physiological mechanisms 
under their skin that enable them to act and survive; nor does it imply that such reactions are 
objective in the demanding sense that Davidson insists must characterize the relation of thinking 
creatures to their environment. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that nonhuman animals (and 
human beings, for that matter) are reacting to the distal causes of their behavior, not to sensory 
promptings at the surface of their skin. Otherwise, we would not be able to explain what 
nonhuman animals do by recourse to how they perceive the world at all. If Davidson is not 
urging that we significantly revise our ordinary conception of animal life, then, he must be 
                                                                                                                                                             
principle of charity; it is not social qua interpersonally interactionist in the way that concerns me here. That said, 
there are certainly convergent points of criticism in his and my reading of Davidson.  
52 Davidson, “The Second Person”, pp. 119-21; “Epistemology Externalized”, pp. 201-3; “Three Varieties of 
Knowledge”, p. 212f. 
53 Bridges, “Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism”, pp. 307-13. I am indebted to him for the following line of 
criticism. 
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wrong to assume that nonhuman animals cannot identify the distal causes of their behavior 
unless they have engaged at some point in triangulation. The same conclusion holds mutatis 
mutandis in this respect for our understanding of human behavior. This does not entail that there 
are no other ways in which nonhuman animals or human beings exist or act as essentially social 
creatures – quite to the contrary, as this dissertation argued at length in Ch. 2 in the case of 
human beings. But locating distal causes in the external environment as something requiring 
social interaction qua triangulation is not one of them, insofar as this figures in the ascription of 
perceptual beliefs to nonhuman animals or to human beings.  
4.3 CONCLUSION 
There is a final, general point that I wish to make regarding Davidson’s implicit conception of 
the social qua interpretive interactionism, one that generalizes from the foregoing criticisms. In 
light of the Heideggerian conception of the social constitution of the human individual, 
Davidson’s conception of the social is flawed insofar as it emphasizes the individual and active 
dimension of social (interpretive) interactions to such an extent that it becomes tempting to 
overlook or dismiss as irrelevant the communal and passive dimension of such interactions, as 
this latter dimension is articulated by the Heideggerian conception (please note this proviso). At 
a high level of abstraction, this is basically the same mistake that theorists of collective 
intentionality make in their analyses of the nature of collective phenomena (see 3.2).  
Although there can be no denial that human individuals are social by interacting with one 
another in myriad ways, one the central claims of this dissertation has been that such interactions 
cannot be intelligible, and in this sense possible, unless human individuals are already socially 
constituted in the sense of projecting situational possibilities that are normalized by way of their 
existence as the one. Even though it is an individual who projects such possibilities, what is 
projected is always initially and mostly a common way of knowing one’s way around in the 
world. Furthermore, this by and large common way of making sense of things in the world 
cannot be something that two or more individuals, or even a group of individuals, can ever 
generate or construct on their own, for such generation or construction always already 
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presupposes this ongoing common way of making sense of things (which is not to say that the 
latter is static).54 From this perspective, then, what is fundamentally unsatisfactory about 
Davidson’s appeals to social interaction in ways that have concerned us is the persistence of a 
minimalistic conception of human sociality, one that traces precisely to the slighting of the 
passive and communal source of human social existence. I have tried to show why this 
conception is problematic for reasons both internal and external to those appeals. 
                                                 
54 Cf. Wittgenstein’s imagery of the movement of the water of a river at its surface in relation to its river-bed in On 
Certainty, §§94-7.  
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5.0  THE CRITIQUE OF IPIA IN COMMUNALIST ACCOUNTS OF THE 
NORMATIVITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING 
5.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
In one way or another, the theme of normativity, as this is connected to the social constitution of 
the human individual, has been in play in each of the previous chapters. It is useful at this point 
to spell out this connection a bit more, both as a summary of what has been shown thus far in the 
dissertation and as a way of setting the stage for the more extensive discussion of how we should 
properly understand the connection between normativity and the social constitution of the human 
individual in this chapter.  
In 1.3, I criticized Pettit’s defense of social holism (as he conceives this position) by 
arguing that he does not succeed in showing convincingly how his interpersonal-interactionist 
account of the normativity of rule-following can satisfy the requirement that there be genuinely 
normative standards determining whether an individual is following rules correctly or not. I 
argued there that interpersonal interactions as Pettit conceives them can at best articulate, but not 
constitute, the normativity of rule-following. In 2.1, I substantially modified Pettit’s argument for 
the social constitution of the human individual by means of an interpretive appropriation of 
Heidegger’s conception of that constitution in Being and Time. Following Heidegger, I argued 
that normativity ordinarily shows up under the guise of how everyday human existence is 
fundamentally normalized, for human beings exist by primarily and mostly (zunächst und 
zumeist) making sense of the world, including themselves and other people, in accordance with 
the public norms (das Man: the one) with which they are utterly familiar. More specifically, the 
main conclusion for which I argued is that the human individual is fundamentally socially 
constituted because she cannot help but project normalized situational possibilities that make 
intelligible, and in so doing enable and constrain, how she primarily and mostly acts and, 
thereby, who she is primarily and mostly to herself and to others in everyday life. It is this 
normalized understanding of situational possibilities of action that different human individuals 
project which ensures that those individuals who have been “socialized” into a particular set of 
customs, practices, and traditions share a common world, i.e., share a common starting-point or 
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frame of reference in terms of which they make sense of the world and act (a common way of 
knowing their way around the world).1 It should be evident how normativity, under the guise of 
normalization (i.e., our everyday existence in the mode of the one), is crucial to my Heideggerian 
conception of the social constitution of the human individual. 
With this conception in place, I then sought to show how it challenges the prevalent 
understanding of human sociality that most philosophers especially in the analytic tradition take 
for granted, an understanding which I have characterized in terms of the idea of interpersonal 
interactionism (IPIA):  
The Assumptions of Interpersonal Interactionism (IPIA):  
(I) There exists a prevalent mode of human sociality that is realized when (i) two or more 
individuals are present in some context (ii) who interact with one another in accordance 
with some implicit set of constraints that (should) govern in that context.  
(II) This mode of human sociality suffices for understanding both the fundamental way in 
which human beings are social and all forms of sociality. Accordingly, any account or 
invocation of human sociality should begin with this mode of sociality as its key datum 
and point of departure. 
 
I believe that IPIA is exemplified by some currently influential ways of thinking about or 
appealing to human sociality in contemporary philosophy. To mention only those that I 
examined at some length thus far in the dissertation, Pettit’s conception and defense of social 
holism, prominent theories of collective intentionality, and Davidson’s view of the social 
character of linguistic communication and the objectivity of thought each instantiate IPIA in 
their own way. As I noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, although IPIA does not, strictly 
speaking, offer a competing conception of the social constitution of the human individual, it does 
not follow that understanding the nature of human sociality is completely disconnected from 
reflection on this constitution. Thus, even though IPIA may be, strictly speaking, irrelevant, or at 
least silent, in connection with the social constitution of the individual, the same cannot be said 
for the converse. One of the main aims of the dissertation is to show that understanding the 
nature of human sociality along the lines of IPIA is seriously flawed precisely because it ignores 
or fails to take fully into account the social constitution of the individual.  
In my assessment of prominent theories of collective intentionality in Ch. 3, one of my 
main criticisms concerns how their accounts of what they take to be paradigmatic social 
                                                 
1 This way of putting the thought in question can risk sounding trivial. But those who have read Ch. 2 of this 
dissertation should have little trouble by now in dispelling this possible impression.    
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phenomena like going for a walk together (Gilbert), the collective beliefs and actions of an 
organization (Tuomela), or money (Searle) take for granted the intelligibility of such phenomena. 
The objection is that these social phenomena can only be what and how they are by presupposing 
individual agents’ normalized understanding of the roles and behavior of the entities that 
typically compose the nexuses of practices and material arrangements in virtue of which these 
social phenomena make sense at all. The claim is that theories of collective intentionality must 
help themselves to conceptual “raw materials” (paradigmatically, the supposed explanatory 
primitives of the individual agent, her attitudes and actions, etc.) that are already normatively 
constituted.2 And I argued that whatever specific kinds of normativity exhibited in collective or 
social phenomena theorists of collective intentionality discern and take themselves to explain3 
must ultimately rest on individual agents’ prior familiarity with normatively understood attitudes, 
roles, and practices that are intelligible only in terms of how they are bound up with their 
relevant nexuses of practices and material arrangements.  
Readers familiar with Davidson’s way of thinking will not be surprised that normativity 
is a central theme in his philosophy as a whole. What I criticized in Ch. 4 (among other things) is 
his specific attempt to explain the objectivity of thought and the empirical content of thought 
about the world by appealing to a certain kind of social interaction that he describes as 
triangulation. Davidson argues that triangulation is necessary because it helps to create the 
conceptual space for the very possibility of being wrong about the way the world is, as seen from 
the perspectives of the creatures in question themselves.4 Although I cast doubt on the cogency 
of his argument for this claim in 4.2, it is evident that he takes triangulation to be at least a 
necessary condition for the normativity, and thereby objectivity, of thought.5   
The connection between normativity and the social constitution of the human individual, 
then, has been a leitmotif in this dissertation. If so, one may wonder why I have chosen to 
postpone its more extensive discussion until now. There are three reasons for this choice. First, I 
                                                 
2 Recall my argument in 3.2 that Gilbert’s , Tuomela’s, and Searle’s theories are faced with various problems of 
circularity.  
3 E.g., Gilbert’s emphasis on satisfying the “permission requirement” in constituting a plural subject; Tuomela on 
constructing the authority structure of an organization; Searle on the importance of collectively following 
constitutive rules. 
4 It is this particular requirement that is crucial to why Davidson finds triangulation appealing as a conceptual tool. I 
argued in 4.2 that his argument falls short because it fails to satisfy this requirement.      
5 It should be mentioned that he also holds that there must be a causal dimension to the objectivity of thought; see 
“The Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, esp. pp. 151-3, and “Epistemology Externalized”.  
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did not wish to distract from my chief aim of showing the inadequacy of various conceptions of 
human sociality along the lines of IPIA, from the standpoint of a Heideggerian conception of this 
constitution. When suitably interpreted and reconstructed, the Heideggerian conception as such 
has in my view sufficient conceptual resources that it can deploy for accomplishing this task.  
If this is so, one may ask why we should bother considering the normativity of rule-
following at all as an aspect of the foregoing. Addressing this question leads to the second reason 
for postponing until now my treatment of the connection between normativity and the social 
constitution of the individual. The context of this point is the following. One may get the 
impression that the Heideggerian conception of this constitution focuses overwhelmingly or even 
exclusively on the unavoidability and necessary stability of our conformity to public norms. 
More precisely, one may get the impression that our predominant existence in everyday life as 
one-selves (Man-selbst) – i.e., that we must primarily and mostly understand things and act in 
conformity with the public norms that the one supplies and, indeed, prescribes – implies a largely 
passive and static understanding of what it is to conform to norms. Put in the terms that I 
elaborated in Ch. 2, the impression may be that the normalization of situational possibilities of 
understanding and action that flows from our everyday existence as one-selves exhaustively 
captures how we conform to norms. In short, normativity amounts to nothing but normalization 
on such a view.6 I also mentioned in passing in Ch. 2, however, that this is a mistaken impression 
that will be dispelled once we consider the nature of rule-following. This issue has broader 
significance because it pertains not only to how we should understand and appropriate 
Heidegger’s insights about the social in Being and Time, but also to the nature of normativity in 
general. There is an important point of contact and mutual illumination here between early 
Heidegger’s thinking and that of the later Wittgenstein on this issue. In particular, I think that 
careful consideration of the nature of normativity helps to better clarify whether and (if so) in 
what sense exactly the later Wittgenstein holds a so-called “community view” of rule-following.7 
In so doing, Wittgenstein’s reflection on the normativity of rule-following casts further light on 
                                                 
6 As I pointed out in 2.3, the familiar (but in my view overly simplistic and reductive) existentialist reading of 
Heidegger’s conception of das Man in effect construes normativity only as normalization. Such a reading wrongly 
accepts at face value Heidegger’s rhetoric about the “dictatorship” of das Man and how it prescribes conformity in 
how Dasein is supposed to live, etc. (Heidegger, SZ §27).  
7 I think that the expression ‘the community view’ is quite ambiguous. I will show how this matters philosophically 
below.   
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Heidegger’s argument that human individuals are necessarily socially constituted by always 
already sharing a public normative (in the first instance, normalized) understanding of the world. 
As we will see, one of Wittgenstein’s key points is that human individuals have an active role to 
play in sustaining this normativity.       
This leads to the third and final reason for postponing the discussion of the connection 
between normativity and the social constitution of the human individual until now. For my 
purposes, such a discussion involves some minimal degree of engagement with complicated 
issues pertaining to how we should understand Wittgenstein’s remarks about rule-following in 
his Philosophical Investigations,8 an undertaking that also involves some corresponding degree 
of engagement with the relevant secondary literature about this topic. I think that a good deal of 
what we can learn from these remarks has greater force in reaction to this literature. That said, 
this chapter cannot aim to provide a critical survey and assessment of the voluminous secondary 
literature on Wittgenstein’s conception of rule-following. As with my interpretation of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time, that of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is not meant to 
be exegetical and scholarly in that way. Given the style and spirit of Wittgenstein’s way of 
thinking in that text, there is always a risk of potentially distorting what lessons (or “reminders” 
in his distinctive sense [PI §127]) we are meant to learn and appreciate from his remarks. With 
this caution in mind, I hope to highlight and put to use the lesson he emphasizes regarding the 
normativity of rule-following in a way that does justice to the spirit of his thought. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In 5.2, I will explain briefly the standard opposition 
between individualist and what I prefer to call “communalist” conceptions of the normativity of 
rule-following.9 This sets the stage in 5.3 for my discussion of Michael Luntley’s forthright 
critique of communalism about rule-following. His articulation and defense of individualism 
about the normativity of rule-following is insightful precisely because of its unorthodox 
character. Having said this, I show in 5.4 that Luntley’s critique of communalism applies only to 
a dominant but flawed understanding of how normativity is supposed to be connected to the 
social character of human existence. This is precisely the understanding of the social in terms of 
IPIA. Not surprisingly, I will argue that Luntley’s positive account of the normativity of rule-
                                                 
8 All references in the text of this chapter are henceforth to Anscombe’s translation of this work and cited as PI. 
9 I will explain my preference for using this particular label in the next section.  
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following coalesces well with the Heideggerian conception of the social in connection with 
normativity.  
5.2 THE STANDARD OPPOSITION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMUNALISM ABOUT THE NORMATIVITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING 
 
We can begin by quickly forestalling two possible objections that one can have about the 
significance of normativity in connection with the social constitution of the human individual. 
First, there may be those who insist that when Wittgenstein talks about rules and rule-following 
in Philosophical Investigations, he only intends to consider how the latter concern the 
understanding and meaning of words (language), not non-linguistic phenomena in general, 
whether normative or not.10 But this restriction clearly does not square with the spirit of, nor the 
methods applied in, Wittgenstein’s remarks about language and its place in human life. He insists 
in numerous sections that we should understand the meaning of words (with few exceptions) in 
terms of their uses, functions, or roles in human life (e.g., PI §§7, 19, 23, 88, 182, 199, 241). In 
fact, he shows no hesitation in using non-linguistic examples (e.g., games, sign-posts, etc.) to 
illuminate how we should understand the normativity inherent to grasping the meaning of words, 
which he typically highlights by pointing to the particular circumstances in which the uses of 
words are embedded and make sense (e.g., PI §§154-5). Moreover, he is strongly critical of the 
belief that language has an essence that can be fully analyzed as a self-contained system of 
symbols (“a calculus according to definite rules” [PI §81; cf. §§193-4]), in abstraction from the 
non-linguistic activities of everyday life. Consequently, it is a mistake on textual grounds to 
believe that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules and rule-following only pertain to what is involved 
in understanding the meaning of words (language). That this is also a philosophical mistake will 
be shown below. Second, there may be those who remain unconvinced by the significance of the 
                                                 
10 For present purposes, linguistic activities are those that explicitly involve the use of words, while non-linguistic 
ones are those that prima facie can but need not involve such use (e.g., using a hammer, etc.). But Wittgenstein 
would insist that most non-linguistic activities are so closely interwoven with linguistic ones that neither is 
ultimately intelligible without the other (cf. PI §§23, 25). His emphasis throughout PI on the significance of training 
is the crux of this point. (I will discuss this much more below in 5.4.)   
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normativity of rules, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, to everyday life.11 They remark as a 
matter of observation that human beings in actual life seek more often than not to evade 
following rules for reasons of self-interest; they only follow them when it suits the satisfaction of 
their needs or desires or because they fear the punishment that would ensue if they failed to 
follow rules.12  
Empirically speaking, this may be true enough. But if this dismissive attitude about the 
significance of the normativity of rules is supposed to have philosophical import, it is mistaken 
for the following reasons. First of all, following rules need not be a self-conscious action or 
activity. In fact, we often follow rules correctly by simply acting in response to particular 
circumstances without reflection (PI §§289, 506). If we rightly reject an overly intellectualistic 
conception of how we conform to norms, it is evident that norms shape the intelligibility of what 
we primarily and usually do, e.g., how we are supposed to use equipment, how far we should 
stand from people in conversation, etc. Taking this fact into account thus significantly expands 
the scope of the normative in human life. Second, the dismissive attitude about the significance 
of normativity overlooks the great degree to which many (though not all) of the things we do 
require implicitly following constitutive and not merely regulative rules.13 Entities and 
performances such as chess pieces and chess moves, money, a person’s social status and power, 
etc., could not exist at all unless people followed the constitutive rules that let (enable and 
constrain) such entities and performances be what and how they are. Dismissing the significance 
of normativity misses the way in which conformity to rules or norms effects positive freedom, in 
the sense that such conformity can enable (empower) those who conform to certain rules or 
norms to find intelligible and perform certain activities at all. Third, this attitude fundamentally 
misunderstands the very nature of rules and norms. For their very nature makes conceptual room 
for the possibility of their violation; otherwise, they would not be rules or norms at all but rather 
laws of nature. Rules or norms always contain a “moment” of freedom and hence the possibility 
of violation on the part of the agents who subject themselves to them. Lastly and most 
importantly, as I argued (following Heidegger) in 2.1, this attitude completely misses the way in 
                                                 
11 I dealt with Davidson’s objection to the importance of linguistic norms for communication in 4.1.     
12 This attitude echoes in effect Thrasymachus’s cynicism about the nature of justice in Book I of Plato’s Republic, 
which is further amplified by the parable of Gyges’s ring at the beginning of Book II.  
13 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality. Although I criticized Searle’s account of collective intentionality in 
3.2, I have no disagreement with him about the importance of constitutive rules; quite the contrary.  
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which human understanding and existence in the world as such is always already constitutively 
normalized. The fact that many people violate various specific rules and norms in life is actually 
something that presupposes, but does not undermine, the significance of rules and norms in the 
fundamental sense that I have sought to highlight. The burden of argument, then, should be on 
those who dismiss the significance of normativity, once the pervasiveness and centrality of 
normative phenomena is brought to light. In particular, we do well not to run together the way in 
which our conformity to rules and norms enables us to make sense of things at all with the 
separate question of the extent to which we actually follow some specific rules and norms in 
particular circumstances.  
With these remarks in place, we can now elaborate the standard opposition between 
individualist and communalist conceptions of the normativity of rule-following. To a first 
approximation, they are both attempts to satisfy a basic requirement of any satisfactory account 
of normativity: There must be a genuine difference between correct and incorrect performances 
in what we do (PI §§202, 258).14 This leads naturally to the following question: What is the 
basis or source of the standard according to which performances are correct and incorrect? The 
attempts to answer this question define the context in which the standard opposition between 
individualism and communalism about rule-following arises.  
It is important to emphasize that such attempts have reacted invariably to the skepticism 
about the very possibility of meaning – more generally, of rule-following – that Saul Kripke’s 
reading of Wittgenstein has prominently highlighted.15 We need not rehearse in detail the main 
argument provided by this reading because it is by now quite familiar. To summarize, Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein argues that there can be no isolable facts about any single individual, no isolable 
mental states of any kind that she is in or dispositions that she has, that can guarantee that she is 
following a rule correctly or incorrectly. In making this argument, Kripke’s Wittgenstein puts 
enormous emphasis on the first paragraph of PI §201, the so-called “paradox of interpretation” 
argument: 
                                                 
14 On pain of being self-defeating, even those who may wish to reject (“unmask” or “interrogate”) the very idea of 
correct and incorrect performance appeal in practice to some implicitly normative value(s) for this rejection.   
15 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, esp. Ch. 2. Although Winch’s reading of Wittgenstein does 
not develop this sort of skepticism as extensively as Kripke, he already anticipates it in The Idea of a Social Science, 
p. 29f.  
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This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action 
can be made to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, 
then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
 
If this conclusion goes unchallenged, the result we cannot escape is that we are all under the 
illusion of understanding and meaning anything at all. The reason is that understanding and 
meaning depends necessarily on the grasping of something as the same (and thus also of them as 
different) over stretches of time.16 The significance of this basic point (constraint) will be 
discussed much more below, but we can put it for the moment as follows: Our understanding of a 
rule is inadequate if we are unable to extend its correct application to novel circumstances that go 
beyond those under which we initially learned the rule. If someone does what she is supposed to 
do, say, when she encounters traffic lights, but then behaves on subsequent occasions, ceteris 
paribus, in ways that show that she does not know how to respond skillfully to traffic lights, this 
would be evidence that she does not really understand what one is supposed to do in 
circumstances involving them after all. For she does not do the same thing correctly over time in 
circumstances that call for doing so (in this case, knowing how to act appropriately in response 
to traffic lights).  
The same constraint applies regarding the use of words over time to express linguistic 
meaning. Although no use of a word on any particular occasion needs to express the same 
meaning as it did on previous occasions,17 the uses of the other words that accompany the use of 
the word in question must more or less express the same meanings that they usually do if the 
(possibly) idiosyncratic use of the word in question is to be meaningful at all. The exchange 
between Humpty Dumpty and Alice about the meaning of ‘glory’ in Lewis Carroll’s Through the 
Looking-Glass illustrates this nicely. When Humpty Dumpty explains that he means ‘nice knock-
down argument’ when he uses the word ‘glory’, the explanation itself, let alone the expression 
‘nice knock-down argument’, must use words that retain their usual meanings if this explanation 
of the meaning of ‘glory’ is to be itself meaningful. If every single word in linguistic 
communication deviates idiosyncratically from its past usage on every occasion, we would start 
to lose our grip on the meanings of words in general; we would fall into the insane abyss that 
                                                 
16 “The word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use 
of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it. The use of the word ‘rule’ and the use of the word ‘same’ are 
interwoven. (As are the use of ‘proposition’ and the use of ‘true’.)” (PI §§224-5; cf. §207) 
17 Davidson’s “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” gives a compelling argument for this claim.  
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Kripke’s skeptic about meaning tries to motivate as a viable possibility.18 In short, if Kripke’s 
skeptical reading of Wittgenstein is right, there can be nothing determinate that we grasp in a 
stable way over time as the same in our attempts to understand and mean anything. On this view, 
what we are actually doing is making “unjustified stabs or leaps in the dark” when we believe, 
mistakenly, that we are understanding and meaning anything at all.  
Although Kripke focuses on the meaning and understanding of words, this skeptical line 
of thought applies readily (as we just saw) to the understanding of non-linguistic phenomena as 
well. For the understanding of non-linguistic entities, paradigmatically equipment, what is 
grasped as the same is their standard use, their standard role or function in an interrelated nexus 
of activities and material arrangements. But if Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein is right, what 
ensures that we always know what (is the same thing that) we are supposed to do when we 
encounter, say, a sign-post? Why couldn’t there be some bizarre but logically possible rule 
governing our encounter of a sign-post that applies, say, only on sunny days where there must be 
at least another person standing half a mile from us? What ensures that our use of a hammer 
cannot also instantiate another norm of usage, for hammers can also be used for other purposes 
than for pounding in nails? Clearly, this line of skeptical questioning can be easily generalized 
for our understanding of non-linguistic entities in general.     
Kripke thus reads Wittgenstein as having invented a novel and radical form of skepticism 
about meaning and rule-following. Seeing no way of providing a “straight solution” to this sort 
of skepticism, Kripke’s Wittgenstein advocates instead a “skeptical solution” to the problem of 
the normativity of rule-following, a resolution that emphasizes how the embeddedness of the 
single individual in a community is supposed to enable us to live with this sort of skepticism. 
What is important for present purposes is that almost all individualists and communalists take 
this sort of skepticism seriously, thereby tacitly accepting the underlying assumptions that make 
it seem compelling, and develop their accounts in reaction to it as a foil.  
                                                 
18 Cf. Pettit, “The Reality of Rule-Following”: “If speech and thought involve rule-following, then the magnitude of 
[Kripke’s skeptical challenge about its reality] can hardly be overstated. Deny that there are such things as rules, 
deny that there is anything that counts strictly as rule-following, and you put in jeopardy some of our most central 
notions about ourselves. More than that, you also put in jeopardy our notion of the world as requiring us, given our 
words and concepts, to describe it this way rather than that; you undermine our conception of objective 
characterization. There is no extant philosophical challenge that compares on the scale of iconoclasm with the 
skeptical challenge to rule-following.” (p. 31) 
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Against the background of this sort of skepticism, individualists about rule-following 
hold that a single person has in fact sufficient resources to distinguish between the appearance of 
following rules correctly and actually following them correctly.19 They typically make two 
moves. First, they argue that a single individual can be the bearer of properties that effect the 
application of this distinction and thus overcome skepticism about meaning and rule-following. 
While they differ quite significantly regarding the nature of those properties – these may be, e.g., 
mental states, dispositions, access to transcendent standards of applications of rules, habits,20 etc. 
– what matters for our purposes is that they hold that such resources, whatever their nature, are 
fully available to the single individual in ensuring normative standards for their rule-following. 
Second, they also argue that the “community view” of rule-following, upon critical examination, 
fares no better than individualist accounts in genuinely distinguishing between the appearance of 
following rules correctly and actually following them correctly.21 The answer of individualists to 
the question about the basis or source of normativity, then, is straightforward: The standard of 
correctness and incorrectness for our application of rules is, contra Kripke’s Wittgenstein, 
provided either by properties beneath or at the skin surface of the single individual; or else such 
an individual has access to some normative standard transcending finite usage that can fully 
determine what counts as correct and incorrect performance (a version of Platonism about rule-
following).  
In this context, there are those who oppose individualism about rule-following and draw 
upon Wittgenstein’s way of thinking in Philosophical Investigations as a conceptual resource. 
These interpreters ascribe a “community view” of rule-following to Wittgenstein, according to 
which a single individual can only genuinely apply the distinction between the appearance of 
following rules correctly and actually following them correctly in virtue of being embedded 
within a community.22 On this view, it is the community that is the ultimate source and basis of 
                                                 
19 E.g., Baker and Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language; McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning; Blackburn, “The 
Individual Strikes Back”; Gilbert, On Social Facts, Ch. III; Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”. For 
a full bibliography of individualists about rule-following, see Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 145, 
note 2. 
20 Turner, The Social Theory of Practices, esp. Ch. 4. For convincing criticisms of Turner’s arguments, see Bohman, 
“Do Practices Explain Anything?” and Rouse, “Two Concepts of Practices”.  
21 Blackburn, “The Individual Strikes Back”, makes an especially strong argument for this conclusion. 
22 E.g., Winch, The Idea of a Social Science; Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language; Malcolm, 
Wittgenstein, Ch. 9, and “Wittgenstein on Language and Rules”; Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”; Pettit, The Common 
Mind, Ch. 2 and 4; Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions; M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. For a 
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the normative standards that determine which performances are correct and incorrect. As with 
individualist accounts of normativity, most advocates of the “community view” accept that the 
sort of skepticism about meaning and rule-following that Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein 
highlights is a challenge worth taking on.  
I think it is crucial at this juncture to distinguish three different understandings of the 
“community view” of rule-following, which I will regiment terminologically as follows. The first 
is one to which I will give very short shrift here, especially since I examined it at some length in 
Ch. 1. This is the view of the community as a self-subsistent supraindividual entity that allegedly 
exercises the agency of an individual person. On this view, it is the community as such that 
determines the standards of correct and incorrect performance. As extensively discussed in 1.2, 
however, this conception of the nature of a community is beset by several significant problems, 
the most serious of which are its illegitimate reification of the community and its account of the 
latter’s causal powers. Although I will not discuss it further in what follows, we can accordingly 
call this the “reified community” view of normativity.  
The second understanding of the “community view” of normativity is prima facie more 
plausible. Call this “communalism”.23 Communalism differs from the reified community view 
precisely by not committing the fallacy of reifying (personifying) the community. Communalists 
differ considerably among themselves, however, with regard to how exactly the embeddedness of 
the individual in a community is supposed to constitute normativity. Now, although the third 
understanding of the “community view” of normativity – namely, the “socially constituted” view 
– will have to remain off the stage until 5.4 below, we can give a preview of it as follows. In 
contrast with the reified community and communalist views of normativity, the socially 
constituted view contends that it is the learning of bedrock practices through training, not the 
policing and sanctioning of one’s rule-following by others, that fundamentally connects the 
human individual to others in his or her community. The argument for this conclusion, however, 
will have to await the discussion in 5.4 because the significance and force of the socially 
                                                                                                                                                             
full bibliography of communalists about rule-following, see Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 145, note 
2. Note that many of these communalists strongly criticize Kripke’s particular way of invoking the community in 
this debate.   
23 This expression is preferable to ‘communitarian’ or ‘collectivist’, which are also sometimes used in the literature 
about rule-following, because the latter terms have connotations in political theory that are related to but 
conceptually distinct from the sort of issues considered here.  
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constituted view of normativity will be much better appreciated in juxtaposition with 
communalism. In this section and the next, it is communalism and its problems that are in the 
forefront.  
It is useful to cite some representative passages from the texts of communalists not only 
to illustrate the differences among them, but, more importantly for my purposes, to bring out 
their similar assumptions regarding the terms of debate against individualists. Peter Winch’s 
reading of Wittgenstein, for instance, emphasizes how the normativity of one’s rule-following 
consists in the possibility of its being checked by other people:  
Establishing a standard [for one’s rule-following] is not an activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any 
individual in complete isolation from other individuals. For it is contact with other individuals which alone 
makes possible the external check on one’s actions which is inseparable from an established standard.24 
 
The public checkability by others of one’s rule-following is the source and basis of normative 
standards according to Winch.25 Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein also emphasizes the 
importance of public checkability, but is more self-conscious about the exact status of what can 
and cannot serve as the basis of normativity. Put in its terms, its main claim is that there are no 
facts of any sort that can constitute normativity, but only communally sanctioned justification 
(“assertibility”) conditions that an individual must satisfy in order to count as following rules. 
… [I]f one person is considered in isolation, the notion of a rule as guiding the person who adopts it can 
have no substantive content. There are no truth conditions or facts in virtue of which it can be the case that 
he accords with his past intentions [of following a rule] or not. … The situation is very different if we 
widen our gaze from consideration of the rule follower alone and allow ourselves to consider him as 
interacting with a wider community. Others will then have justification conditions for attributing correct or 
incorrect rule following to the subject, and these will not be simply that the subject’s own authority is 
unconditionally to be accepted.26  
 
The [skeptical] solution turns on the idea that each person who claims to be following a rule can be checked 
by others. Others in the community can check whether the putative rule follower is or is not giving 
particular responses that they endorse, that agree with their own.27 
 
The thought here is that an individual can receive her entitlement (i.e., her right to “assert”) that 
she is correctly following rules only from others in the community who are already authorized to 
grant such entitlement.  
More sociologically minded defenders of communalism likewise emphasize the presence 
of consensus as the source and basis of normativity. Thus, David Bloor writes: 
                                                 
24 Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, p. 32. 
25 Ibid., pp. 33, 39. 
26 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p. 89, emphases in the original.  
27 Ibid., p. 101. 
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Normative standards come from the consensus generated by a number of interacting rule-followers, and it 
is maintained by collectively monitoring, controlling and sanctioning their individual tendencies. 
Consensus makes norms objective, that is, a source of external and impersonal constraint on the 
individual.28 
 
… [E]ach of us individually is compelled by something outside, namely, other people around us in society. 
It is society that is external to us and the true source of our sense that rules exist as an independent reality 
set over against the individual rule-follower. … We are only compelled by rules in so far as we, 
collectively, compel one another.29  
 
More specifically, Bloor argues that it is the idea of rules as institutions (picking up on PI §199), 
which he characterizes in terms of “collective pattern[s] of self-referring activity”, that underpin 
the consensus that effects the normativity of rule-following. Although Bloor agrees with 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there cannot be any facts about the lone individual that can effect 
normativity, he argues that there are social – more precisely, institutional – facts that are 
available, in the form of tacit consensus, to perform this task: 
The “right” continuation, say, of a number series (which also defines what is meant by the rule) is that 
continuation which is collectively called “right”. This is not a matter of counting up votes, but refers to a 
stable pattern of interaction. I call this continuation right because others call it right, but I am correct in 
calling it right on this basis because their calling it right makes it right.30      
 
The claim is that the “self-referring” character of institutional facts is supposed to generate the 
requisite normativity: “An institution [i.e., a rule] can be looked upon as the collective product of 
the interactions between the dispositions of many individuals. … [It] provide[s] a normative 
basis for the actions of the individuals who are within it.”31 Unlike Kripke, then, Bloor argues 
that we can give a “straight solution” to skepticism about meaning and rule-following, for we can 
directly appeal to social-institutional facts to ensure the normativity of rules.  
So much for a sampling of the standard line of argument that some prominent 
communalists give regarding the source and basis of normativity.32 I have quoted these passages 
at some length not just to give the reader a sense of how they typically appeal to the social for 
explaining the constitution of normativity, but also to bring out how they each rely on an 
understanding of the social along the lines of IPIA. Their respective communalism clearly 
                                                 
28 Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, p. 17.     
29 Ibid., p. 22, emphasis in the original.   
30 Ibid., p. 33; cf. pp. 65-9.  
31 Ibid., p. 68.  
32 For an elaboration (and critique) of Pettit’s communalism, see 1.3. I postpone my discussion of Meredith 
Williams’s defense of what she now prefers to call the “social view” of normativity for reasons that will emerge in 
5.4 below.   
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accepts assumption (I) of IPIA: They each assume that (i) two or more individuals have to be 
present in some context (ii) who must interact with one another in order to constitute the 
normative standards that govern their rule-following in that context. Their communalism also 
endorses assumption (II) of IPIA: Interpersonal interactions are presumed to suffice for 
generating the normativity of rules or norms; moreover, there is the presumption that all forms of 
sociality must rest on such interactions, for no other alternative conception of human sociality is 
(on this way of thinking) thought to be available or viable. In short, the core idea is that only 
interpersonal interactions can generate the source and basis of the bindingness of norms. 
Furthermore, the primary character of these interactions is corrective, consisting in the standing 
possibility of other people checking – interpersonally monitoring, assessing, and sanctioning – an 
individual’s efforts to conform to norms. According to communalism, then, the social shows up 
primarily as that which polices the individual’s rule-following activities.   
5.3 LUNTLEY’S CRITIQUE OF COMMUNALISM ABOUT THE NORMATIVITY 
OF RULE-FOLLOWING 
 
Luntley has recently argued forcefully against the communalist view of the normativity of 
meaning.33 Although he takes himself to argue for a strongly individualist account of rule-
following, his position breaks with some central tenets of orthodox individualism about rule-
following and is for this reason instructive. One of the achievements of his reading is to draw our 
attention to what he calls the “bipartite conception of meaning”, which he sees as informing 
virtually every competing account of meaning on offer, whether they be Platonist, individualist, 
or communalist. If Luntley is right, the prevalence of this conception of meaning shows that it is 
deeply entrenched in and thus hard to dislodge from our current assumptions about the nature of 
meaning. In order to appreciate the implications of his critique of communalism, then, we need 
to understand this in terms of its attack on the bipartite conception of meaning.  
                                                 
33 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement. Although Luntley focuses on the normativity of meaning, it 
would be easy (as noted above in relation to Kripke’s skeptical reading of Wittgenstein) to generalize the 
implications of this reading to the understanding of non-linguistic phenomena as well.   
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According to this conception, the understanding and meaning of words consist in the 
combination of two components: (1) normless things (e.g., bare sounds or inscriptions) with (2) 
some additional element that supplies the normativity for normless things. Once this occurs, 
normless things become “animated” because of this addition and are thereby rendered 
meaningful or action-guiding (cf. PI §§431-2).34 The element usually thought to supply the 
requisite normativity is what Wittgenstein calls an “interpretation” (Deutung), which he defines 
as the substitution of an expression of a rule for another expression (see the third paragraph of PI 
§201). Although Wittgenstein urges that we restrict the use of ‘interpretation’ and its cognates to 
express this meaning, I do not think that it goes against his way of thinking to see how this 
conception of interpretation applies more generally to any act or activity that confers meaning on 
bare sounds or inscriptions, whether via substitution in the aforementioned sense or else via 
some more general sort of semantically relevant activity (cf. PI §§206-7).35 Interpretations on 
this view, then, serve as that which enables us to perceive sounds and inscriptions as meaningful 
at all. Given this conception of the function of interpretations, it is evident that the bipartite 
conception of meaning must presuppose that bare sounds and inscriptions are intrinsically 
meaningless because they are not intrinsically normatively constrained. Otherwise, there would 
be no work for interpretations to do, for then sounds and inscriptions as such would be already 
meaningful and action-guiding without needing interpretations. Clearly, this interpretivist model 
of meaning is most plausible when speakers of a language try to understand the words of 
languages foreign to them. The question is whether it can serve as the standard way in which our 
use of words is normatively constrained, i.e., as the normal way in which we understand and 
speak our native language(s).  
As mentioned above, much of the debate concerning normativity takes place in a dialectic 
that takes the “paradox of interpretation” (see the first paragraph of PI §201) to be the central 
point of departure for this debate. The conclusion of the paradox is radical: Normativity is 
                                                 
34 Ibid., pp. 2-9, 100-5. For a lucid account of the motivations of this conception of meaning, see also Stroud, 
Meaning, Understanding, and Practice, pp. 80f., 170-4.  
35 Unless otherwise noted, I will henceforth use ‘interpretation’ and its cognates to express this broader meaning.  
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illusory because everything we do can be interpreted in accordance with some logically possible 
alternative rule. This is the conclusion that skepticism about meaning establishes:36 
A: Meaning Skepticism 
(1) Suppose meaning is a function of sign display (what you say) + interpretation. 
(2) Nothing you say can fix the interpretation. 
 
 
(3) There is no such thing as determinate meaning.  
 
Premise (1) seems intuitively compelling because we have all at times encountered words whose 
meanings we can grasp only by imposing an understanding on them, i.e., by interpreting such 
words, whether these words belong to a foreign language or even to our own native language(s). 
That we need to do so presents evidence that words do not have meanings before we interpret 
them. Premise (2) would be true if we grant the paradox of interpretation. If (1) and (2) hold, it 
seems unavoidable that (3) must follow.      
In the face of this result, most interpreters of the PI across the spectrum reject its 
compellingness by correctly noting that Kripke’s skeptical reading of Wittgenstein on rule-
following unjustifiably ignores Wittgenstein’s own immediate suggestion (made in the second 
paragraph of PI §201) about the paradox of interpretation. As Wittgenstein writes in a passage 
that is often cited: 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here [i.e., with the paradox of interpretation] from the mere 
fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us 
at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a 
way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation [Deutung], but which is exhibited, from case to case 
of application [von Fall zu Fall der Anwendung], in what we call “following the rule” and “acting against 
it” (PI §201, emphases in the original, translation slightly altered in the second half of the last sentence). 
 
The suggestion is clearly that the paradox of interpretation only arises when we assume the 
necessity of interpretation for the application of every rule. But this assumption is mistaken for 
two reasons. First, interpretations are not helpful for ensuring the correct application of every 
rule because this thought opens up an infinite regress of interpretations. For if every case of 
following a rule requires interpretation, what ensures that the interpretation itself, or the 
interpretation of an interpretation, etc., is correct (PI §§186, 198)? Second, even if we could 
avoid this regress by claiming that there is a final, uniquely correct interpretation that we can 
                                                 
36 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 95. By ‘display’, Luntley means words we encounter that are 
not normatively constrained (ibid., p. 98). In such cases, words “just stand there” without any connections to the 
contexts in which they show up (cf. PI §85). 
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unproblematically access and apply for every rule, we become committed thereby to a Platonism 
about the normativity of rule-following (PI §§188-97). But this sort of Platonism is untenable. 
For it either begs the question concerning the normativity of rule-following by simply asserting 
that this normativity can only flow from an abstract normative standard transcending and yet 
somehow governing our use of words; or else it too is subject to the problem of infinite regress 
because this problem arises for our understanding (interpretation) of this abstract normative 
standard itself.37 In short, normativity cannot be derived from interpretations “all the way down” 
(PI §§217-9). Rather, Wittgenstein argues (“reminds” us) that we can prevent skepticism about 
meaning from arising in the first place by emphasizing that there must be ways of following 
rules, of conforming to norms, that do not involve interpretations at all: “For this reason [Darum] 
‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.” (PI §202, translation slightly altered). “To obey a rule, to make a 
report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).” (PI §199, 
emphasis in the original) Wittgenstein’s point, then, is that we can (re)gain a satisfactory 
understanding of normativity by paying attention to how this is bound up with customs and 
practices. Modifying argument A, we can set out this line of thought as follows:38  
B: Normativity as Engagement in Practices (I) 
(1) Suppose meaning is a function of sign display + interpretation. 
(2) Nothing you say can fix the interpretation. 
 
 
(3) It is not what you say that determines meaning; it is what you do.  
 
This is the point at which individualists and communalists diverge in their accounts of 
normativity. While they both agree that it is what we do that is central to understanding the 
nature of normativity, they disagree about the nature of what we do, with individualists insisting 
that the practices we perform can be individual (singular), while communalists argue that they 
must be communal.  
Luntley’s critique of communalism gets its purchase at this point in the dialectic, both at 
the textual and philosophical levels.39 Textually speaking, communalists understandably seize 
upon and highlight PI §199 as evidence for communalism, where Wittgenstein writes: 
                                                 
37 For succinct and convincing objections to Platonism about rule-following, see ibid., p. 9f.  
38 Cf. ibid., p. 95.  
39 He is strongly critical of orthodox individualism about rule-following too; see ibid., pp. 11-5 and esp. Ch. 4. I am 
sympathetic to these criticisms. But since they are not my concern here, I omit discussion of them.  
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Is what we call “following a rule” something that only one human being, only once in his or her life, could 
do? – And this is of course an issue about the grammar of the expression “following a rule”. It cannot be 
the case that there is only one occasion on which only one human being followed a rule. It cannot be the 
case that there is only one occasion on which a report is made, an order given or understood, etc. [Es kann 
nicht ein einziges Mal nur ein Mensch einer Regel gefolgt sein. Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal eine 
Mitteilung gemacht, ein Befehl gegeben, oder verstanden worden sein, etc.] – To follow a rule, to make a 
report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs [Gepflogenheiten] (uses [Gebräuche], 
institutions).40  
 
At first glance, this passage seems to invite, if not explicitly support, the communalist reading. 
The first sentence explicitly draws attention to two modes of generality pertaining to the 
normativity of rule-following: one applying to different people and the other over stretches of 
time. But as Luntley notes, what is striking is that after having drawn explicit attention to this 
distinction, Wittgenstein chooses not to discuss the first mode of generality about the relevance 
of other people for normativity, but goes on only to address the second one about whether an 
individual could follow a rule on only one occasion.41 As the above passage shows, Wittgenstein 
denies that the latter state of affairs is possible. One important central feature for Wittgenstein of 
the concept of following a rule (performing a practice), then, is repeatability over time: “a person 
goes by a sign-post [i.e., follows a rule] only insofar as there exists a continual [ständigen] use of 
sign-posts, a custom” (PI §198, translations slightly altered, emphasis added; cf. §202 on the 
application of a rule from case to case and also §207).42 If he had also wanted to insist on the 
importance of other people for constituting the normativity of rule-following, it is puzzling that 
he chooses not to discuss this at all despite having just given himself the opportunity to do so in 
that context. What the above passage suggests, especially the particular placements of ‘ein 
einziges Mal’ in the sentences in which this expression appears, is that what matters centrally for 
Wittgenstein is the repeated application of a rule over time, not so much the fact that other 
people can also apply the rule in question, let alone check on the correctness of one’s rule-
following.43 
                                                 
40 Emphases are made in the original German text. I have consulted it and altered the English translation somewhat 
so that the latter hews more closely to the former.  
41 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 105f. 
42 See also Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: “In order to describe the phenomenon of language, we 
must describe a practice, not something that happens once, no matter of what kind.” (Part VI, §34, p. 335, emphasis 
in the original)  
43 The emphasis on repeatability over time, not across people, is also highlighted in ibid.: “But what about this 
consensus [of techniques belonging to the essence of calculation] – doesn’t it mean that one human being by himself 
could not calculate? Well, one human being could at any rate not calculate just once in his life.” (Part III, §67, p. 
193, emphases in the original)  
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Now, Eike von Savigny in this context has emphasized not only that ‘Gepflogenheiten’, 
‘Gebräuche’, and their cognates connote socially established customs in ordinary German, but 
that Wittgenstein can only be plausibly read as using these terms in this sense in PI.44 As a 
German interpreter of Wittgenstein’s philosophy who pays meticulous attention to how words 
are used by Wittgenstein in PI and in ordinary German, von Savigny is surely on solid ground 
here.45 Consequently, it may seem that he would reject Luntley’s non-social reading of §199 and 
its surrounding sections simply on linguistic grounds. Let us grant that customs, uses, and 
obviously institutions are socially established. Does this imply that they are necessarily social? A 
lot turns on how one conceives the nature of socially established customs and what role they play 
with regard to the normativity of rule-following. If the performances of such customs imply 
communalism, then someone like Luntley would certainly reject the claim that the normativity 
involved in these performances are necessarily social (more on this below). In other words, if 
von Savigny is a communalist about rule-following, then his and Luntley’s readings of §199 and 
its surrounding sections would indeed be opposed. But it seems in fact that von Savigny should 
not be understood as a communalist about the sort of normativity involved in performing socially 
established customs. For he remarks that what makes a custom socially established is not that 
there are other people on the scene that continually monitor and sanction your rule-following, but 
that there exists a shared, public understanding (to put it in Heideggerian terms) of the 
referential nexus of significance that must be in place and makes intelligible what one does in 
typical situations involving, e.g., the use of sign-posts. As von Savigny writes: 
One person follows a rule [e.g., a custom of going by a sign-post] only in so far as a corresponding way of 
acting is established in her social environment. … The custom may involve more than the fact that all 
concerned are just following one and the same rule; the sign-post custom necessary for any one person to 
go by a sign-post involves, for instance, following the rule of erecting sign-posts in certain ways, having 
public ways [i.e., paths, streets, and roads], using names for referring to places, etc., as well as following 
the rule of going in (what we are used to calling) the direction of its finger.46 
 
Put in terms of site ontology, von Savigny is emphasizing the integrative practices involving 
sign-posts that must be already established in order for an individual to act appropriately in 
response to sign-posts, on the basis of her understanding of these practices. His emphasis on the 
fact that customs, uses, and institutions are socially established, then, does not in itself preclude 
                                                 
44 Von Savigny, “Self-Conscious Individual versus Social Soul”, p. 81.   
45 That these terms have this connotation is also confirmed by my German friend Martin Kley, who (as a native 
speaker and a fellow academic) is sensitive to the linguistic nuances of his native tongue.    
46 Von Savigny, “Self-Conscious Individual versus Social Soul”, p. 81f. 
 179 
 
particular occasions on which single individuals can follow rules, as long as their actions 
instantiate socially established customs that they understand. If so, this view of how the social 
figures in rule-following is not incompatible with Luntley’s position (see more below).47       
Without attending further to issues of scholarship, it seems fair to hold that the textual 
evidence shows that it is repeatability over time that is crucial for Wittgenstein, even though he 
does not explicitly rule out the importance of others for understanding normativity either (as 
evidenced by his mention of customs, uses, and especially institutions in the above passage). 
What this shows is that we should be very cautious about assuming that the concepts of custom 
and practice are inherently social in some unexplained sense. After all, it is logically and indeed 
actually possible, once a human being has been brought up (“socialized”), that she can at least 
perform certain customs or practices by herself so long as she does so on many occasions over 
time.      
Philosophical issues cannot be settled just by appeal to textual evidence alone, however. 
Luntley argues that Wittgenstein’s real target is the bipartite conception of meaning in general, 
not just the interpretivist model of meaning as commonly assumed.48 This model turns out only 
to be the intellectualist version of the bipartite conception of meaning, not this conception in 
general. The problem for communalists is that they leave the bipartite conception of meaning as 
such in place, even after they reject its interpretivist species. But if this conception as such is left 
unchallenged, it remains quite unclear how engagement in communal practices can manage, all 
on their own, to generate the requisite normativity constraining our use of words without 
presupposing the prior availability of this very normativity. As Luntley argues: 
If “use” [i.e., practice] picks out a thin conception of use, mere empirical patterns of sign deployment, then 
it is utterly unclear how sign deployment gets policed by reference to what amounts to no more than more 
of the same; the sign deployment of the individual gets policed by being measured against the sign 
deployment of others. If there is a problem with what constitutes sign deployment as such, for signs are 
inert and require animation, then simply throwing more signs into the picture offers no policing. 
Alternatively, if “use” is not understood thinly in terms of sign deployment, then “use” does not necessarily 
pick out something that stands in need of animation.49    
 
In other words, if other people’s clarifications or criticisms of our uses of words are to genuinely 
constrain these uses, such responses must themselves be already normatively structured. It is not 
                                                 
47 Von Savigny is in effect giving a partial glimpse here of the socially constituted view of normativity that I will 
discuss in 5.4 below, though he himself does not put it, of course, in those terms.  
48 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, pp. 96-8. 
49 Ibid., p. 16.  
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the case that sheer responses from other people suffice alone to constrain these uses, for now we 
would want to ask what it is about these responses that can ensure the normativity of meaning. 
Unless this objection to communalism is successfully rebutted, communalism cannot 
satisfactorily account for the normativity of meaning. Communalism is appealing as an account 
of normativity because it trades on the genuine gain in knowledge and understanding that 
sometimes results when we interact with others, paradigmatically, through linguistic 
communication and dialogue responsive to reasons.  
This is all well and good. But interpersonal interactions serve at most an articulatory and 
critical function by enabling us to clarify our stance toward things in the world and subjecting 
this stance to criticism. This is certainly important and deserves to receive the significance that it 
has garnered in certain strands of contemporary philosophy, both in the analytic and continental 
traditions. Nevertheless, the communalist view cannot serve as a constitutive account of the 
normativity of meaning because it is faced with the following dilemma: Either it opens up an 
infinite regress or else it is redundant. An infinite regress would ensue if the correctness and 
incorrectness of an individual’s rule-following derives solely from its being checked by other 
people. For what makes the assessments of other people authoritative in turn? If the reason is that 
their assessments are checked again by others, an infinite regress looms. Now, communalists 
could try to halt the regress by insisting that there can be a final group of arbiters whose 
assessments are definitive. But this move goes nowhere because the question then arises about 
why this group is so privileged. As I argued toward the end of my assessment of Pettit’s version 
of communalism in 1.3, other people’s responses are authoritative only if such responses 
themselves answer to normative standards that are independent of other people in the sense of 
not being fully under their control. We should not conflate the factual, often institutional, 
circumstances that certify what an individual must be able to do in order to show that her rule-
following is correct (i.e., her entitlement to claim to have mastered some set of skills and 
knowledge by passing some sort of tests) with the philosophical point that the evaluation by 
others of this rule-following must itself answer to some independent normative standard that is 
not fully under the control of other people. On the other hand, communalism would be redundant 
if it concedes that other people’s evaluations of an individual’s rule-following cannot after all 
depend solely on the fact that these evaluations come from others. For if this concession is 
granted, it becomes very unclear why an individual cannot sustain the normativity of rule-
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following, whereas interpersonal checking by others can do so. To this limited extent, Luntley’s 
individualism is in agreement with the orthodox individualist critique of communalism.  
In light of this rather devastating critique of communalism, Luntley’s positive account of 
normativity breaks with both communalism and orthodox individualism by focusing, not on the 
normativity putatively supplied by other people checking the correctness of an individual’s rule-
following, nor on some state occurring beneath or at the skin surface of an individual, but on the 
nature of the practices themselves that an individual engages in. As he puts it:  
The focus should be, not on the notion of what you do, but on what you do. That is to say, it is the nature of 
the “doing” that matters. To put this another way, understanding is a practice, but what matters about the 
concept of practice is not centrally whether the practitioner is singular or plural; it is the nature of practice 
itself. In short, on an impoverished conception of “doing”, it is tempting to recover normativity by 
embedding the doer in a community of doers. My account rejects this by focusing on a conception of doing 
in which normativity is intrinsic.50 … If we get the individual subject’s doings right, as activities in direct 
calibration with things, we do not need others to supply the normativity.51  
 
What matters, then, is not whether practices are individual or social (on a communalist 
understanding of the social), but whether practices are intrinsically normative. Put in terms of 
arguments A and B from above, the central task of a satisfactory account of normativity does not 
consist in trying to challenge or cope somehow with premise (2), i.e., the claim that nothing we 
say can determine meaning in a stable way. This is what communalists and orthodox 
individualists try to do. Instead, the central task of such an account should discern premise (1) – 
the assumption that meaning is a function of a normless component and something additional 
that supplies the normativity (the bipartite conception of meaning) – as the real source of the 
difficulty we apparently have with understanding the nature of normativity. It is thus premise (1) 
that should be rejected. Modifying argument B, the conclusion that Luntley defends is therefore 
this:52 
C: Normativity as Engagement in Practices (II) 
(1) Suppose meaning is a function of sign display + interpretation. 
(2) No amount of further sign display can fix the interpretation. 
 
 
(3) It is not sign display + some additional element X that determines meaning; it is sign 
practice.  
 
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 95f., emphases in the original.  
51 Ibid., p. 97. 
52 Cf. ibid., p. 98. 
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The positive part of his account aims to show what it is to engage in “sign practice”. It is relevant 
for my purposes to sketch this account now because some of its features will be significant in the 
next section.  
Luntley defends a unitary conception of meaning in which we come to see how 
normativity is intrinsic to our engagement in linguistic and non-linguistic practices. The 
normative bindingness of rules or norms is not something we have to generate somehow apart 
from this engagement and then impose on normless sounds and inscriptions or, for that matter, 
on normless non-linguistic entities. For Luntley, talk of seeing how this is so is not metaphorical 
or merely a figure of speech. He argues that the central task is to see aright – and it is crucial for 
Luntley’s position that he means this literally – how normativity can be immanent to practices in 
our engagement with the world. In particular, it is crucial that we understand how normative 
patterns of language use emerge from the activity of seeing similarities from case to case. On this 
view, following a rule is a practice because it is only by seeing similarities in particular 
circumstances that patterns of the correct use of words (correct application of concepts) actually 
bind us. This conception of how normativity is immanent to our use of words is strongly 
individualist (as Luntley understands this) insofar as the activity of seeing similarities from case 
to case is something that an individual does. But the right contrast to this view is not 
communalism, as is commonly believed in the literature on rule-following, but rather the view 
that performing this sort of activity is something essentially passive, something that an individual 
merely does in accordance with rules whose normative bindingness comes from somewhere 
extrinsic to the actual performances that accord with the rule. As Luntley puts it, we have an 
active part to play in how norms come to bind us: “we are not pawns in the grip of the 
transcendent structures of meaning or, for that matter, the empirical structures of use. We are 
active shapers of the patterns of language use, agents with a capacity to judge and thereby to 
affect the ongoing patterns of use.”53   
How does he argue for these claims? He begins by showing how his position can actually 
draw support from the thrust of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical remarks, rather than 
conveniently ignoring or even contravening them, as constructive readings of PI in particular do. 
Indeed, this support is crucial for his positive account of the nature of normativity; it has not only 
                                                 
53 Ibid., p. 56.   
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interpretive but also philosophical import. He starts by noting perceptively that Wittgenstein 
actually works with two understandings of the hidden in his thinking, not just the one that 
Wittgenstein attacks continually in PI. This distinction deserves greater attention in the literature. 
The first understanding of the hidden is that of the transcendent hidden, which stands in various 
guises as Wittgenstein’s main target (e.g., PI §§91-2, 102, 111, 153). According to this 
understanding of the hidden, what we must do in order to understand, say, the essence of 
language, is to look behind or beneath linguistic phenomena (PI §§90, 92, 97) so that we can 
articulate a philosophical theory that definitively explains this essence. Such a theory propounds 
and justifies philosophical theses that claim to articulate the deep structure of language once and 
for all and explain on that basis how this structure underpins ordinary uses of language. It 
exemplifies a Platonic attitude toward the phenomena it seeks to analyze: It disparages their 
contingency, their transitory, complex, and messy character, and aims to articulate transcendent 
(“crystalline”) doctrines that are timeless and universally applicable.54  
It is well known that the later Wittgenstein is deeply hostile to this Platonic or 
intellectualist way of doing philosophy. By contrast, his own method of philosophizing does not 
seek to resolve philosophical problems by providing a better theory, but to clarify the “grammar” 
of certain basic concepts that we cannot help but apply, i.e., to do so by illuminating the 
multifaceted roles they play in human life. By removing misunderstandings (mistaken 
assumptions) that lead us to believe that we have to solve certain unavoidable philosophical 
problems associated with the use of these concepts, “grammatical” investigations do not so much 
solve these problems as dissolve them (PI §§90, 93, 109, 118, 122). On this view, the idea of the 
transcendent hidden is a tempting illusion of which we can rid ourselves by means of such 
investigations (PI §§97, 110). What we are left with is a position that is often characterized as 
“quietism”, which aims to do away with all philosophical explanations and renounces the 
obligation of doing constructive philosophy (PI §§109-33): 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. – Since 
everything lies open to view [offen daliegt], there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden [verborgen], for 
example, is of no interest to us. (PI §126)             
 
                                                 
54 Consider the lessons we are suppose to learn from the famous parable of the cave at the beginning of Book VII of 
Plato’s Republic.  
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On this understanding of what it is to conduct grammatical investigations, then, there is not much 
left over for philosophy to do after “bring[ing] words back from their metaphysical to their 
ordinary use” (PI §116), after we rid ourselves of the impulse to try to capture the transcendent 
hidden by explaining it with some philosophical theory.     
But there is another understanding of the hidden at work in the PI, one to which 
Wittgenstein is not hostile. As he writes:   
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden [verborgen] because of their simplicity and 
familiarity [Alltäglichkeit]. (One cannot notice this – because it is always before one’s eyes.) The actual 
foundations of a human being’s inquiry do not strike him or her at all. Unless that fact has at some point in 
time struck him or her. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most 
powerful. (PI §129, emphasis in the original, translation slightly altered)55 
 
Several ideas stand out in this thought-provoking passage.  
The first is that there are aspects of things that are hidden, not by being an essence that 
lies behind or beneath the phenomena we investigate, but precisely by being obvious or utterly 
familiar. Moreover, Wittgenstein claims that these are the aspects of things that are most 
important and most powerful. In contrast to his strongly critical attitude about our craving for the 
transcendent hidden, these remarks about this second kind of hiddenness show great respect for 
it.56  
Another striking idea from PI §129 can be best brought out when it is considered in 
conjunction with PI §122. It concerns the nature of the aspects of things that are most striking 
and most powerful according to Wittgenstein. Although he does not elaborate them very much, 
he does suggest that they pertain to how our uses of words are connected by the contexts 
(Zusammenhänge) in which such uses make sense and function in human life. Although these 
uses are often readily intelligible to us in context, in the sense that we usually know how to 
respond correctly and skillfully to them (PI §150), it is very hard to attain a perspicuous survey 
(Übersicht) of the diverse ways in which words are understood and used in context. We know 
how to do so in practice, but have great difficulty in providing an explicit account of this sort of 
knowledge. As Wittgenstein writes: 
                                                 
55 This second understanding of the hidden shows up already in PI §92, where he is focused primarily on criticizing 
the idea of the transcendent hidden.  
56 For readers familiar with Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time, this passage will have strong resonance. For 
the idea that there are hidden aspects of things in this sense that are at once most important and yet very hard to 
bring into focus (e.g., the world in its worldliness, the nature of being-in as such, the nature of the self, etc.) is a 
pervasive theme in Being and Time.      
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A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not perspicuously survey [übersehen] the use of 
our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of synoptical character [Übersichtlichkeit]. – A synoptic 
presentation [übersichtliche Darstellung] produces just that understanding which consists in our “seeing 
connections or contexts” [“Zusammenhänge sehen”]. … The concept of synoptic presentation is of 
fundamental significance for us. It signifies our form of presentation [Darstellungsform], the way in which 
we see things. (PI §122, emphases in the original, translation altered; cf. §125) 
 
It is hard to attain a perspicuous survey of the uses of words because their aims and functioning 
(PI §5) are context-dependent and hence open-ended (PI §§11, 23), for this kind of survey 
requires that we take into account the particular circumstances in which words are used in each 
situation (PI §§154-5). There is no mechanical way of knowing in advance which aspects of 
particular circumstances are relevant for understanding the uses of words on each occasion.57 
What is hidden concerning the use and understanding of words, then, is not transcendent and 
static, but dynamic and immanent, to the phenomena with which they are connected. This is the 
immanent hidden. As Luntley writes: 
What is hidden is the structure of use, not because it is something that lies behind use as an essence to be 
articulated and stated in a philosophical theory of meaning, but because it is a structure immanent to 
language use. Given its multifaceted shape, this structure is difficult to take in a perspicuous representation 
[better: synoptic presentation – JJK]. The aim, in removing the obstacles to this hidden, is not, however, to 
achieve a statement of the hidden. The aim is to achieve a clear sight of this hidden – to see things aright.58    
 
The translation of ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ as ‘perspicuous representation’ may suggest that 
such a representation is something obtained from a “God’s eye view” of things. But this cannot 
be what Wittgenstein has in mind in using this expression. For one thing, this construal opposes 
the general spirit of his way of thinking, which is hostile to the craving that we have for a 
transcendent perspective on things that is external to any engagement in human practices (forms 
of life). For another, the immanent hidden is not something we can fully represent by explicitly 
articulating it, but rather something we can only show by presenting it in certain ways, e.g., by 
using examples or comparisons that shed light on similarities and dissimilarities among the uses 
of words (PI §130).59 Not just this. It is a form of presentation that serves a particular purpose: It 
aims to show and thereby teach, through its presentation, how we can see what is common (PI 
                                                 
57 Once again, Davidson illustrates this point nicely in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”.   
58 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 51. 
59 In German, ‘Darstellung’ usually means presentation, arrangement, installation, etc. and has an aspect of engaged 
involvement on the part of the one to whom something is presented, etc. By contrast, ‘Vorstellung’ usually means 
representation or conception; the mode of engagement from the one who represents or conceives something tends to 
be detached or theoretical. (The matter is not so simple in Kant’s philosophy and those he influenced. But this is 
obviously not the place to pursue this matter.)    
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§72) to the use of words in contexts over time. That is, it aims to be a synoptic (übersichtliche) 
presentation.   
A paradigm instance of such a presentation is Wittgenstein’s remarks on games. It is 
evident that the significance of these remarks extends beyond phenomena of games, for he takes 
his consideration of these phenomena to be a reply to the objection that his method fails to 
articulate the essence of language-games and hence of language (PI §65). Indeed, it seems clear 
that these remarks pertain to what is involved in our understanding and use of classificatory 
concepts in general, whether concrete or abstract. As is well known, Wittgenstein rejects the 
demand that we must isolate and specify a set of necessary and sufficient features, i.e., some 
unique essence, that all activities must have in common if they are to be rightly classified as 
games. He urges us instead to look and see on a case-by-case basis, not think (i.e., theorize) 
about, whether there is any set of properties that games share; the idea of family resemblance is 
put forward as an anti-essentialist account of what games have in common (PI §§66-7).  
Luntley notes that there are at least two different ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s 
remarks here.60 On the quietist understanding, what we classify as games is simply something 
that we do. We note various similarities and dissimilarities among the games we compare and 
that is pretty much the end of the story: “we are left with homely reminders of the complex and 
multifaceted way in which words are actually used”, without much insight about what makes 
these uses of words (applications of concepts) hang together.61 This may be an appealing result 
to quietists who have a dogmatic understanding of what Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical 
remarks enjoin. But this is unsatisfactory because it assumes the false dilemma that we are forced 
either to do philosophy in an explanatorily reductive way, or else only to engage with philosophy 
so as to cure it of the problems with which it has afflicted itself, the foremost of which is its 
craving for generality (i.e., for the full articulation of the transcendent hidden).62  
There is, however, a middle ground between these options. It shows up in Luntley’s 
proposal that there is an alternative understanding of the remarks on games available, one that 
illuminates how our uses of words hang together without acceding to the demand that we must 
explain this reductively. Because this sort of illumination is inherently context-dependent and 
                                                 
60 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 78f. 
61 Ibid., p. 80. 
62 This is a familiar, but I would argue facile, way of understanding the metaphilosophical remarks that culminate in 
PI §133. 
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open-ended, it draws limits to explicitness. This alternative understanding sheds light not only on 
how we classify things, but on the nature of normativity in general, i.e., how our words are 
constrained in contexts from case to case in their applications. Although both the quietist and the 
more illuminating understandings deny that there must be some essentialist account of what 
games are in order to be rightly classified as such, the more illuminating understanding 
emphasizes the primacy of seeing similarities as a constitutive aspect of what it is to rightly 
classify something as such and such. As Luntley writes: 
Wittgenstein is not merely critiquing conceptual essentialism but asking, “Which comes first – seeing the 
similarities or the patterns [of language use]?” His view is that seeing the similarities is primitive. … To 
say that seeing the similarities between things is primitive is to say that the normative patterns of correct 
use of words emerge from the activity of seeing similarities. This is in contrast to holding that we see 
similarities in virtue of having grasped the transcendent patterns and applying it. This is not to deny 
patterns of correct use, it is only to deny that they pre-exist the activity of seeing similarities.63   
 
Two key passages in Wittgenstein’s remarks on games support this emphasis on the 
primacy of seeing similarities as constitutive of normativity. For they respond to the objection 
that unless we can set sharp boundaries, i.e., formulate explicit rules, that determine what counts 
as a game and what not, the games we play will be unconstrained by rules (PI §68). Wittgenstein 
writes: 
How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe games to him, and 
we might add: “This and similar things are called ‘games’.” And do we know any more about it ourselves? 
Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is? – But this is not ignorance. (PI §69, 
emphases in the original)  
 
The key point here is expressed by the last sentence of this passage. On an intellectualist 
conception of what knowledge of classificatory concepts consist in, if we are entitled to claim 
knowledge, e.g., of what a game is, we must be able to specify the essential features that 
something must have if it is to count as a game. If we persist in claiming to have such knowledge 
and yet fail to articulate these features in a general definition, this would show (as someone like 
Socrates would point out) that we do not really possess this knowledge after all. More generally, 
on this conception of what knowledge of classificatory concepts is, resorting to the “this and 
similar things” locution in explaining the nature of anything is either woefully incomplete or at 
                                                 
63 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 79. Luntley connects his emphasis on seeing similarities with 
the disjunctive account of perceptual experience (ibid., pp. 100-5) and especially with Wittgenstein’s lengthy 
remarks in Part II, xi of PI on what is involved in seeing aspects (ibid., Ch. 6). It is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
however, to elaborate Luntley’s rich discussion of these connections.  
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best only gestures at what a complete account of it could look like.64 On this Socratic way of 
thinking, the use of this locution exposes our ignorance about something’s nature because we 
cannot give a fully explicit account of its essential properties.  
Wittgenstein rejects this intellectualist conception of what this sort of knowledge consists 
in. He argues that our inability to fully articulate what a game is does not show our ignorance 
about it, for such a conclusive articulation cannot be had in principle, given the inherent context-
dependence of what counts as a game from occasion to occasion. What we should reject is 
intellectualism about what such knowledge is. He puts forward the alternative view that one can 
sufficiently explain what a game is by giving various examples of it, in order to get his readers to 
see why this and similar activities are called ‘games’:  
One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. – I do not, however, mean by this that 
he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing which I – for some reason – was unable to 
express; but that he is now to employ those examples in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an 
indirect means of explaining – in default of a better. For any general definition can be misunderstood too. 
(PI §71, emphases in the original) 
 
The last sentence anticipates his response to the paradox of interpretation in PI §201: 
Explanations must come to an end somewhere (see already  PI §1, where he first uses a variation 
of the “this and similar things” locution), for otherwise we are off on an infinite regress. But the 
more relevant point here is that once we have exhausted our explanations (justifications), all we 
can do is to give examples that aim to teach our audience to see how concepts are rightly applied:  
But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and 
by practice [Übung]. – And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself. (PI §208, 
emphases in the original; cf. §144) 
 
Giving examples does not display the possession of an inferior sort of knowledge, “a loose 
exercise in arm-waving that roughly indicates but cannot fully specify what ought to be said” 
about why something should be classified as such and such.65 It is not ignorance to resort to the 
“this and similar things” locution for such purposes because our judgment that two or more 
things are X rests ultimately on our activity of seeing the similarities among them, once our 
explicit reasons for thinking that they are X are exhausted (PI §§217, 340). This activity is basic 
(explanatorily primitive), not the intellectualistic view that two or more things are similar only in 
virtue of some fully explicit account of why they are so.      
                                                 
64 Ibid., p. 81. 
65 Ibid. 
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The significance of seeing similarities for understanding the normativity of rule-
following should be apparent. This is another striking idea that is implicit in PI §129 (“… we fail 
to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful” [emphasis added – JJK]), 
especially when it is understood in conjunction with the other passages considered above. To be 
specific, when Wittgenstein reminds us that understanding and following norms are practices, he 
is highlighting how the normativity of norms is something that we ourselves must continually 
bring about over time (PI §§197-202), not something that derives from the explicit formulations 
of rules, captured or experienced perhaps by undergoing certain kinds of mental episodes, that 
supposedly predetermined how norms should be applied (PI §§138-40, 152-55, 188-93).66 We 
continually enact and thereby effect their normativity by seeing the similarities between the 
aspects of past circumstances that are connected to our application of norms and those of the 
present that elicit the possible application of these norms (PI §§154, 228). As Luntley writes:  
There is nothing behind the utterance of a formula that underwrites the normativity of the right way of 
going on: that is, there is no transcendent hidden in virtue of which going on one way rather than another is 
correct. The notion of the correctness of going on one way rather than another, for there is such a thing, is 
available in the particular circumstances. We justify one way rather than another not by subsuming it under 
a general theoretically articulated pattern, but by seeing the pattern in the particular case. And part of what 
it is to see the right development consists in the fact that the language user is an agent, a judge with the 
capacity to contribute to the patterns of right usage.67 
 
We are not passive in relation to norms, but act in ways that enable norms to have claims on us 
by seeing similarities – seeing connections or related contexts (PI §122) – between the aspects of 
things.   
Another way to put this point is to say that we are continually judging whether, and if so 
how, norms can and should apply in connection with the relevant aspects of a particular 
situation. In so doing, we have a part to play in calibrating the normativity of norms with how the 
world is in a particular situation. It is important to emphasize that judging in this sense need not 
be and often is not something consciously or deliberately done, but is exhibited simply in how 
we cope practically with the relevant aspects of things in that situation (PI §201). To object that 
practical coping is not properly judging, because judging should be understood as a conscious or 
deliberate activity, assumes an intellectualistic understanding of what judging is. But 
Wittgenstein directly challenges the very plausibility of such an understanding in his extended 
                                                 
66 See also Taylor, “To Follow a Rule”, pp. 176-8. 
67 Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, p. 57. 
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discussion of rule-following. Someone who makes this objection cannot, therefore, take its 
plausibility for granted because this is exactly what is at issue here. Once we jettison the 
intellectualistic understanding of judging, it becomes clear that judging is something that we do 
all the time in the course of living human lives, primarily and usually as an implicit or necessary 
aspect of many of the other things that we do (PI §§25, 31, 224-5, 241-2). To judge in this sense 
involves engaging in bedrock practices that outrun any explanation (explicit justification) of why 
they are correctly or incorrectly performed (PI §§217-8).   
We are now also better placed to explain why Wittgenstein’s remarks on games are a 
paradigm instance of what he calls a synoptic presentation. Although we have trouble attaining a 
perspicuous survey (a fully explicit articulation) of why and how a norm applies on all the 
occasions on which it does over time (PI §125), we can nevertheless show how normativity is 
immanent to our conformity to linguistic and non-linguistic norms on each occasion by using 
perspicuous examples like games, sign-posts, the proper continuation of an arithmetic function, 
etc. Once we gain the insight (are “reminded”) that normativity is something that we ourselves 
must continually effect over time in response to relevant aspects of particular circumstances, we 
acquire a synoptic presentation of the nature of normativity in general. That is, we come to see 
aright the immanent hidden (PI §129). A synoptic presentation of the nature of normativity 
contrasts strongly with its representation from a “God’s eye” point of view by taking the 
inherently context-dependent and open-ended character of rule-following into account. It shows, 
so to speak, the “how” of normativity – the way in which we enable norms to make claims on us 
and bind us from occasion to occasion – but cannot fully specify the “what” of normativity – i.e., 
give a fully explicit theoretical articulation of its nature that can transcend its contingency. It is in 
this manner that the concept of a synoptic presentation is of fundamental significance: It 
illuminates a distinctive form of presentation, the way in which we come to see the immanent 
hidden (PI §122).68      
                                                 
68 Although Luntley does not make this point in the way that I do here, his reading of PI clearly implies it.   
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5.4 THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF NORMATIVITY 
In light of my sympathetic sketch above of Luntley’s account of the nature of normativity, it 
should not be surprising that I find much of it to be illuminating and persuasive. But this 
endorsement would seem to stand in tension with my defense of the social constitution of the 
human individual, given Luntley’s forthright critique of communalism about the normativity of 
rule-following. I will argue in this section that not only is there no tension between these 
commitments, but that Luntley’s understanding of his account of normativity as strongly 
individualist is compelling only when set against the understanding of the social as IPIA. Once 
we jettison the latter, I will show how his account of normativity actually coalesces with the 
Heideggerian conception of the social constitution of the individual. 
I begin by considering whether Luntley’s critique of communalism also applies to 
Meredith Williams’s defense of the “community view” of normativity, a task that I have 
deliberately postponed for present purposes. This defense is worth examining in virtue of its 
nuance and emphasis in particular on the significance of learning for normativity, something on 
which most defenders of the “community view” insufficiently focus. At first glance, it seems that 
Williams’s position also falls into the target range of Luntley’s critique. Like other 
communalists, Williams highlights PI §§185-242 (especially §§198-219) as expressing a line of 
thought that supports a “community view” of rule-following. According to Williams, this view 
has four important tenets.69 (1) We need to change the typical way in which we consider the 
nature of rule-following, for this way leads us to try to isolate certain sorts of mental states or 
else appeal to interpretations as the source of normativity. (2) Training into customs or social 
practices is the way in which we come to follow rules. (3) Meaning is a social phenomenon and 
thus the individual cannot be radically (socially) isolated from the community. (4) Once the 
individual is trained in the correct performance of customs or social practices, he or she has 
learned to master certain techniques, i.e., certain ways of doing things that exhibit a normatively 
structured understanding of them.70  
                                                 
69 M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, p. 167f. 
70 The fact that Williams takes customs and social practices to be interchangeable phenomena or concepts is grist for 
Luntley’s mill here. Taylor also makes this assumption without argument in “To Follow a Rule”, p. 173f.  
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As we will see below, the endorsement of these tenets does not as such necessarily imply 
a commitment to communalism, provided that they are qualified in certain ways. What renders 
them, especially (2) and (3), into an instance of communalism is the further construal that these 
tenets are only intelligible in terms of interpersonal interactions. This seems to be what Williams 
affirms in the following passages:      
The very logic of actions, of obeying a rule, presupposes a context of structure, and that is provided by the 
actual harmonious interactions of a group of people. … That structure is a social structure, that is, the 
dynamic interactions of a group of people in sustaining certain regularities, customs, and patterns of action 
over time.71 
 
This appeal to the harmonious interactions of a group of people as that which grounds the 
normativity of rules gives us initial reason to think that Williams understands the social along the 
lines of IPIA. This seems to be confirmed when Williams asserts that  
the very idea of normativity, and so the structure within which the distinction between correct and incorrect 
can be drawn, cannot get a foothold unless the practice is a social one. … Wittgenstein’s point is that only a 
social structure can provide the context within which objects can be used as standards and representations. 
For the defeasibility of our judgments, that is, that judgment can be incorrect, can only get a hold in our 
being able to contrast the actions of the individual with the actions of the community.72   
 
It is passages like these that lead Luntley, understandably, to read Williams as espousing 
communalism about the normativity of rule-following.    
Unlike Kripke or Bloor, however, Williams is careful to emphasize that we should not 
conceive communal consensus as static or overly harmonious, but more dynamically as the 
relatively stable “bedrock” (PI §217) on which individuals act in accordance with normative 
standards. Bedrock practices are performances that are right without needing justifications (PI 
§§219, 289); their performances stop the regress of interpretations that unavoidably looms if one 
assumes the necessity of an intellectualist understanding of rule-following. This emphasis on the 
centrality of bedrock practices clarifies the sort of agreement that must be in place in order for 
rule-following to be possible (PI §241): What human beings agree on concerns the things they 
all do that are right without needing justifications (e.g., how to understand the gesture of pointing 
with one’s finger, basic judgments of sameness, or pain behavior, etc.), not opinions that can be 
made explicit and hence ones for which justifications may be asked. That human beings agree in 
their bedrock practices cannot mean, therefore, that this agreement can consist in a majority or 
even unanimity of opinions. As Williams argues: 
                                                 
71 M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, p. 169.  
72 Ibid., p. 175. 
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We have standards only in virtue of group harmony and against the background of group harmony, but the 
standards themselves do not refer to, nor are described in terms of, group harmony. It is important to see 
that whatever is meant by “following a rule”, it cannot be captured by a description of actual practice. The 
community view does not provide a schema for analyzing normative expressions in terms of what people 
do or are disposed to do.73 
 
Williams, then, rejects the simplistic conception of the community that Kripke’s and Bloor’s 
readings of Wittgenstein put forward. Nevertheless, it is clear that she is committed to defending 
the crucial role that the community plays in the constitution of normativity. This is what Luntley 
takes issue with in reading Williams as a (non-reductive) communalist about rule-following. If 
his reading is right, her position would not be able to avoid his devastating critique of 
communalism as either question-begging or redundant for understanding the nature of 
normativity.74  
I want now to show, however, that this reading is mistaken because it does not capture 
Williams’s best thinking about the way in which normativity is social or, as I prefer to 
characterize it, socially constituted. I think, therefore, that her position is best interpreted as 
defending a “socially constituted” view of normativity, which is the third understanding of the 
“community view” alluded to in passing above, not a communalist view thereof. The task of 
understanding properly the social constitution of normativity has implications beyond the issue 
of how we should understand the thought of the later Wittgenstein on rule-following, but pertains 
more generally to how exactly normativity is central to the social constitution of the human 
individual. Discussing this will also show how it connects directly with the Heideggerian 
conception of this constitution that I articulated and defended in Ch. 2.   
At the core of the socially constituted view of normativity is the significance of learning 
through training. Textually speaking, it is clear that Wittgenstein holds that this process is one of 
the two key elements needed for dissolving the apparent problem that we have in understanding 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 176f., emphases in the original. Cf. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: “And 
does this mean, e.g., that the definition of ‘same’ would be this: same is what all or most human beings with one 
voice take for the same? – Of course not. For of course I don’t make use of the agreement of human beings to affirm 
identity. What criterion do you use, then? None at all.” (Part VII, §40) See also Stroud, Meaning, Understanding, 
and Practice, pp. 84-94, for a forceful critique of understanding the “community view” in terms of conformity to 
consensus.    
74 In fact, her initial argument for the “community view” (M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, p. 175f.) 
does seem to beg the question at least against Baker and Hacker’s individualism about rule-following, which is her 
target in that context.  
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the nature of normativity (see especially PI §198, but also §§5-6, 189-90, 206, 208). His most 
direct statement of the centrality of learning through training is given elsewhere as follows: 
To what extent can the function of language be described? If someone has not mastered a language, I may 
bring him to a mastery of it by training. To someone who has mastered it, I may remind him of the kind 
and manner of training, or describe this to him; for a particular purpose; using thus already a technique of 
the language.  
 
To what extent can the function of a rule be described? Someone who is master of none, I can only 
train.75   
 
The reminders about what we learn through training draw attention to a number of important 
points. First, such learning takes place at the level of bedrock practices, where justifications 
(explanations) run out and we are simply taught (trained) to do what one does in that situation. 
This is what stops the threat of the regress of interpretations from occurring (PI §§217-9). 
Second, what we learn through training are not further instructions in the form of explicit rules 
but techniques, i.e., skills that we perform in doing things (PI §201; cf. §150). Otherwise, the 
regress of interpretations would not be stopped because then the question of how to correctly 
understand further instructions (explanations, justifications) would arise once again. We perform 
these techniques “blindly” (PI §219) only in the sense that we do not need to reflect consciously 
about what to do and how to do so, not that we act as mindless automata without any sense of 
why or how well we perform these techniques.   
These two points are familiar in the literature and should not require further elaboration 
and defense. Williams’s position diverges from orthodox communalism, however, by further 
emphasizing that the point of learning bedrock practices through training is not primarily 
corrective, but aims rather at the inculcation of a shared sense of the obvious among teachers and 
initiate learners.76 Taking this point into account presents an alternative account of the 
normativity of rule-following that deemphasizes its policing character. We can elaborate this 
account in terms of two stages: the first is that of learning through training, the second that of 
autonomous rule-following.  
At the first stage, there is no doubt that the teaching and learning of bedrock practices are 
interpersonally interactive and corrective, provided that these features are understood in a 
                                                 
75 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part VI, §31; cf. §§16-9, translation slightly altered in 
consultation with the original German. As discussed above, the other key element is repeatability over stretches of 
time.  
76 M. Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, pp. 180-2 and 201-6. Although she does not elaborate this point in 
the way that I choose to do in what follows, it is the source of insights for my remarks. 
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particular way. For example, when we teach a young child how to count the natural numbers 
sequence, we simply correct her attempt to count correctly without further explanation; we just 
drill her to count in the right way. And we do this with all sorts of very basic capacities that we 
seek to instill in young children, such as teaching them how to identify colors and shapes, how to 
hold and use certain tools, how to be polite by uttering certain words or expressions when the 
circumstances call for performing such actions, etc. (Wittgenstein’s emphasis in PI §6 on the 
importance of ostensive teaching of words and its contrast with ostensive definition is much to 
the point here.)  
But it is crucial to notice that the teaching and learning of bedrock practices do not 
involve knowledge (justificatory) claims, except in the uninformative sense that once the learner 
has mastered the skills in question, she knows then that 9 comes after 8, or that you hold a pencil 
or a spoon in this way, or that you normally say “Thank you” after someone gives you something 
you asked for, etc. For the learner, it is clear that such know-how depends on the prior mastery of 
the skills in question, not the other way around, for it makes no sense for someone to claim to 
possess such knowledge and yet fail to demonstrate it when actually called upon to do so. 
Knowing how to count the natural number sequence consists simply in doing it right, not in 
coming up with some independent justification for why 9 comes after 8, etc., in the sense of 
supplying a proof or evidence of its correctness.  
One might think here, understandably, that it is the teacher who provides the justification 
for the correctness of the initiate learner’s actions. It is one of Williams’s insights to emphasize 
that this thought is also mistaken. For while the teacher’s demonstration of how (continually) to 
perform an action is the standard of correctness, this demonstration is not the justification of this 
action. The purpose of correcting the actions of the initiate learner is to bring her into conformity 
with the practices of the community: to train her into its practices, not to justify her actions. Until 
this is done, the initiate learner is not even in the position of understanding, let alone questioning, 
the rightness or wrongness of what she has learned to do. The proper response to her question or 
doubt about how (continually) to perform a bedrock action, or why it is the one that she should 
perform in a certain circumstance, is not an explanation (justification) of why an action is the 
correct one, but more training (drilling). The aim of training bedrock practices is to make it 
obvious (selbstverständlich: a matter of course [PI §238]) to the learner that this is the right thing 
to do when certain circumstances arise, i.e., to make what she does in those circumstances 
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become second nature to her. In short, there is no concern with justification either for the initiate 
learner or for the teacher in the learning or teaching of bedrock practices. 
This understanding of the significance of learning through training avoids Luntley’s 
critique of communalism as either question-begging or redundant. Such learning is not question-
begging because the role of other people is not justificatory, but instructional. The infinite 
regress that looms in communalism, according to which justificatory authority is grounded solely 
in other people’s assessments and sanction of the correctness of one’s rule-following, does not 
arise because it is learning bedrock practices through training that equips one to do the things 
that one must be able to do in order for issues of justification to be relevant at all. Thus, it is only 
once you have learned what pointing with your finger accomplishes in the presence of other 
people that there can be questions that intelligibly arise about what exactly you are trying to draw 
their attention to in pointing, and what possible justificatory role this pointing is playing in what 
one says and does, etc. By the same token, learning through training is clearly not redundant 
because one must be able to exercise certain very basic capacities competently in order for other 
people’s correction of one’s behavior to be intelligible (PI §§238, 241-2). If one could not, e.g., 
count the natural number sequence correctly, it would not make sense for others to correct one’s 
attempt to perform simple arithmetical functions like addition, etc.  
Williams is thus right to claim that the distinction between correct and incorrect 
performance cannot “get a foothold” unless we have learned first to perform bedrock practices, 
provided that we understand that what it is to “get a foothold” means having been trained to 
perform such practices competently and not being checked continually by other people, even 
after the training has ended. Accordingly, once training is finished and the learner displays 
reliable mastery of the skills in question (the second stage of rule-following), there is no further 
need for the sort of continually corrective interpersonal instruction (interaction) that took place 
during the period of learning through training. One has become a competent and autonomous 
follower of rules by having learned to correctly perform certain actions as the obvious thing to do 
in particular circumstances. As Williams writes: 
The community is not required in order to police the actions and judgments of all members, but in order to 
sustain the articulated structure within which understanding and judging can occur and against which error 
and mistake can be discerned.77 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid., p. 176f. 
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Though a community is required to create the structured context within which we name, decorate walls, 
obey rules, and the like, we, once we have mastered language, are blind to the community in that we act 
and judge without checking with others. The individual thus has an autonomy that is not subject to 
community check; she is as able to recognize error as anyone else.78  
 
The socially constituted view of normativity deemphasizes, then, the importance of correction 
and policing as the primary way in which others are significant for rule-following. Rather, 
normativity has a social basis because it is other people who first train initiate learners to do 
things correctly without justification, i.e., train them to see what are the obvious things they 
should do in certain circumstances, which is what puts them in the position to engage in norm-
governed practices at all. It is learning through training that fundamentally connects the 
individual to the community, not the latter’s policing of the former. Communalism goes wrong 
by overgeneralizing the importance of correction from those rather specific circumstances of 
rule-following to all of them. The checking of the correctness of one’s rule-following, whether 
by others or oneself, is mostly out of place and does not figure centrally in the performance of 
everyday practices, except in the case of initiate learners and those who claim to possess 
expertise in rarified areas of knowledge, where it does indeed make sense to verify that they are 
entitled to claim such expertise. I conclude, therefore, that Williams’s conception of the social 
constitution of normativity – when properly understood – does not fall into Luntley’s target 
range as a version of communalism.  
Furthermore, the socially constituted view of normativity can readily take in stride 
Luntley’s emphasis on the primacy of seeing the similarities from case to case for the 
constitution of normativity. As Williams writes: 
Through training in the use of the technique for continuing or proceeding correctly, the novice comes to see 
the activity as rule-guided, which means he sees a certain outcome as necessary. Without judgments of 
sameness, judgments of necessity are impossible. … Initiate learning is a matter of learning what is 
obvious, not as expressed in explicit propositional form but as expressed in the learner’s trained reactions. 
Mastery of the technique of going on or applying the rule is the vehicle for coming to see things as 
obvious.79   
There is thus no incompatibility between the social basis of learning through training and the 
primacy of seeing the similarities from case to case on the part of the individual in performing 
rule-governed activities. In fact, it is the training that first teaches the initiate learner which 
particular aspects of a situation are the relevant similarities to which he should pay heed. 
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 183. 
79 Ibid., p. 209f., emphases added. 
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Conversely, it is the activity of seeing the similarities from case to case that enables the 
individual who has learned through training to extend appropriately what she has learned into 
future possible applications of the rule or norm in question. For a competent rule-follower does 
not only correctly perform actions that she has been trained to perform before, but must be able 
to perform them in novel circumstances in a rule-governed way. Indeed, the ability to show that 
one can account for novel aspects of circumstances in one’s rule-following is a necessary 
requirement for manifesting that one has correctly understood the rule at all. The rule or norm is 
binding only when it is acknowledged and applied from occasion to occasion by the individual 
rule follower (PI §§154, 201). Learning to follow rules or conform to norms through training, 
and the individual’s autonomy in applying them from case to case, are thus mutually implicating. 
Even in cases where the application of a rule or norm in a particular situation demands going 
against the results of past applications (i.e., going against what past training regarding how one 
should apply the rule or norm in question has taught one to do), it is one’s prior training that 
serves as the background against which present applications that go against past ones become 
intelligible. In sum, Luntley is wrong to dismiss the social constitution of normativity in two 
ways. (1) There is a way in which rule-following is socially constituted that does not consist in 
its being continually checked by others. (2) Learning through training is crucial in teaching rule-
followers to see which particular aspects (out of many) of a situation are relevant as far as their 
similarities to other ones in the past and the present are concerned.          
This understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following connects now with my 
appropriation of Heidegger’s conception of human social constitution in Ch. 2 in the following 
way. I noted there that the normativity of our social constitution shows up, primarily and usually 
(zunächst und zumeist), under the guise of the normalization of our everyday understanding of 
our activities in the world by the public norms supplied and prescribed by the one (das Man). We 
take for granted without self-consciousness in our everyday existence, as our “default” way of 
dealing with entities in the world, including ourselves and other people, that there are normal 
ways for entities and people to be what and how they are. The use of ‘normal’ here only 
expresses secondarily its statistical sense as repeated ways of understanding or doing things over 
time. Rather, its basic use is properly normative in that it points out what are the correct and 
incorrect, or at least the acceptable and unacceptable, ways of understanding and doing things 
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from occasion to occasion. The statistical sense of ‘normal’ flows from its normative sense, not 
the other way around. 
I also noted, though, that we should distinguish the idea of normativity from that of 
normalization. Wittgenstein’s reflections on the nature of normativity, in particular, on the 
significance of learning through training for rule-following, enable us to see how normativity and 
normalization can be related and yet distinct. Through such learning, we are taught how to do 
things correctly and incorrectly without justification. In other words, our bedrock actions become 
normalized; they form thereby a more or less stable condition or basis (bedrock) on which more 
complex or sophisticated actions rest, along with the self-understandings with which they are 
interwoven. Through such learning and the possibilities that it opens up, then, we get a grip on 
the very idea of normativity. Our initial normalization (through training by others) brings about, 
both as a matter of causation and as a matter of understanding, our grasp of normativity. But as 
Wittgenstein argues, and Luntley following his lead does well to elaborate, we cannot be wholly 
passive with regard to the bindingness of rules or norms on us, especially once the process of 
learning through training has finished. Rather, rules or norms can only bind us when we see 
similarities between their past applications and aspects of our current situation that can call for 
their present application. Once we have been trained (acculturated) into bedrock practices, rules 
and norms bind us only in virtue of individual rule-followers’ activity of seeing such similarities. 
As Williams puts it (and in so doing she expresses her agreement here with Luntley): 
Instead of seeing actions as flowing from the sign [i.e., the rule], we need to see the mutually supporting 
interconnections between the sign and ways of acting. How we act fixes the rule. The rule is made a guide, 
or standard, for action by our acting towards it in ways that are fixed by our training. … [Moreover] an 
object [i.e., a rule (e.g., a signpost)] becomes a standard or norm in virtue of the way in which that object is 
used. The attitudes, judgments, and actions of the participants in the practice hold the object in place as a 
standard.80      
 
In other words, what we do, along with the self-understandings that render what we do 
intelligible, remains normalized only insofar as we continually let the rules or norms bind us in 
particular circumstances by seeing similarities (and dissimilarities) in their applications. 
Normalization is not a static condition, but requires ongoing conformity to norms from occasion 
to occasion on the part of those who engage in the practices through which such norms make 
sense and are binding.  
                                                 
80 Ibid., p. 200, emphasis in the original.  
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Putting it this way risks making what is in view here sound overly voluntary, however. 
Primarily and usually, we simply understand and do things (for better or worse) in the customary 
ways that we have learned through training and, more generally, in our upbringing, because we 
see them as the obviously correct or incorrect things to do. In short, although we initially acquire 
the very idea of normativity by being normalized, normativity is the more basic idea or 
phenomenon at work.  
5.5  CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this chapter that Wittgenstein’s reflection on the nature of rule-following 
(normativity) in his later philosophy is significant for understanding the social constitution of the 
human individual in a number of ways. First, this reflection enables us to clarify the precise 
sense in which he can be understood as advocating a “community view” – better, a socially 
constituted view – of normativity, one that breaks with the orthodox communalist understanding 
of how normativity has a social basis. It is the learning of bedrock practices that fundamentally 
ties the individual to the community in which he or she is raised, not the possibility that other 
people can always check (monitor and sanction) the correctness of his or her rule-following, 
especially once the process of learning bedrock practices has been successfully completed. 
Although there is no doubt that other people perform a vital function in human social life by 
articulating and (when appropriate) critically evaluating the correctness of one’s rule-following, 
these activities cannot constitute the normativity of rule-following because this normativity must 
be already available if these activities are to do the work that they aim to accomplish.  
Second, this clarification helps us in turn to see how a socially constituted view of 
normativity can not just deflect, but more importantly, align itself with Luntley’s devastating 
critique of orthodox communalism, without jettisoning the insistence that normativity has a 
necessarily social basis. Although Luntley does well to criticize orthodox communalism about 
rule-following, he fails to envisage another way in which the social constitution of the individual 
is crucial for normativity. Because he can only conceive the significance of the social for rule-
following in corrective (policing) terms, he wrongly infers that the social can have no further 
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relevance for the normativity of rule-following once he succeeds in undermining the orthodox 
communalist understanding of it. This reveals a blind spot on his part concerning how the social 
is significant for the normativity of rule-following in non-policing terms. Third and finally, once 
we properly understand the nature of the social constitution of the individual, doing so helps us 
make more precise sense of the sort of normativity that Heidegger has in view when he claims 
that the one prescribes and regulates our standard interpretation (Auslegung [SZ §32]) of the 
world and each other (SZ 127, 129).81 Our everyday ongoing absorption in the familiar public 
norms into which we have been trained normalizes the various roles that entities and people play 
in their relevant referential nexuses of significance. But this sort of normalization is not a static 
condition in relation to which we rule-followers are passive. Rather, we have an active part to 
play in constituting its normative bindingness on our self-understandings and activities. Although 
the social constitution of the individual is normalized, this normalization also provides the 
possibility that we can alter its content and force on us from occasion to occasion in the course of 
living our lives.     
                                                 
81 We should not run together Heidegger’s conception of interpretation with Wittgenstein’s. The fact that the same 
word (‘interpretation’) is used is an artifact of translation into English. Interpretation (Auslegung) for Heidegger 
makes explicit and appropriates what is already tacitly grasped in an understanding of things that is normatively 
structured; it does not confer meaningfulness on a constellation of things that are, in themselves, normatively inert. 
By contrast, interpretation (Deutung) for Wittgenstein is the act or activity that supposedly confers meaningfulness 
on things that are in themselves normatively inert. Indeed, Wittgenstein’s conception of rule-following converges 
quite closely with Heidegger’s conception of interpretation (Auslegung): the “circumspective-hermeneutic as” of 
interpretation.   
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CONCLUSION. THE SOCIAL IN THE INDIVIDUAL 
The central claim for which this dissertation has argued is that the human individual is socially 
constituted in virtue of his or her distinctive way of understanding and acting in the world. More 
specifically, on the basis of an interpretive appropriation of Heidegger’s conception of human 
social existence in Being and Time, I argued that the human individual is socially constituted in 
virtue of his or her normative (in the first instance, normalized) understanding of the world, i.e., 
his or her training into and (by and large) ongoing conformity with the public norms of the one 
(das Man). For this training into and general conformity with such norms is what makes 
intelligible, primarily and mostly, the typical way in which the human individual understands the 
world on each particular occasion, including how he or she relates to or interacts with other 
people as they show up and make sense as aspects of the world. In short, this dissertation has 
argued that the social ineluctably permeates the very way in which the human individual 
understands and acts in the world as an individual agent; being with others in terms of the public 
norms that the one makes available is a constitutive condition of human existence that comes 
prior (in the order of understanding) to the human individual’s interactions with others. Having 
established this conclusion, we put ourselves in the position to adapt Pettit’s formulation of the 
thesis of social holism (his label for the thesis of the social constitution of the individual) as 
follows: 
Individual human beings are not entirely self-sufficient. (1) They must depend upon one another for the 
possession and exercise of some basic capacity – namely, the capacity to be-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-
sein) – that is central to the flourishing of the human being. (2) Furthermore, no one can come to possess 
and exercise this basic capacity – no one can be properly human – except by sharing the world, not 
primarily by interacting with other human beings. 
 
The key move in establishing the social constitution of the human individual, then, is to show 
that such an individual cannot acquire and exercise some basic capacity that is central to his or 
her flourishing as fully human absent her social constitution.  
Once this thesis is established, I then argued that the attempt to understand the nature of 
human sociality solely in terms of modes of interpersonal interaction is inadequate. I engaged 
two groups of philosophers who dissent from this judgment. The first group work in the 
European continental tradition and often criticize the Heideggerian conception of human social 
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existence as failing to appreciate the positive aspects of this existence. Although these critics 
readily affirm the social constitution of the individual, they often object that Heidegger’s 
understanding of this constitution fails to appreciate the positive contribution that interpersonal 
interactions can make in various ways to human life because this understanding (according to 
these critics) unfairly disparages them as anonymous, shallow, and conformist. This dissertation 
(especially Ch. 2) defuses the force of this objection by arguing that this objection stems from a 
common but simplistic interpretation of Heidegger’s view of social normativity (the one) in 
Being and Time. I argued that once we put this existentialist interpretation of this text in its 
rightful place, no more no less, a proper understanding of the Heideggerian conception of the 
social can not only make room for the positive significance of the social, but also illuminate the 
basis on which this significance rests. Thus, the primary mistake of these critics is that they have 
a reductive understanding of Heidegger’s insights about the nature of social normativity and its 
multifaceted ramifications.  
The second group of philosophers who focus on the importance of interpersonal 
interactions work in the Anglo-American analytic tradition and seek to analyze or appeal to them 
in order to account for specific phenomena or resolve certain philosophical problems that interest 
them. In contrast to those in the first group, who emphasize the positive value of interpersonal 
interactions for human flourishing, those in the second group are motivated by explanatory 
concerns in their conception and use of the idea of interpersonal interactions. From the 
standpoint developed in this dissertation, the main problem that troubles philosophers in the 
second group is not that they dissent from any particular conception of the social constitution of 
the individual, whether Heideggerian or otherwise, but that they do not even have this 
constitution in view at all as something significant for their own philosophical concerns. Part II 
of this dissertation showed at great length, however, that their failure to see that this constitution 
can matter for their work significantly diminishes the persuasiveness of their accounts of social-
cum-collective phenomena, or of their attempts to appeal to the social in order to satisfactorily 
handle certain philosophical problems.   
Although this dissertation has been critical for the most part of interpersonal 
interactionism (IPIA) as forming the core of an adequate account of human sociality, we do well 
to remind ourselves of an important point that was emphasized in Ch. 5 in connection with its 
discussion of the normativity of rule-following. This is that our activity of understanding and 
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following norms or rules are practices in the sense that it is each of us as individuals, whether 
consciously or not, who must continually enact and sustain the norms that bind us on particular 
occasions. On this view, we each continually enact and thereby effect the normativity of norms 
or rules by seeing the similarities between the aspects of past circumstances connected to our 
application of norms or rules on those occasions and those of the present that elicit the possible 
continual application of those norms or rules. Consequently, there is not only room for single 
individuals to play their part in effecting normativity by seeing (understanding) these aspects and 
acting in response to them in context, but this normativity cannot bind anything or anyone unless 
it is taken up and effected by individuals from occasion to occasion in particular circumstances. 
To think otherwise amounts to a mistaken return to some form of Platonism about how norms 
bind us or else to an unjustified reification of this process (cf. the “reified community” view of 
normativity). Because much of what we do involves seeing (understanding) situational aspects 
and acting in response to them that are themselves features of interpersonal interactions, the 
attitudes and activities of individuals are vital to sustaining the normativity of norms or rules as 
expressed in and through such interactions. It is just that the normative (normalized) 
intelligibility of these attitudes and activities can never be something that single individuals 
generate, all on their own, through interactions with one another. In short, there continues to be 
an important role for individuals to play with regard to the bindingness of norms or rules, some 
of which does indeed occur in and through interpersonal interactions, provided that the latter are 
understood to be intelligible in terms of the sites to which they inherently belong and apart from 
which they would not have the normative (normalized) significance that they do.  
While this standpoint affirms Pettit’s understanding of what holistic individualism in 
social ontology means, it casts it now under a different light. Recall that this position (as Pettit 
specifies it) holds that there is no incompatibility, on the one hand, between insisting that the 
existence and causal relevance of aggregate social regularities or social forces do not 
compromise intentional psychology and individual agency, and also maintaining, on the other 
hand, that individual agents’ social relations with one another are partly constitutive of their very 
capacity to be thinking intentional agents. According to my Heideggerian modification of Pettit’s 
formulation of holistic individualism, however, we must transform our understanding of these 
social relations so that their intelligibility is no longer understood as something constituted 
through interpersonal interactions, but as something that flows from their social constitution, i.e., 
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their normative (normalized) way of understanding their situations and activities in accordance 
with the public norms that enable them to share a common world. On this view, holistic 
individualism comes to be the view that individual human beings are socially constituted without 
implying that they are thereby under the control of social-structural regularities or social forces 
in ways that threaten their autonomy. It succeeds thus in dislodging some entrenched but 
mistaken assumptions that we often make regarding the social character of human existence. 
More positively, the conception of the social constitution of the human individual that informs 
holistic individualism enables us to make genuine progress in carrying out the difficult but 
worthwhile project of understanding what it is to be human.  
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APPENDIX A. THE DISTINCTNESS OF PETTIT’S INDIVIDUALISM IN RELATION 
TO FIVE QUESTIONS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Pettit emphasizes that his conception of non-reductive individualism in social ontology is 
distinguishable from five other questions (or theses) that often arise and mislead in the debate 
between individualism and collectivism (137-43). These are: (I) the holism thesis; (II) the 
reciprocal influence thesis; (III) the revisability thesis; (IV) the dispensability thesis; and (V) the 
inevitability thesis. I will very briefly discuss his treatment of them as a further way of 
specifying the distinctiveness of Pettit’s individualism. 
(I) The holist thesis concerns the “horizontal” issue in social ontology, i.e., that of 
whether our social relations with one another are constitutive of the possession and exercise of 
some basic capacity that is central for being a human individual. This issue must be distinguished 
from the “vertical” one in social ontology concerning collectivism and individualism. If the 
holist thesis is true (and Pettit argues that it is), then, this claim is non-committal with regard to 
the “vertical” issue. Consequently, one can be a non-reductive individualist in Pettit’s sense 
without also being a social atomist, contrary to conventional wisdom about the supposedly 
inherent connection between individualism and social atomism (see 1.1 and 1.2 for discussion).  
(II) The reciprocal influence thesis holds that collective entities can affect the attitudes 
and behavior of individual agents and vice versa. As examined in the first half of 1.2, the truth of 
this thesis does not imply that the agency of individual human beings is somehow undermined. 
Once we understand how there can be no conflict of separate levels of causal powers between the 
intentional and the social-structural, the thought that there is reciprocal influence between 
collective entities and individual agents is harmless. Collectivists are wrong to believe that the 
capacity of collective entities to constrain the exercise of individual agency implies that the latter 
is compromised. But reductive individualists are also mistaken in insisting that the exercise of 
individual agency tells the complete story about the nature of human social life.  
(III) The revisability thesis is that certain results discovered in the social sciences or in 
everyday communal life can challenge individual agents by compelling them to significantly 
revise their prior assumptions or self-understandings. The idea is that individuals may be 
pressured to change their beliefs and alter their actions even if doing so goes against their 
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judgments, ethical or otherwise.1 No doubt individuals can be so affected in their lives, as we can 
see in the course of human history. But it does not follow that the intentional psychology 
inherent to individual agency is somehow fundamentally disabled on account of this sort of 
coerced revision of individuals’ beliefs and actions. For once again there is no sense in which 
higher-level regularities or forces directly cause the production of this sort of lower-level effects 
in people’s intentional psychology. The individual agents in such circumstances still exercise at 
least the freedom of thought, at least if they have some moral conscience. It is just that the scope 
of their freedom, especially political freedom, is much more regimented and hence limited. In 
order to take the truth of the revisability thesis as seriously undermining individual agency, it 
must preclude the possibility of intentional psychology in general, not just restrict the scope of 
individual agency especially with regard to its exercise in politics. But there is no such 
entailment in light of the truth of the revisability thesis; its truth does not undermine or 
fundamentally compromise the intentional psychology that informs individual agency. (Even 
when Pettit does not explicitly draw the following lesson, what this resolution shows is the 
confusion that results when we conflate the understanding of collectivism as this view figures in 
political philosophy with its understanding as a position in social ontology. Unfortunately, this 
conflation seems to have bedeviled much of the debate concerning “individualism and holism” 
that ensued from Popper’s polemics against what he perceived as totalitarian ways of thinking 
and social-political arrangements.2)            
(IV) The dispensability thesis is that  
while any socially significant event is going to come about because of the actions of this or that individual 
or set of individuals, still no individual makes an indispensable contribution. Had that individual not existed 
or not acted appropriately, still the phenomenon in question would have occurred. It is either the case that 
the individual’s contribution was not a necessary part of the total cause of the phenomenon or that in the 
absence of that individual some other agent would have taken her place. (140)    
 
There are two specific versions of this thesis. First, Durkheim argues that the relative invariance 
of social patterns shows that no activities of a single individual or set of individuals are required 
to necessitate the existence of such patterns. Second, even if social events or phenomena do 
                                                 
1 An extreme example of this is Stanley Milgram’s set of experiments. But a more plausible set of examples may be 
people’s unwitting tolerance of doctrines and policies in fascist or totalitarian regimes like in Nazi Germany, the sort 
of political collectivism practiced in eastern Europe after the end of World War II, or theocratic states like in 
Afghanistan under the Taliban.    
2 Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies; The Poverty of Historicism. For a useful and critical clarification of this 
confusion, see esp. Lukes, “Methodological Individualism Reconsidered”. 
 208 
 
depend on the activities of a single individual or set of individuals for their occurrence (e.g., that 
of a social movement or political revolution), those events or phenomena would have happened 
anyway without the contribution of that individual or set of individuals because there would have 
been some other individual(s) available to occupy the causal role of these individual(s).3 Do 
these two versions of the dispensability thesis undermine individual agency and intentional 
psychology? 
Pettit denies that they do. Regarding the first version of the thesis, the reason is that 
someone like Durkheim could argue that the activities of individuals do not matter for the 
occurrence of the social patterns he is interested to highlight because such patterns are only 
discernable at a high level of abstraction from concrete human activities. The illusion that such 
patterns can still exist and have the significance that they do, absent the contributions of 
individual agents, stems from the nature of statistical analysis. For it is a truism of the science of 
statistics that statistics characterize only a population of individuals, not any single individual. In 
other words, Durkheim can justify the dispensability thesis only by conflating two levels of 
organization and analysis that ought to be held distinct. The fact that statistical analysis of the 
properties characterizing a population does not require the existence or activities of any single 
individuals, or even a set of particular individuals, does not imply that the patterns discerned in 
such analysis can exist above and beyond the existence and activities of all the individuals that 
compose a population. Once again, Durkheim is simply reifying statistical phenomena, treating 
them as if they were self-subsistent things, as opposed to phenomena that can be revealed only 
by using a certain theoretical vocabulary and methodology.  
Regarding the second version of the dispensability thesis, one can respond that it too 
reifies the phenomena it aims to characterize. What is reified in this case are not social statistics, 
but social forces. But the same sort of critical response given to the first version of this thesis can 
be provided. We can grant that it is contingent that someone like Caesar, Napoleon, or Hitler 
happened to be in the world at a certain point in human history and caused certain sequences of 
events to occur. But it took a certain talent and set of political skills, for better or worse for 
human history, for them to have caused the events that they did. It is quite doubtful that such 
events could have occurred absent their individual talents and skills. Their decisions and doings 
                                                 
3 This specification of the dispensability thesis, if true, would undercut the force of the so-called “great men” theory 
of human history.    
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were not necessary to cause these events, but only insofar as no single individual can bring 
about, just on his or her own, the totality of the set of social conditions that provided the context 
for his or her decisions and doings. Such a totality, and the complex of social forces that it 
engendered, cannot as such cause a particular sequence of events to occur, though it is certainly 
plausible to argue that this totality and complex of social forces set the stage for the occurrence 
of this sequence. In any case, even if this second version of the dispensability thesis were true, its 
truth could not possibly override intentional psychology and individual agency. 
Lastly, (V) the inevitability thesis is that 
various features of social life limit the opportunities available to individual agents – they are structural 
constraints on feasible options – in such a way that it is inevitable that agents will act so as to sustain 
certain social constancies. (141f.)    
 
As far as I understand it, this thesis is a social-structural version of the revisability thesis.4 That 
is, it claims that life in a society or community is so regimented that the actual freedom exercised 
by its members does not really amount to much (e.g., the sort of freedom exercised within tight-
knit premodern communities). In other words, the range of opportunities available to its 
members as they live their lives is so limited that this range makes it inevitable that such 
members cannot help but sustain the regimented way of life embodied by such a society or 
community. I suppose the best analogy to a sort of communal existence along these lines is that 
of a bee or ant colony. But the very fact that I must resort to an analogy with the social existence 
of non-human animals already gives the lie to the application of the inevitability thesis to human 
social life. For it is simply hard to imagine how human beings could live in accordance with the 
vision of society or community that is envisaged by the inevitability thesis. Human beings are 
cultural beings. But living as acculturated beings always involves subjection to norms of belief 
and conduct. Human beings are, therefore, beings who are immersed in social norms in their 
lives. But these norms are not in general grounded in their biology, or at least most of their 
normativity does not have such a basis. Given this fact, it is always in principle possible for 
human beings to revise or even violate the norms according to which they live. The exercise of 
freedom is always inherent in the subjection to norms, especially to social norms, on the part of 
human beings. If all this is true, and I submit that it is, the inevitability thesis must be grossly 
implausible if not outright false.  
                                                 
4 It is unclear to me why Pettit distinguishes it from the revisability and dispensability theses.   
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In any case, Pettit’s main concern has been to show how none of these five issues (theses) 
should be identified with the way in which he argues the vertical issue in social ontology should 
be understood: as the issue of whether social-structural regularities or forces can override the 
autonomy that rightly has a central place in our understanding of individual agency and 
intentional psychology. And it should be clear by now how Pettit’s holistic individualism (and, 
for that matter, Little’s methodological localism) can accommodate the grain of truth in 
collectivism and methodological individualism without their excesses.                 
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APPENDIX B. EXPLICATION OF RELEVANT HEIDEGGERIAN TERMINOLOGY IN 
BEING AND TIME 
An entity (Seiendes) is anything that is, in all its different temporal and modal permutations (e.g., 
anything that was or will be, that can or could be, could have been, that may or may not be, etc.). 
Rocks, quarks, money, the Big Bang, mathematical formulae, physical laws, ghosts, dreams, 
swampmen, God, society, evolution, animals, human beings, etc., are all entities. By contrast, 
being (Sein) always refers to that which determines an entity as what and how it is at all. What is 
important is to understand that whatever being is, it is not a substance, form, event, process, 
metaphysical foundation, original ground, first cause, or God. Above all, being is not any entity 
or the totality of entities, but that which lets entities be what and how they are as such 
(Heidegger’s so-called “ontological difference” between being and entities). The being of an 
entity or a domain of entities must never be hypostasized and understood as referring to any 
(particular) thing or collection of things. It is rather that which enables things of any sort to make 
sense in general. Most importantly, letting entities be does not mean causally bringing them into 
existence. Put more positively, being is closely bound up with intelligibility, in the sense of 
serving as that in virtue or on the basis of which entities are understood as entities at all. With 
this working distinction between entities and being in place, we can now make sense of the 
difference in status between the “ontic” and “ontological” characteristics of something: Ontic 
determinations specify the factual or specific features of entities, whereas ontological 
determinations characterize the (way of) being of entities.  
Dasein is fundamentally distinct from other entities because it is the entity that 
understands being. As far as we know, it is the only entity that understands being, in the sense of 
being explicated above. A human being is Dasein (or “daseins” [verb]) only insofar as it 
understands being. Thus, those human beings who lack such an understanding are not Dasein 
(i.e., they do not “dasein”) – they do not exist as and by being-in-the-world. What their status is, 
especially their moral status, is a related but separate question. Consequently, the general terms 
‘Dasein’ and ‘human being’ or ‘person’ are often, but not always, coextensive.       
There can be ontological determinations of entities that are either categorical or 
existential. Categorical determinations (“categories”) articulate the being of entities that are not 
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Dasein; such entities do not in Heidegger’s terminology “exist” in the sense of having an 
understanding of being as a matter of their ontological constitution. By contrast, existential 
determinations (“existentials”) articulate the way of being of entities that understand being, i.e., 
entities that exist in the way of being Dasein.  
Lastly, the distinction between “existential” and “existentiell” applies to the sort of 
understanding that a human being qua Dasein has of itself; this distinction applies thus to the 
individual self-understanding of a human being qua Dasein. An existential understanding of 
oneself concerns that in virtue or on the basis of which a human being can exist as Dasein at all; 
it is structural and constitutive of what it is to be Dasein as such, regardless of any human 
being’s particular individual self-understanding. By contrast, an existentiell understanding of 
oneself involves the concrete, actual way in which a human being understands his or her 
particular existence; it is a personal and contingent understanding of who he or she is in the 
course of actually living his or her life, though it is, of course, not optional that he or she has 
some existentiell understanding of who he or she is in actual life.   
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